Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

LIVERPOOL EXTENSION BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday next.

Oral Answers to Questions — BORSTAL INSTITUTIONS (DISCIPLINE)

Earl Winterton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he wall order an official inquiry into the present methods of maintaining discipline in Borstal establishments in view of the representations on the subject made by the Prison Officers' Association.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): I have recently received the report of a committee appointed for this purpose among others. The report is being published, but I am not yet in a position to add to the reply which I gave to a Question by the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) on 7th June.

Earl Winterton: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean by that answer that the statement or suggestions made by the Association to which I referred in my Question have been considered by this committee?

Mr. Ede: No, Sir. The committee sat and compiled its report before this meeting was held. The report deals with the issues which were raised at the meeting.

Earl Winterton: Yes, but the point is that this very responsible body, which he and I know, having at different times had the honour of addressing it, has made some very serious charges about the state of discipline, and certain suggestions.

Will all that be taken into consideration before the right hon. Gentleman acts on the report of the committee?

Mr. Ede: Yes, Sir. May I say that, before making those statements in public, they made no representations to me about the matter? The Home Office are always willing to listen to their views on such a subject and it might have been better if they had approached me first, and then, if I had not heeded them, had made a statement in public.

Oral Answers to Questions — POLICE (ANIMAL PROTECTION)

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will facilitate the formation of a council of police officials for the protection of animals, such as that which is in operation in Holland and has been widely appreciated by the judiciary and chiefs of police there, and details of which have been sent him.

Mr. Ede: I have read with interest the document which my hon. Friend was good enough to send me, but I do not think that a council of police officers on the lines suggested would be appropriate to conditions in this country.

Mr. Arthur Colegate: Does not the Home Secretary agree that the work done by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in conjunction with the police provides adequate protection?

Mr. Ede: The liaison between police officers and the members of that Society makes for the proper administration of the law.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL DEFENCE

Strength

Mr. Key: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the strength of the Civil Defence Corps and of the Auxiliary Fire Service in England and Wales on 31st May.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas): The figures are 143,000 and 10,100 respectively. I will circulate the detailed figures in HANSARD.

Mr. H. Hynd: Does that represent a satisfactory improvement?

Mr. de Freitas: It is a steady improvement, but of course my right hon. Friend is not satisfied.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Am I right in saying that recruitment in the rescue and pioneer sections is particularly unsatisfactory? Is the hon. Gentleman taking any special action to improve this position?

Mr. de Freitas: It is particularly unsatisfactory in those sections. We are looking into that matter.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: How far does the number fall short of the number required?

Mr. de Freitas: It is between one-third and one-quarter of what we want.

Following are the figures:


CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS


Region
Increase during May, 1951
Total Strength at 31st May, 1951
Strength per thousand of population


Eastern
713
16,730
5·45


Southern
495
13,849
5·23


South-Western
1,090
14,873
4·94


South-Eastern
409
11,065
4·32


Northern
546
10,410
3·31


Midland
571
13,136
2·97


Wales
220
7,525
2·90


North-Western
542
18,001
2·82


North Midland
293
9,416
2·73


London
656
19,740
2·34


North-Easten
262
8,448
2·05



5,797
143,193
Average for England &amp; Wales 3·26




AUXILIARY FIRE SERVICE


Increse during May· 1951
Total at 31st May,1951


208
10,072

Sir Ian Fraser: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what

progress is being made in recruiting for Civil Defence.

Mr. de Freitas: The strength of the Civil Defence Corps in England and Wales was doubled in the last seven months. It is now 143,000 which is just over three per thousand of the population.

Sir I. Fraser: How far does that fall below the minimum necessary for safety?

Mr. de Freitas: As I said in reply to an earlier supplementary question, the provisional peace-time strength is between three and four times as high as that.

Brigadier Head: Are not the main obstacles to Civil Defence recruiting at the present time the absence of an age ceiling for liability to recall to the Services and the absence of a decision about recruitment to the Home Guard?

Mr. de Freitas: I do not agree with that. The subject has been dealt with on more than one occasion by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence and others, from this Box.

Squadron Leader Kinghorn: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many recruits for Civil Defence have been enrolled during the last six months in East Anglia.

Mr. de Freitas: In the Eastern Region 7,100, half of whom are in East Anglia proper, that is, Norfolk and Suffolk.

Squadron Leader Kinghorn: In view of the gratifying results which we naturally expect from East Anglia, would my hon. Friend say how those figures compare with the overall figures for the rest of the country?

Mr. de Freitas: The Eastern Region as a whole is top of the regions, but there is still room for an increase, especially in certain sections of the Corps.

Light Aircraft

Mr. Ian Harvey: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement with regard to the possible use of light aircraft for Civil Defence operations.

Mr. de Freitas: Light aircraft may well play a useful part in Civil Defence and we are taking this fact into account in planning to meet the effects of enemy attack.

Uniforms

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is in a position to make a statement regarding the issue of uniforms to members of the Civil Defence Corps.

Mr. de Freitas: During the next year or two a considerable amount of cloth will be required for the Armed Forces and it is unlikely that the Civil Defence Corps will get all they need for uniforms. As I told the House in April the issue of uniforms has been suspended. My right hon. Friend is consulting the local authority associations as to which of these three alternatives should be followed:

 uniforms should be issued, as they become available, to all members of the Corps;
 uniforms should be issued to certain selected members of the Corps;
 uniforms should not be issued but should be put in stock as a reserve in case of war.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether protective clothing against atomic radiation is included in "uniforms"?

Mr. de Freitas: Except for certain specialist sections of the Corps, it is.

Inter-communication System (Wireless)

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether wireless sets will be available for inter-communication between the Civil Defence central war-room in London, the regional war-rooms, and local authority headquarters.

Mr. de Freitas: I do not think it would be in the national interest to disclose details of our inter-communication system in war time, but I can assure the hon. and gallant Member that wireless will be used whenever it is practicable on technical grounds.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: That is a rather uninformative reply. Does the hon. Gentleman realise that wireless is used in the Army from the highest command to the lowest unit, by the police, and even by taxi drivers? Does he also realise that a message is no alternative if

there is a breakdown of telephonic communications between regional headquarters and London, and will he please take urgent steps to see that the highest form of wireless inter-communication is installed?

Mr. de Freitas: I certainly appreciate that the use of wireless saves time, but the appropriate wave bands have to be available.

Mobile Columns

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what progress has been made with the organisation of Civil Defence mobile columns: whether they are to be equipped with wireless for inter-communication; and what vehicles will be available to them.

Mr. de Freitas: Plans for an experimental mobile column are far advanced, but I cannot yet make a detailed statement.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Can the hon. Gentleman say what vehicles are to be used? Will they be commandeered vehicles or will their own vehicles be issued to them?

Mr. de Freitas: They will have all the vehicles they require and they will be issued to them, but I am not yet ready to make a detailed statement.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Considering that these mobile columns are one of the key features of the new organisation of Civil Defence for dealing with atomic attacks, could the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that he will press on with this important problem?

Mr. de Freitas: Yes, Sir. It is because this is an entirely new conception that we are not launching it until we have worked it out carefully, especially with the military.

Mr. Ian Harvey: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his reply is almost identical with those he has given in reply to similar questions over a long period and that the general impression—which is growing—is that there is no sound Government policy?

Mr. de Freitas: I would certainly not agree with that.

Oral Answers to Questions — LONDON TAXICAB FARES (INCREASE)

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he has received arising from the recent increase in London taxi fares.

Mr. Ede: I have received only one letter of protest.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the charge which he has authorised is fixed, and whether it is the maximum or minimum charge; and will the right hon. Gentleman—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member's original Question asked whether the Home Secretary had received representations and not for details of taxicab charges.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the present rate is of financial advantage to drivers and owners of London taxicabs?

Mr. Ede: I can only give the statistics for which the hon. Gentleman asked. But I have discovered that the present London rate is below the rate charged in several provincial cities.

Mr. William Teeling: Is the Home Secretary aware that in at any rate one town, Brighton, the rate is very much lower? It is far, far cheaper. Can the right hon. Gentleman also state, as he has only received one letter, whether he would make it public that he is quite willing to receive a deputation; because many of us receive masses of complaints from the ordinary drivers?

Mr. Ede: It is well known that I can be approached.

Commander Noble: Was the letter of protest from a taxi driver or from a passenger?

Mr. Ede: I think it was from a passenger.

Oral Answers to Questions — DOGS (SHEEP WORRYING)

Mr. Hurd: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many cases of sheep worrying by dogs have been proved before magistrates' courts in the past year; and in how many instances the magistrates have admonished the

owners without ordering the dogs to be destroyed.

Mr. Ede: I regret that this information is not available.

Mr. Hurd: As the worrying of sheep by dogs has become such a serious menace in many districts, will the right hon. Gentleman see if it is possible to provide these figures so that we may know whether there has been an improvement or whether the position is deteriorating?

Mr. Ede: I hope that the publicity of this Question and answer will attract the attention of magistrates to the public interest in the matter.

Earl Winterton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there have been a number of other Questions on this subject in which attention has been called to the great damage caused to the farming community and the intense cruelty occasioned to the sheep, but that nothing has happened? There has been an astonishing absence of any statement by any of the so-called animal protection societies, who are apparently more concerned with the interests of the dogs than the poor tortured sheep. Will he circularise magistrates on the subject?

Mr. Ede: I do not think that a circular would have any marked effect. I can only hope that any magistrates who may have been reluctant to do their duty in the past will notice the opinions expressed in the House.

Mr. Bossom: Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire into the terrible situation on the Romney Marsh, Kent, where great cruelty is being caused to sheep? Attacks by tremendous numbers of dogs are still occurring. Can the right hon. Gentleman do something to stop this?

Mr. Ede: I will make inquiries into it.

Oral Answers to Questions — MAGISTRATES' POWERS (REMANDS)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what official steps are being taken to ensure that all magistrates are informed of a recent statement by the Lord Chancellor on the use of their power to remand persons in custody.

Mr. Ede: I am causing a copy of the Lord Chancellor's statement to be sent to clerks to justices for information.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: As the purpose of the Lord Chancellor's statement was to provide some useful guidance to magistrates, would it not be better to circularise all magistrates personally? Would not that be more in the public interest, as many magistrates do not read Parliamentary reports either in the OFFICIAL REPORT or in the daily newspapers?

Mr. Ede: If they do not do that, I cannot see why they should read a circular sent to them. If the circular is sent to the clerk to the justices, he will at least mention it at the next meeting of the justices and, I hope, in most cases will be able to read it.

Sir Herbert Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Sankey, gave to me in 1933 in this building in relation to a case of a remand, a point of view entirely in conflict with that of the present Lord Chancellor? As many justices have been deceived by the instructions sent out by the Lord Chancellor in 1933, is it not very desirable that justices should be in no doubt whatever about the present situation?

Mr. Ede: I hope that the circular will put all doubt out of their minds. I shall not circulate any report of the conversation between the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams), and the then Lord Chancellor.

Sir H. Williams: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that both Lord Sankey was, and the present Lord Chancellor is, a Socialist?

Mr. Blyton: As the Lord Chancellor said that an error of judgment had been committed in the "three tulips case" at South Shields, will the Home Secretary recommend His Majesty to exercise his prerogative to enable the whole or the major portion of the fine to be refunded?

Mr. Ede: I should not like to make a statement on that point at the moment.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will introduce legislation to limit the power of magistrates to

remand in custody for more than four weeks children awaiting trial in juvenile courts.

Mr. Ede: Circumstances vary so much that legislation for this purpose would not in my view be desirable. Any person who is aggrieved by the action of the court may apply to a judge in chambers for release on bail or to the High Court for an order requiring the magistrates to hear and determine his case.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these safeguards are not normally or easily available to the ordinary people concerned in these cases, and that the case of a 14-year-old Brixton schoolboy which I brought to his notice proves that children can be remanded in custody for grossly excessive periods while awaiting trial? Is there any reason why 28 days in custody for a child—

Mr. Speaker: We must keep to short supplementary questions.

Mr. MacColl: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that under the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, the period of remand was limited to three weeks? Is he also aware that many magistrates find that that length of time a great handicap to them in dealing with the question of juvenile delinquency?

Mr. Ede: This is a very difficult matter and I am convinced that the majority of magistrates exercise wisely the discretion vested in them.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Will my right hon. Friend make it clear that the remarks made by the Lord Chancellor the other day, to which he referred in a previous answer, apply equally in the remand of juvenile prisoners as they apply in the case of adult prisoners, and that it is quite improper in either case to use the power to remand as a form of penalty?

Mr. Ede: Yes, I agree with that, and it is probably even more improper in the case of juveniles than in the case of adults.

Oral Answers to Questions — ALIENS

Polish Community (Activities)

Mr. Harry Wallace: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that certain members of the Polish community in the United


Kingdom are engaged in the practice of collecting for transmission to the Polish Government information about other members of the Polish community; and since such activities are not conducive to the public good, whether he will exercise his power to deport the persons concerned.

Mr. Ede: Yes, Sir. The activities to which my hon. Friend refers have for some time been known
to me, and I take a serious view of them. Thirteen persons concerned have been identified and I have made deportation orders against them on the ground that their continued presence in this country is not conducive to the public good. One has already left the country and others will be deported as soon as practicable. I hope that this reply will be a warning to Poles and nationals of other Communist-controlled countries who are resident in the United Kingdom to be on their guard against approaches by persons who may be collecting information for the Governments of those countries. Any such approaches should be reported to the police.

American Children (Channel Swim)

Brigadier Medlicott: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if his attention has been drawn to the proposal to allow two American children, aged four and five years respectively, to attempt to swim the English Channel this summer and to prepare for this attempt at a holiday camp in Great Britain; and if, with a view to preventing the exploitation and commercialisation of these two young children in this country, he will refuse permission to the parents of the children to land in Great Britain.

Mr. Ede: The information available, which is derived from Press reports, does not suggest that there are likely to be grounds for refusing leave to land to this family. But if they come to this country it will be for the immigration officer to ascertain what are the intentions of the parents and, if it is decided to grant leave to land, to attach suitable conditions.

Brigadier Medlicott: Is the Home Secretary aware that it has been stated that these children are being flown to Europe tomorrow, and that there will be widespread support on both sides of the

Atlantic for anything which can be done to prevent what, according to our standards, would certainly be cruelty to children?

Sir H. Williams: Is it not the case that the elder of these children is an infant prodigy and has swum successfully many miles, and that their father, who is a trainer in swimming, wants to develop these children?

Mr. Ede: That may well be so, but I cannot help thinking that swimming the Channel at that early age is rather a severe test even for an infant prodigy.

Oral Answers to Questions — IMPRISONED SCIENTISTS

Mr. Fernyhough: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how far facilities have been given to the prisoners Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May to carry on scientific research work for the benefit of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Ede: These prisoners have not been engaged on any form of scientific research for the purposes of His Majesty's Government; no approaches to that end have been made to them; and they have not been in contact with other scientists engaged in research on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Fernyhough: Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that despite their special scientific knowledge the two prisoners will not be released earlier than other prisoners serving a similar sentence?

Mr. Ede: I am not aware of any grounds to justify my advising any interference with the due course of the sentences passed on these two men by the courts.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Could not these inventors be set to scientific work to devise a fool-proof screen for the Foreign Office?

Oral Answers to Questions — CRUELTY TO CHILDREN (PENALTIES)

Mr. Gammans: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware of the number of recent cases


of ill treatment and neglect of small children and of the growing feeling that the penalties provided by existing legislation are inadequate; and what action he now proposes to take.

Mr. Ede: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Wimbledon (Mr. Black) on 22nd February.

Mr. Gammans: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise how strong the feeling in the country is about repeated revolting cruelties to children? Does he realise that his previous reply gave an impression, rightly or wrongly, that he is complacent about it?

Mr. Ede: I am not complacent about the matter. I welcome the much heavier sentences which I have seen passed in some recent cases, but the magistrates must be left some discretion to discriminate between the various cases in accordance with the evidence which they hear in the courts.

Mr. Kenneth Thompson: What recommendations have been made to the right hon. Gentleman with regard to action in cases of cruelty or neglect of children in their own homes?

Mr. Ede: Most of the cases to which I have been alluding, and which I believe the hon. Member for Hornsey (Mr. Gammans) had in mind, are cases where the cruelty has been inflicted by the parents on children, and my reply to the supplementary question was intended to deal with precisely that class of case.

Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Is the attitude of the right hon. Gentleman that it is up to the magistrates to employ to the full the powers which they already have? If that is so, will he bear in mind that the standard by which the magistrates judge is set by the maximum penalty to be inflicted and that the maximum is imposed in only the very worst cases? Ought not the maximum to be increased to enable heavier sentences to be imposed in other cases?

Mr. Ede: I have frequently told the House the maximum sentence which can be inflicted on indictment, and I think it is adequate to cover this class of case.

Oral Answers to Questions — U.N.O. OFFICIALS (VOTING)

Lieut.-Commander Clark Hutchison: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will introduce legislation to extend to British subjects, who are permanent officials of the Secretariat of the United Nations organisation, and their wives, the service qualification for voting at general elections which is already applicable to prescribed classes of persons in the service of the Crown.

Mr. Ede: No, Sir.

Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: Will the right hon. Gentleman give further thought to this matter when considering the next Bill to amend the Representation of the People Act?

Mr. Ede: When the time comes for such an amending Bill, this is one of the matters which will be considered.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

Mentally Defective Children (Accommodation)

Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: asked the Minister of Health what steps are being taken to increase the accommodation for mentally defective children.

The Minister of Health (Mr. Marquand): The attention of regional hospital boards has been drawn to the urgent need to increase this accommodation; and since the appointed day a number of new schemes have been approved or are under active consideration.

Mr. Hirst: Is the Minister aware that, whatever they may be, these facilities are quite inadequate, and that appalling delays are occurring? I know of one delay dating back to December when the authorities of the Shipley Council made application and there have been many cases since then. If I send him details, will he give full consideration to the matter?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, Sir, I will, but I assure the House that I am well aware of the difficult and awkward situation here.

Mr. K. Thompson: Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that there is no undue delay in inspecting these


children, which is the earliest stage of sending them to the appropriate place, so that their case can be considered as soon as possible for the proper treatment?

Mr. Marquand: I am not aware of undue delay in classification.

Cortisone

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: asked the Minister of Health what quantity of the new American drug cortisone has been imported during the quarter ended 31st March, 1951; and how far this amount has fallen short of medical requirements.

Mr. Marquand: One thousand five hundred grammes of cortisone were purchased by my Department from the American manufacturers during the quarter ended 31st March, 1951. As the use of this scarce drug is still experimental, requirements cannot be estimated, but we are importing all the manufacturers can make available.

Sir T. Moore: But does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that, as far as is known at present, this drug is the only known one that can relieve the painful malady of arthritis, and will he not either obtain the release of further dollars for such quantities of the drug as are available, or else encourage its manufacture in this country?

Mr. Marquand: It is not a shortage of dollars that is the limitation; there is export control in the United States of America.

Hearing Aids

Mr. Ralph Morley: asked the Minister of Health the reasons for the long delay in the production and supply of bone conductor hearing aids.

Mr. Marquand: Research resources had at first to be concentrated on the production and improvement of the air-conduction aid, the different models of which have now been found to meet the needs of the great majority of people requiring an aid. The production of a satisfactory bone-conduction aid raises difficult technical problems involving considerable research, but encouraging progress is now being made.

Mr. Morley: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in the last two years many

hon. Members have received many letters from their constituents complaining of the inconvenience of not being able to get these aids? Will he hasten their production as rapidly as possible?

Mr. Marquand: I think we are now at the point where the production of models for clinical trials is possible, and if those trials are satisfactory we shall certainly press on with rapid production.

Mr. George Thomas: asked the Minister of Health what arrangements he has made for the local manufacture of ear moulds at Cardiff in order that the supply of hearing aids might be facilitated.

Mr. Marquand: Ear moulds for use with Medresco hearing aids are normally supplied to distribution centres under contracts placed by my Department. Trial arrangements for local manufacture by a firm in Cardiff have been discontinued on grounds of expense.

Mr. Wills: asked the Minister of Health what is the average length of the waiting periods between application and delivery of priority and non-priority hearing aids in the South-West Hospital Region; and how these compare with other regions.

Mr. Marquand: Average figures of this kind are not available, and it would require a disproportionate expenditure to obtain them.

Mr. Wills: Is the right hon. Gentleman getting any effects from the adjustment of allocation he promised to make to the Bristol Hospital on 3rd May, or is it a fact that Bristol are still dealing with 1,948 patients, as I was informed in a letter on 22nd May?

Mr. Marquand: The new allocation has been made and, therefore, there must be an improvement in the supply in Bristol, but it must be borne in mind in making comparisons that there were particularly heavy initial demands in Bristol in 1948.

Mr. Wills: What is the meaning of "priority" in this case? Priority seems to give a false indication to the patient that he is to get exceptional treatment.

Mr. Marquand: Priority patients receive their aids in, at most, five months.

Premature Baby Unit (University College Hospital)

Mr. Eric Fletcher: asked the Minister of Health why the premature baby unit at University College Hospital is being closed; and whether he will institute an inquiry into the subject of premature births and mortality resulting therefrom.

Mr. Marquand: This unit will not be closed. Investigation of the general problem of premature births has already been made by a Joint Committee of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the British Paediatric Association, as part of an inquiry into neonatal mortality and morbidity and I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of the committee's report.

Medical Auxiliaries

Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth: asked the Minister of Health whether he accepts the recommendations of the majority Report of the Cope Committees.

Mr. Marquand: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave on 19th April to the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo).

Mr. Linstead: asked the Minister of Health when he proposes to begin discussions with the professions covered by the Cope Committees on Medical Auxiliaries.

Mr. Marquand: I hope to do so shortly.

Mr. Linstead: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate the great anxiety which is felt in these professions about their future, and will he press on as quickly as possible with the discussions with them?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, Sir, but altogether there are 122 recommendations in these Reports. They have to be considered carefully, and the practicability of legislation to carry them out has to be gone into before we can actually meet the organisations concerned. We will, however, press on as fast as possible.

Mrs. Hill: asked the Minister of Health why he has refused to recognise the qualification of the Joint Council of Chiropodists of Great Britain for new applicants for posts in the National Health Service.

Mr. Marquand: One of the recommendations of the Cope Committees, which were appointed to review, inter alia, the training and qualification of medical auxiliaries in the National Health Service, was that chiropodists, to be qualified for employment in the Service, should not only have passed the appropriate examinations but should also have been trained in suitable schools. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and I have accepted this recommendation as a criterion for the selection of chiropodist entrants to the National Health Service in future.

Mr. Fort: asked the Minister of Health in view of the shortage of almoners in the National Health Service, what action he proposes to take to encourage recruitment into this profession.

Mr. Marquand: The matter is being considered, but I am doubtful whether it will be decided to take any special steps in the present circumstances.

Mr. Fort: Is the right hon. Gentleman discussing the matter both with the universities who train students in social science and also with the Institute of Almoners with a view to overcoming the present shortage in the latter profession?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, Sir, I am considering what the Cope Committees reported about this matter and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education may also have to be consulted.

Chemists (Payment)

Mr. Summers: asked the Minister of Health the total amount still due and unpaid by him to chemists for services rendered under the National Health Service Act.

Mr. Marquand: It is estimated that at 30th April, 1951, the total amount due and unpaid was of the order of £5 million. A substantial supplementary payment is accordingly being made this month.

Mr. Summers: Is the Minister aware that there is an overwhelming number of chemists who have something like £350 to £400 owing to them and that this is an intolerable burden when added to the many other difficulties with which they have to contend?

Mr. Marquand: I know that some of the accounts are not finally completed but,


on the other hand, payments in advance are regularly made and I am advised that even if the pricings were up to date the chemists would have £3 million to £3½ million owing to them at the end of any month.

Mr. Nally: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that, making all the allowance that might be made for the fall in the value of the pound, the average private chemist over the last three years, in terms of real pound value, has made more money—I do not complain about that—and has had a higher income than ever before?

Mr. Speaker: That is not the Question. The Question asks what is unpaid.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: What is it that prevents a Government Department, with the great funds at its disposal, from carrying on the ordinary honest principles of business and paying their debts when they become due?

Mr. Marquand: We cannot, obviously, pay at once without checking the figures in a matter where public funds are concerned.

Mr. Summers: asked the Minister of Health what is the last date up to which chemists have been paid in full for their work under the National Health Service.

Mr. Marquand: Substantial payments on account are made each month. Executive Councils have been authorised to make final settlements up to June, 1950, in all cases and up to July, 1950, in about 70 per cent. of cases.

Mr. Summers: Is the Minister aware that it is very unsatisfactory indeed for 12 months' business to remain unsettled and uncompleted, and is he making any progress in reducing the present time lag of 12 months between the issue of the account and its final settlement?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, Sir. Progress is definitely being made, and we are not far now from the point of being able in any one month to keep pace with all the accounts for that month.

Mr. Linstead: Is the Minister's pricing system now catching up with the arrears, so that, once those arrears are cleared off, current prices will run with current needs?

Mr. Marquand: I cannot say that the arrears are actually being overcome. My information is that they are almost at the point of being overtaken.

Mr. Nally: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that in at least 5 per cent. of cases where accounts are rendered by chemists, there is very good reason to suppose that the accounts need looking at? Despite the pressure from the Opposition, will my right hon. Friend not prevent his Department from ensuring that the National Health Service is not made into a racket by private enterprise?

Mr. Marquand: The situation is that with the institution of the free supply to all persons of drugs of this kind, there was an enormous increase in the number of prescriptions. It is not possible, with the numbers of competent staff available, immediately to overtake those arrears, but the chemists themselves are not at any serious disadvantage because these payments are regularly made in addition to payments on account.

Mr. Summers: Are we to understand from the Minister's reply that he can hold out no prospect of the arrears being overtaken and that he will be content merely to complete the pricing of these goods some 12 months after they were supplied?

Mr. Marquand: No, Sir. That would be an incorrect deduction to draw from what I have said.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: Is the Minister taking action to improve the existing machinery, because even if he pays off the outstanding arrears for the last 12 months other arrears will be accumulating and with the rise in prices the time lag will become even greater?

Mr. Marquand: That is a perfectly fair question. As I have said, progress is being made in dealing with these arrears.

St. Luke's Hospital (Transferred Beds)

Commander Noble: asked the Minister of Health when he expects to make the alternative arrangements for the 60 beds no longer available in St. Luke's Hospital owing to the decision of the regional board, approved by him, to transfer certain wards to the Chelsea Hospital for Women for pathological laboratory


work; and whether this alternative accommodation will be available before this transfer is started.

Mr. Marquand: I regret that I cannot yet add to the reply given to the hon. and gallant Member on 31st May.

Commander Noble: In view of the fact that the Minister told me a short time ago that there were over 1,300 on the waiting lists for chronic sick beds in London, will he bear in mind that it would be a very good thing if these alternative arrangements were made before the wards were actually taken over?

Mr. Marquand: Yes, I will bear that in mind. I understand that the Regional Board was having a meeting to discuss that yesterday.

Mr. Linstead: Has the right hon. Gentleman earmarked accommodation for this purpose, and are there identifiable beds which he hopes to put into use?

Mr. Marquand: I should require notice of that question.

Medical Teaching Centre, Cardiff

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Minister of Health what amount of money he has sanctioned the United Cardiff Hospitals governors to offer as prize money in a national competition for architects to submit a plan for the new 800 bed medical teaching centre at Heath Park, Cardiff.

Mr. Marquand: The question is under consideration. No amount has yet been sanctioned.

Mr. Thomas: In view of the fact that the United Cardiff Hospital governors have given publicity to their desire that prize money shall be on a substantial scale, will my right hon. Friend see that while the hospitals are cutting down in other important aspects, they will not get out of proportion in this matter?

Mr. Marquand: I am sure that they will not get out of proportion. Discussions will go on with my technical advisers and the Royal Institute of British Architects. We must, on the other hand, bear in mind that we want good designs and we must hold out an attractive prize to get them.

Mr. Thomas: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the successful

architect will in any case have a substantial commission apart from this prize money?

Caernarvon and Anglesey Hospital Committee (Appointment)

Mr. William Elwyn Jones: asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that, contrary to the terms of the advertisement inviting applications for the post of part-time consultant physician to serve the Caernarvon and Anglesey Hospital Management Committee group fixed on Bangor, a person unable to speak or understand the Welsh language has been appointed by the Welsh Regional Hospital Board; and what action he proposes to take in the matter in exercise of his statutory powers.

Mr. Marquand: It is the practice of the Welsh Regional Hospital Board to indicate through their advertisements for certain appointments that where the professional and other qualifications of rival candidates are adjudged equal, preference will be given to a Welsh speaking candidate. The assessment of these qualifications is a function of the Reginal Hospital Board as advised by an Appointments Advisory Committee. I understand that the normal practice was followed in the particular appointment in question.

Mr. Elwyn Jones: Is my right hon. Friend not aware of the very grave misgiving about this appointment which has been expressed in the form of resolutions by local authorities, and that this person, however well qualified he may be otherwise, does not have the essential qualification of being able to speak to his patients?

Mr. Marquand: I should be surprised to hear that there were widespread misgivings as the result of an appointment made by the Welsh Board to look after Welsh interests.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Can the right hon. Gentleman explain how and why this unfortunate committee is "fixed on Bangor"?

Rheumatism (Treatment)

Brigadier Medlicott: asked the Minister of Health if, in view of the fact that there are understood to be between


two and three million sufferers from rheumatism in its various forms in the United Kingdom, of whom a large proportion are dwellers in the country, he will give greater priority to research into the causes of the disease, and to the treatment and rehabilitation of rheumatic cases.

Mr. Marquand: I am very much alive to the importance of this problem. Special research and treatment centres for chronic rheumatism have already been set up in many of the hospital regions, and this will be developed as fast as medical and other resources allow.

Brigadier Medlicott: Is the Minister aware that this painful complaint, which is responsible for the loss of a great number of working hours, appears to be on the increase, and will he do all he possibly can to keep pace with this problem?

Mr. Marquand: I should require notice to answer whether or not it is on the increase; but we certainly intend to continue to develop research in this field.

Spectacles

Brigadier Medlicott: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware of the unnecessary expense which is being caused by the supplying of complete new spectacles in those cases where the new lenses could be fitted to the old frame; and if he will take steps to encourage the more economical method to be followed whenever possible.

Mr. Marquand: Opticians are required to satisfy themselves before supplying a person with new spectacles that he has no suitable frame which could be used for the new lenses. The charges recently imposed for new frames supplied should add an additional incentive to economy here.

Birmingham Hospital Board (Chairman)

Mr. Baird: asked the Minister of Health what are the qualifications of the newly appointed Chairman of the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board for that appointment.

Mr. Marquand: The Chairman has had long experience of hospital and health work, and since the inception of the

National Health Service has been Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Board and of an important hospital management committee.

Mr. Baird: Does my right hon. Friend realise that this appointment caused widespread disappointment in the Midlands and will he tell me why the present vice-chairman of the Board with even better qualifications, being an alderman of Birmingham City Council, chairman of its Finance Committee and leader of the Labour group, was overlooked for this appointment?

Mr. Marquand: No, Sir, I am not prepared to make comparisons between individuals in this way. I am, of course, aware, as we must all be that whenever appointments are made some people may be disappointed.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this appointment was generally welcomed in Birmingham because of the outstanding record in health administration of Mr. Grosvenor, notably his maintenance of the high standard of the Birmingham health services and hospitals during the difficult time of the war?

Mr. Marquand: I am hoping that this exchange across the Floor of the House will not give the impression that any party consideration entered into the appointment.

Mr. Baird: asked the Minister of Health if his attention has been drawn to the speech of the Chairman of the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board on 7th June, in which he attacked his Department for its opposition to the Voluntary Leagues of Hospital Friends; and if he will appoint a new chairman.

Mr. Marquand: I have seen a newspaper report, the terms of which I naturally regret, but I think that the Chairman must be under some misapprehension which I shall endeavour to clear up.

Mr. Baird: Will my right hon. Friend appreciate that this gentleman is one of the most reactionary Tories of Birmingham and has always been an enemy of the National Health Service?

Hospital Management Committees (Accounts)

Mr. Vosper: asked the Minister of Health what arrangements exist to make available to the public the contents of the annual accounts of hospital management committees after their presentation to Parliament.

Mr. Marquand: Management committees are free to publish their accounts after the national accounts have been presented to Parliament, and some of them do so.

Mr. Vosper: Could the Minister do anything to ensure that more of them do so, because it is difficult to get the public to take a lively interest in hospital accounts if they do not see the accounts?

Mr. Marquand: I think I can leave it to their discretion, but no doubt their attention may be called to the matter by this exchange of question and answer.

Major Guy Lloyd: Could one of the reasons be that the enormous amount of money spent on administration so far exceeds that spent on the real welfare of the hospitals that the Government would not like to publish the figures?

Mr. Marquand: That could not be the reason because the statement is not justified by the facts.

Mr. G. Thomas: Will my right hon. Friend suggest that other hospitals do what is done at Cardiff, hold public meetings at which these things can be considered? They are well attended at Cardiff.

Sir H. Williams: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what is the time lag between the submission of the accounts to a hospital group and submission to him before they are published to Parliament? Does he realise that there is an immense delay?

Mr. Marquand: I could not say without notice.

Hospital Estimates

Sir I. Fraser: asked the Minister of Health what steps he is taking to ensure that the cuts in hospital estimates now being imposed do not adversely affect the interests of the patients.

Mr. Marquand: The reduction in estimates still allows, of course, for a substantial increase in hospital expenditure and there is, in my view, no reason at all why the interests of patients should be adversely affected.

Oral Answers to Questions — PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Mr. Baker White: asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that the President of the United States of America has established a Psychological Warfare Board headed by Mr. Gordon Gray, the Secretary of the Army; and what steps His Majesty's Government now propose to take to establish a parallel organisation in this country.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Herbert Morrison): I have been asked to reply. Yes, Sir. I am aware of the setting up of this Board. But I have not yet received details of its function, and can therefore express no view as to the need to set up a parallel organisation in this country. I understand that Mr. Gray ceased to be Secretary of the Army some time ago.

Mr. Baker White: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Board's functions have been fully published in the American Press and that its broad purpose is to counter Communist aggression other than military aggression? Does he not think it highly desirable that we should have a parallel organisation in this country?

Mr. Morrison: I think it is a need that requires to be met and I think we are meeting it. It does not follow that we should do it in exactly the same way as is being undertaken by the United States.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether adequate liaison is maintained between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on this very important matter?

Mr. Morrison: There is appropriate liaison.

Mr. Profumo: Is the new Minister in charge of these matters looking into the necessity for this sort of organisation being set up again as it was during the war—is he looking into it at the moment?

Mr. Morrison: These things are constantly under examination—[Laughter]— oh, yes, they are—by the appropriate Minister, whoever that may be.

Brigadier Head: When the right hon. Gentleman indicated that this requirement is being met by existing Departments did that refer to the Propaganda Department of the Foreign Office as being an equivalent organisation?

Mr. Morrison: I did not say anything about existing Departments.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE

Egg and Milk Production

Mr. Hurd: asked the Minister of Agriculture if, in view of the limit now set to the expansion of the poultry industry, he expects that the home production of eggs in the coming year will be adequate, with the imports likely to be available, to meet consumers' requirements in full.

The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Thomas Williams): Given a normal season, I expect that home produced egg supplies, together with probable imports, will be sufficient to meet consumers' requirements during the spring and summer of next year. There is still room for an appreciable expansion of home egg production in the autumn and winter.

Mr. Hurd: Will the Minister take another opportunity of clearing up misunderstandings and telling farmers and smallholders that all the eggs they can produce will be wanted?

Mr. Williams: We shall certainly require all the home produced eggs we can obtain for the autumn and winter periods, and that is why, in the seasonal spread, advantage is given for the autumn and winter months.

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he will review his declared policy of discouraging excessive production of milk and eggs in the spring and early summer, in view of the fact that it has not been found possible to deration eggs and of his prohibition of the use of milk for the manufacture of cream after 30th June.

Mr. T. Williams: These matters will be examined from time to time in the ordin-

ary course of implementing the policy of Part I of the Agriculture Act, 1947. The reductions in supplies of milk and eggs to which the hon. Member particularly refers are largely caused by exceptional weather conditions, and I see no need for any special reconsideration at this time.

Mr. Turton: Will the Minister now reconsider paragraph 13 of his February Price Review, in view of the fact that we are not getting the milk and eggs which we require?

Mr. Williams: The hon. Member must be aware that at least 1,000 million eggs more went to the packing stations for the year ending 31st March, 1951, than for the previous year, and that for the first quarter of 1951 there was only three-fifths of one egg per person fewer than for the first three months of last year.

Major Sir Thomas Dugdale: Does not the Minister realise that since paragraph 13 was written poultry keepers have been killing off their stock, and that the same thing has happened with dairy herds? That is not entirely due to the weather, but is largely due to the Minister's policy of active discouragement.

Mr. Williams: The hon. and gallant Member is not strictly accurate. It is true that there has been some slaughter of heifers and poultry this spring, largely due to weather conditions and the absence of suitable feedingstuffs—[Laughter]— well, if hon. Members can make some feedingstuffs we shall be happy to use it.

Mr. De la Bère: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether, having regard to the increase in cost of production of both milk and eggs, he will confer with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Food to adjust the awards given in the price review and to ensure full encouragement being given to the home producer.

Mr. T. Williams: No, Sir. The increased costs of production of milk and eggs were taken into account at the Price Review and are not a new factor. I see no reason to re-open the matter.

Mr. De la Bère: Why not make an all-out effort to produce more food? Is not the best way to do this to give a real price incentive and a fair deal?

Mr. Williams: If the hon. Member had noted the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) he would recall that there have been 1,000 million more eggs sent to the packing station this year than for the previous year.

Mr. Turton: Is not the Minister aware that the Minister of Food said that not enough eggs have been produced in this country and would he therefore communicate with his right hon. Friend?

Mr. Williams: I am also aware that we are now producing 30 per cent. more eggs than before the war.

Mr. Dye: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that it is more essential to have both milk and eggs in greater quantities during the winter months than during the spring months? Will he therefore maintain his policy?

Mr. Williams: Certainly, Sir; and that is why we have provided a very high price incentive for the autumn and winter months.

Vermin (Destruction)

Mr. Turton: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he is aware that certain rural district councils are operating a service for the destruction of rats and mice on agricultural land, which has proved to be more effective and less costly than the service rendered by the agricultural executive committees of the counties concerned; and what steps he. is taking to avoid unnecessary duplication in this work.

Mr. T. Williams: I am aware that a very few rural district councils have started a contract service for rat and mouse destruction on agricultural land, but as this is quite a recent development it cannot yet be said to be more effective and less costly than the service rendered by the county agricultural executive committees. In the particular and isolated cases concerned the councils and the committees have discussed how their services might be adjusted to avoid overlapping.

Mr. Turton: Will the Minister explain why his Department wrote to the Rural District Councils' Association asking them to discourage any competition between district councils and his Depart-

ment? Surely what we want to get is a more efficient and less costly service.

Mr. Williams: I agree with the hon. Member, but what we want is co-operation and not competition.

Mr. R. S. Hudson: Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to express his views to the Minister of Health and the President of the Board of Trade?

Cattle and Poultry (Slaughter)

Mr. De la Bèere: asked the Minister of Agriculture what steps the Government propose to take to prevent the exceptional slaughter of heifers and of poultry throughout the country owing to the small meat ration, with special reference to the effect that this must have on future milk production and egg production.

Mr. T. Williams: While there were considerably more heifers slaughtered in April, 1951, than there were in April, 1950, this was a temporary increase only which did not persist during May. I do not consider therefore that any special steps to prevent the slaughter of heifers are needed or that future milk production will be affected to a significant extent. With regard to poultry, I would refer the hon. Member to my answer to his Question on 26th April and to the answer to the Question of the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) on 31st May.

Mr. De la Bère: Is the Minister aware that the answer to my Question was not satisfactory? Is he further aware that the Government are jeopardising the milk supply of the country by allowing these animals to be killed? Something must be done about it.

Mr. Williams: I should be surprised if any answer given to the hon. Member was satisfactory.

Mr. Paget: Is it not desirable that there should be an increased culling of heifers in a great many herds?

Experimental Station, Botley

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: asked the Minister of Agriculture what has been the cost of the Experimental Fruit Station, Botley, Hampshire, since he has been responsible for it; what


results have been obtained from it; why he proposes to close it down; and what equivalent services he proposes to provide.

Mr. T. Williams: Botley is one of the Ministry's experimental centres, which are not designed to be run as commercial units and for which therefore it is not proposed to publish separate accounts or particulars of running costs, which would serve no useful purpose. The station was taken over nearly five years ago on a short lease to serve as the centre for N.A.A.S. investigations into disease of strawberries and related problems pending the setting up of the projected experimental horticulture station for Southern England, for which a suitable site has now been found near Lymington. The progress made with the investigations at Botley will assist the further development of work there.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: While it is undoubtedly true that the work at Botley has every relevance to the growing of strawberries, is not the Minister aware that Lymington is situated in totally different circumstances; and that there are several conditions which do not apply at Lymington but which do apply in the Botley region, research into which would help strawberry growers?

Mr. Williams: All our advice is to the contrary.

Strawberry Crop (Transport)

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: asked the Minister of Agriculture what representations he has received from agricultural executive committees and other bodies about the shortage of suitably equipped vans for the transport of strawberry crops this year, in view of the undesirability of such fruit being packed in depth in vehicles which are unsuitable; and what action he proposes to take.

Mr. T. Williams: I have not recently received any representations of this kind, but I understand that the National n Farmers' Union are at present in consultation with the railway authorities about the transport requirements of strawberry growers in Hampshire.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Is not it a fact that in recent years strawberries have been sent in baskets only one layer deep in the bottom of open trucks; although for purposes which may

seem best to the railway they have arrived at their destination sometimes five layers deep, with the bottom layer crushed? Will the Minister do all he can to expedite the use of vans with shelves, even if the shelves are only temporary?

Mr. Williams: If the hon. Member will give me any specific case of a shortage of vans I will gladly contact the Railway Executive.

Mr. Nally: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that even within this House the first three weeks of the strawberry season is a complete and unmitigated racket? Will he give us an assurance that whatever facilities may be needed to bring in cheap strawberries the approach to the problem of transport will be based on the fact that for at least three weeks of the strawberry season housewives and Members of Parliament are grossly exploited by having to pay high prices for inferior products?

Quality Milk Production (Working Party)

Mr. John Hay: asked the Minister of Agriculture why the Working Party on Quality Milk Production includes no woman member and no prominent medical authority on bovine tuberculosis; and whether the constitution of the working party can be so revised that the interests of housewives and public health can be adequately represented.

Mr. T. Williams: As the terms of reference state, the task of the Working Party is to examine the structure of producers' prices, and the members have been chosen for their knowledge and experience in that field. I do not consider that the appointment of additional members of the type proposed would contribute to the better performance of the Working Party's remit.

Oral Answers to Questions — HORSES AND CATTLE (TRANSPORT FROM IRELAND)

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he has now a report to make on the steps he is taking to ensure improved conditions for the transport of horses and cattle from Eire.

Mr. T. Williams: I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave on 14th June to the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore).

Mr. Freeman: Can my right hon. Friend say when he will be able to announce a decision?

Mr. Williams: My hon. Friend has already been made aware that we have communicated with the Southern Ireland Parliament, the Northern Ireland Parliament, the Ministry of Transport and the Chamber of Shipping seeking their advice on the regulations he has in mind?

Sir Ralph Glyn: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that there is a considerable trade now in importing donkeys for food in this country and that the conditions under which they are transported are deplorable?

Mr. Williams: I have not heard of that.

Oral Answers to Questions — USK, WYE AND EBBW RIVERS

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Minister of Agriculture when he proposes to appoint the joint rivers board for the Usk, Wye and Ebbw rivers, in view of the large industrial and other developments proceeding in these areas and the repeated overflowing of the Ebbw, near Newport.

Mr. T. Williams: The Order defining the Wye and Usk River Board Area was made on 22nd May. Certain authorities that objected to the draft Order have now required the Order to be subject to special Parliamentary procedure. Until this procedure is concluded, no action can be taken to constitute the river board.

Mr. Freeman: Can my right hon. Friend say when he will be able to make a decision?

Mr. Williams: Not until the Parliamentary procedure has been adopted.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that the Government are taking steps to contain all outpourings from Ebbw Vale?

Oral Answers to Questions — FORESTRY

Blaze Wood, Kent

Mr. John Rodgers: asked the Minister of Agriculture (1) why the Blaze Wood site has now been abandoned:

(2) what was the acreage of woodland purchased in Blaze Wood, Mereworth, Kent, for the National Fruit Tree Trial Ground; and what was the cost of purchasing and clearing the site.

Mr. T. Williams: Clearing operations revealed that the site was so severely infested with a particular fungus as to make it unsuitable for the critical experimental work involved in fruit variety testing. The infestation is the heaviest that has been recorded: and the scientific advice we have is that the presence of the fungus in such quantity could not have been detected until the clearance of the woodland had begun and the stumps of trees —under which the fungus is found—had been uprooted. Four hundred and four acres were purchased at a cost of £8,812 and a contract for clearing and cultivating 180 acres was placed at a price of £11,340.

Mr. Rodgers: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that this is, in miniature, a groundnut scandal? The presence of Armillaria Mellea was known in the district and could have been detected had there been a survey beforehand.

Mr. Williams: All I can suggest is that the hon. Member is simply reflecting upon our scientific advisers.

Thetford Forest Area

Mr. Dye: asked the Minister of Agriculture how much land at present under agriculture in the Thetford Forest area it is proposed to plant for forestry in 1951 or 1952.

Mr. T. Williams: Eighty-three acres in 1951 and 63 in 1952 of land already acquired. I am unable to state whether the figure given for 1952 will be raised as a result of further acquisitions.

Mr. Dye: Is not it most desirable, particularly for small-holders, that they should retain their land for food production rather than that it should be planted with trees at the present time?

Mr. Williams: Certainly, Sir, if the land is more suitable for food production than afforestation.

Mr. Dye: asked the Minister of Agriculture what additional land he proposes to acquire for afforestation in the Thetford area.

Mr. T. Williams: I propose to acquire, in this area as in others, as much as possible of the land which in my view is best devoted to forestry. I have approved the acquisition of 694 acres, and negotiations for another 550 acres are proceeding. As my hon. Friend knows, I have also made a compulsory purchase order in respect of 350 acres, the confirmation of which is now being sought by way of a Provisional Order Confirmation Bill.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Churchill: My I ask the Leader of the House whether he has any information to give us about the business for next week?

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 25TH JUNE—Second Reading of the Festival of Britain (Additional Loans) Bill; and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution until 7 o'clock;
Committee and remaining stages of Sir William Turner's Hospital at Kirkleatham Bill;
Second Reading of the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill; and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution;
Consideration of Motions to approve the Draft Lace Industry Orders; the Draft National Health Service (Superannuation) (Amendment) Regulations and similar Regulations for Scotland; and the Workmen's Compensation (Supplementation) Scheme.
TUESDAY, 26TH JUNE—Supply (17th Allotted Day). Committee.
It is proposed to take Supply formally and then debate the Motion relating to Tshekedi Khama standing on the Order Paper in the names of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) and other Members of the Opposition parties.
WEDNESDAY, 27TH JUNE—Second Reading of the Ministry of Materials Bill.
We shall also ask the House to take the Committee and remaining stages as well as the Money Resolution. This proposal has been agreed through the usual channels following the rearrangement of business made for today.
THURSDAY, 28TH JUNE—Beginning of Report stage of the Finance Bill.
FRIDAY, 29TH JUNE—Report and Third Reading of the Mineral Workings Bill.
If there is time, further progress will be made with the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill.

Mr. Churchill: With regard to the Second Reading of the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill, and the Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution, would it be possible to carry the Second Reading over from Monday to Friday, on the understanding that, if the Second Reading then takes a larger share, the Committee stage and the rest of the business on this subject will be concluded at the same time?

Mr. Ede: I think that is a matter which we might be able to discuss through the usual channels.

Mr. Crosland: Can my right hon. Friend say when he proposes to give an opportunity of discussing the very important Government White Paper on resale price maintenance?

Mr. Ede: No, not yet.

Sir Herbert Williams: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Indemnity Bill in connection with Statutory Instrument No. 413 will be introduced, having regard to the promise that it would be before the end of this month?

Mr. Ede: No, I cannot give the answer to that.

Mr. A. Edward Davies: Will my right hon. Friend note that the Annual Report of the British Transport Commission is expected shortly, and will he arrange for time for its discussion, since there are so many problems relating to this industry?

Mr. Ede: That matter will be taken into consideration.

Mr. Geoffrey Cooper: Can my right hon. Friend say when he will be able to find time for a debate on the Beveridge Committee's Report on the B.B.C.?

Mr. Ede: We are under a pledge to have a debate on that before the House rises for the Summer Recess.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the right hon. Gentleman find time for a debate on the Motion calling for an end to the war in


Korea? Is he aware that this war has been going on for 12 months, and that an Amercan general has called it the bottomless pit? Is it not time that this House discussed Korea?

Mr. Ede: I see no chance of discussing that Motion, but I have no doubt that discussion on the subject will probably take place on some other issue.

Mr. Nally: During the last four months, my right hon. Friend has been asked from both sides of the House, and notably by the Leader of the Opposition, whether he could provide an opportunity for a debate on the facilities and general atmosphere in which Members of Parliament work. I should like to ask him whether, in considering that, he would also be good enough to bear in mind the Motion which I have put upon the Order Paper relating to the hours of work of the House? Will he give an assurance that before we adjourn for the Summer Recess all these matters, whether they be the hours of work or the conditions under which Members of Parliament work, will be considered and a day allotted for a general discussion upon what I regard as these particularly important matters?

Mr. Ede: I have no recollection of giving any promise that time would be found for that. What I did promise was that I would enter into discussions with the various authorities who control the amenities of the House and see whether certain improvements could be effected. I have started on that task, but I can see no chance of time being given to a discussion of my hon. Friend's Motion.

Mr. Churchill: As the hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally) appealed to me, may I say that all I can do is to leave him to the tender mercies of his own leader?

CAPITAL INVESTMENT PROGRAMME (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gaitskell): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement on the investment programme.
In the Economic Survey, it was stated that the investment programme was being reviewed to take account of the impact

of defence orders, and I should now like to inform the House of the outcome of this review. As I said in my Budget speech, the heavy new demands of the defence programme on the engineering industries must involve some check to civil investment at home. The total output of these industries is limited by shortages of steel and other materials, and we cannot afford a serious decline in exports of metal goods when the rapidly rising cost of imports presents a serious threat to the stability of our overseas balance of payments.
In consequence, there will in 1951 be no increase in the supplies of plant and machinery available for home industry, while in 1952 and 1953 there must be a substantial reduction, since more and more of the engineering industry will be producing armaments instead. Moreover, of the plant and machinery available for the home market, a much larger share must from now on go to firms engaged on defence production, so that even in 1951 there will be some fall in supplies for purely civil purposes.
In the case of the building and constructional engineering industries, output should continue to rise by about 5 per cent. a year. Provision will have to be made, however, out of this increased production for a substantial amount of defence work, and in the next two years some parts of the civil building programme are bound to be delayed in areas where important defence works have to be executed and where they will, if necessary, be given special priority.
In view of the greater uncertainty caused by the impact of defence production and material shortages, I do not propose to publish for 1951 or 1952 a detailed investment programme of the kind prepared in previous years with figures for individual industries. I can, however, give the broad outcome of the recent review of the programme and indicate in general terms the level of investment which we hope still to achieve.
Total fixed investment in 1951, including a substantial amount of defence investment, may amount to £2,230 million (in terms of the prices ruling at the end of 1950), compared with £2,162 million in 1950. This represents only a very small increase. It will be accompanied, as I have suggested earlier, by an actual


decline in the amount of civil investment, which must be expected to fall still further in 1952 and 1953.
Within this total it is intended that investment in coal, electricity, gas, coke ovens, railways, roads and petroleum will be higher than in 1950—in the first two cases substantially higher. The programme of new industrial building for manufacturing industry, other than the industries to which I have already referred, will continue at about the same rate as in 1950, but a proportion of the work will be on projects directly or indirectly related to defence, and fewer licences will, therefore, be available for ordinary civil projects.
There will be some increase in investment in education in 1951 and 1952, though less than was planned a year ago. The housing programme will be maintained at 200,000 houses a year, but there may have to be some local interference with house building in the interests of defence work.
Investment in other fields will have to be severely restricted. The volume of Government building will be checked, and in 1952 will be below the 1950 level. Investment in the health services, on some local government services, and on university building will have to be less than it would otherwise have been, and in some cases will have to be brought down below the level achieved in 1950. It will be necessary also to reduce private building work for agricultural purposes.
The Government have also decided on two special measures. The building of all new offices will, for the time being, be prohibited, except where work has begun or already been authorised or in other very special circumstances, or in the case of offices which are an integral part of industrial establishments. Secondly, it is proposed to ban all building projects for entertainment purposes costing more than £5,000. Projects costing less will be licensed only if there are especially strong reasons for permitting this work to be done.
These particular restrictions, and the general reduction in the level of civil investment, will unfortunately have to continue for some time. Architects, engineers and other professional and technical staff are urgently required now to deal with the large and sudden increase in the planning of defence works. The

Government hope that all employers who possibly can will release staff—especially those engaged on long-term civil projects —for this much more urgent defence work.
We have also considered carefully whether in the new circumstances further progress can be made with the reconstruction of blitzed towns and cities. It is clear that during the next two years it will not be possible to do much. We propose, however, to make a special survey of the position area by area, and to decide in each case, in the light of the supply of labour and materials, what might be spared for this purpose. Work already authorised will be completed and new work will be approved as and when this can be done without holding up more urgent and important projects such as defence and housing. The ban on new office building will not therefore apply to blitzed areas.

Mr. Lyttelton: I think that a statement of this kind, which covers in very general terms a great many aspects of the industrial life of the country, must really await further consideration. I think we ought to be careful not to accept it until we have had a further opportunity of studying it, but there are one or two questions which occur to me.
The first is this. When the Chancellor said that in the next two years some part of the civil building programme is bound to
be delayed, does that mean that the Government's programme of 200,000 houses will not be reached? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] May I ask the right hon. Gentleman what the words mean if they do not mean that? It seems a genteel manner of saying there will be fewer houses built.
Secondly, I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether what he said about not publishing a detailed investment programme means that the Government have at long last abandoned the idea that the investment programme can be planned in detail. If that is so, I shall welcome it. There are a number of other questions which still remain to be asked, but the statement is in such general terms that I think there must be some delay before making detailed criticisms.

Mr. Gaitskell: With regard to the housing programme, there is no change: it remains at 200,000. We have said on


a number of occasions that if in a particular locality there is a great scarcity of labour for urgent defence production, it may have to be taken from housing and, put on defence.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: Is not this just the sort of statement which ought not to be made after Questions? It is a statement relating to a running programme. There cannot be said to be any special urgency about it, and, at the same time, it is so full of most important details that I should have thought it was a matter which ought to have been made the subject of a White Paper setting out the whole thing in very much more detail so that we might examine what its repercussions are likely to be on the economic life of the country.
Before the White Paper is produced— which I hope it will be—will my right hon. Friend indicate where the cutting back will take place in civil consumption, what industries will be particularly affected, and what part of the country will be affected, because those of us representing development areas are particularly apprehensive about it. May I therefore ask the Government, through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether they will consider a more detailed White Paper and provide an opportunity for an early debate?

Mr. Clement Davies: I agree with what has been put to the Government by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). This is a very general statement, and, of course, it holds out a very grim and austere prospect for the next two and a half years, especially in the development areas. I would ask, therefore, that any White Paper should not only contain details of the programme, but also that the Government should try to put before us the effect of the decision as they see it upon production in the various branches throughout the country.

Mr. Gaitskell: I think that when my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) and the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) have studied this statement they will see that I have given a fairly clear picture of the general effect of these cuts in the investment programme. I made it plain—and here I am replying to

my right hon. Friend's question—that we do not consider that this year there would be any value in giving the detailed figures that have been given in the past for individual industries, for the simple reason that there is a great deal of uncertainty, as there is bound to be, in present circumstances in view of the material position and in view of the impact of the defence programme. But I must, of course, also point out that if we want to carry out the defence programme as swiftly and as smoothly as possible, some other things have got to give way.

Mr. Lyttelton: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that we must regard these overcoat statements with some apprehension, because, unless there is an opportunity of debating them, we become by inference committed to some things about which we might wish to make further comment? I think there is a great deal in the suggestion that a White Paper or some other document should be published so that the House may have an opportunity of debating it.

Mr. Gaitskell: The question of a debate is not one for me, and I was not suggesting that it should not be debated. I have already indicated to the House why I do not think that this year a detailed White Paper of the kind included in the Economic Survey in previous years would be of much value.

Mr. Bevan: May I ask my right hon. Friend for an answer to my question whether there is to be a White Paper?

Mr. Gaitskell: I think I made it perfectly plain that there would be no particular value in a detailed White Paper of the kind suggested.

Mr. Bevan: May I ask the Government to consider this matter further, because as it is left now it is highly unsatisfactory? If we cannot have a debate on the White Paper, will the Government consider having a debate on the statement which has been made?

Mr. Gaitskell: That is not a matter for me. I suggest that my right hon. Friend should first read the statement, which, I agree, contains a good deal of comment, before he comes to a conclusion in his own mind about the need for a White Paper.

Mr. Nally: On a point of order. In my limited experience of the House, it has always been understood that a statement of any kind, whether it be made from the Government Front Bench or anywhere else, is adjusted, so to speak, to the fact that in the nature of things it has to be a précis. I would ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether or not we are now to assume that a vital statement of Government policy affecting many constituencies in the country can be made in the House without any document accompanying it, and whether it is in accordance with the custom of the House that we should be told, in reply to our questions about such a statement, to read it? I wish to ask whether, in point of fact, what has happened today has not been a gross abuse of the normal practice of the House over many years regarding statements of major Government policy.

Mr. Speaker: There is no point of order there. It has always been the custom for Ministers to make statements. They are entirely responsible for what is in them; I am not.

Mr. Edelman: Contrary to what was said by the right hon. Member for Alder-shot (Mr. Lyttelton), does not my right hon. Friend's statement involve a nationwide and detailed system of control, licensing and allocation, particularly for the engineering industry, and will he announce what course he intends to take in that respect, because otherwise the statement on the investment programme will seem to many like putting the cart before the horse?

Mr. Gaitskell: Of course, a great deal of the control through which the investment programme is carried out is through building licensing, but we shall also use material controls, so far as they are appropriate, to ensure that it is carried out.

Mr. Churchill: Is it not rather abrupt to turn down all idea of a White Paper, even supposing it could not have the full precision of previous years—if, indeed, that quality has resided in the documents then published? Could it not be issued under the necessary reserves? Could not we have the most detailed and careful statement that the right hon. Gentleman can prepare under the reserves, even if some of the details are necessarily

I omitted? Surely we ought to have some thing more than just these three pages of typescript read out to us before very large: changes affecting the social life of the: whole people are, as it were, tacitly assented to by the House? May I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will not reconsider this matter and give' us the best White Paper he can, and then we can consider in what form the matter should be debated or carried further.

Mr. Gaitskell: Of course, we considered very carefully whether, in the circumstances, a White Paper would be appropriate, and I have already endeavoured to explain to the House why, in our view, on this occasion it would not have had any particular value and, indeed, would not have contained much, if anything, more than I have already read out to the House. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he would study the statement I have made, because I feel that when he has done that he will appreciate that there is a good deal more in it, perhaps, than appears from a first hearing.
As to the question of a debate, that is not a question for me; it is an entirely different matter and, as far as I know, there is no particular convention which rules out a debate on a statement any more than on a White Paper, if it is the desire of the House generally to have one.

Mr. Michael Foot: With reference to the last two sentences of the Chancellor's statement—on blitzed cities—can he say what will be the nature of this review which is to take place on the question of blitzed cities? How long is that review to take, and what effect will it have upon applications for licences which have been put forward by the blitzed cities? Is not this a further indication of the difficulties which arise from a general statement being made without defining the principles which are to be applied to the blitzed cities in dealing with the whole of their applications?

Mr. Gaitskell: If I may say so to my hon. Friend, it is probably an instance of the difficulty which arises from trying to discuss the statement before it has been read. I made it plain that work already authorised in the case of the blitzed cities would, of course, be completed and new


work approved as and when the labour and materials are available. The surveys to which I referred will be carried out as quickly as possible, and in the light of the pressure of housing and defence work upon the available supplies, we shall be able to see how much can be spared for the work of reconstruction, the building of shops and offices, and so on.

Mr. David Eccles: Apart from the question of the blitzed cities, it appears that the programme announced by the Chancellor calls for more steel than was used in the investment programme last year. Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied, therefore, that there will be enough steel for the programme alone, without any further work on the blitzed cities; and if there is not enough steel, will he indicate to the House which categories in the programme are of low priority and will be cut into first?

Mr. Gaitskell: That is a very much wider question, but it indicates the difficulty we have this year of giving the degree of precision that we should like to give to the individual investment programmes. Uncertainty about the precise output of steel is one of the difficulties I had in mind, but I would not say that one should conclude from this statement that the total demand for steel implied in it is greater than will be available.

Mr. Driberg: In attempting to carry out such a programme in an orderly way, will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the particular importance both of reinstituting controls over the allocation of steel and of reviving something in the nature of the Ministry of Works' mobile labour force, in order to prevent unfairness to local authorities and their housing programmes on account of the defence works of which he has spoken?

Mr. Gaitskell: The allocation of steel is very much under consideration by the Government and I hope that a statement will be made on the subject next week. On the mobile building labour force, perhaps my hon. Friend will address a question on that subject to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Works.

Sir Herbert Williams: On a point of order. As this is neither Question Time nor a debate, would I be in order in moving the Adjournment of the House in order that we may have a debate?

Mr. Speaker: I am afraid nobody can move the Adjournment of the House except the Government. That is the rule.

Major Tufton Beamish: Is the Chancellor of the Exchequer aware that even if a White Paper would be unlikely to contain much more detail than was contained in his statement, the next issue of c "Tribune" certainly will.

Miss Jennie Lee: Will the Chancellor of the Exchequer please try a little harder to meet the real fear in many of our minds that by trying to do too much too soon he will not get as good a defence programme as otherwise he would; and will he also keep in mind that if he wants the best results he needs the cooperation of men and women as well as machines—men and women who really understand what he is trying to do and what he has got to do?

Mr. Gaitskell: I think both precepts put forward by my hon. Friend are admirable, and I will do my best to observe them.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: We are to have a day to debate this, so I think we must get on with the business.

FINANCE BILL AMENDMENTS (CHAIRMAN'S SELECTION)

3.56 p.m.

Captain Crookshank: I beg to move,
That this House views with concern the decision of the Chairman of Ways and Means so to exercise his powers of selection as to exclude Amendments to Clause 1 of the Finance Bill, which would have permitted the House to debate and pronounce upon specific burdens imposed upon individuals and industries.
Complete respect to the Chair is fundamental to the proper working of our Parliamentary institutions. I am quite sure we all wish to show that respect at all times. It is very rare—and how fortunate we are that it should be so—that the decisions of the Chair are questioned in this assembly, but when they are, it is done only with a deep sense of responsibility and of public duty. When hon. Members, in whatever part of the House they may sit, think that attention should be called to some Ruling of the Chair it can, of course, be done only by a substantive Motion; and, as the Leader of the House told us, that Motion should be discussed at the earliest possible moment.
I think there must be common ground everywhere in, first, the fact that we do not, and nobody else does, challenge the right of the Chair of deciding what is and what is not in order, though of course the Chair is good enough on occasions to listen to submissions from all parts of the House with regard to a Ruling given, and it is within our experience that sometimes, as a result, the Chair has taken a contrary view to that which it first announced. But obviously the right of the Chair to interpret the rules of order is unchallengeable.
Secondly, I think we should all be agreed that the modern right of selection of Amendments in Committee is also not challenged, because if it were the practice that every Amendment which was put down must be called, then obviously debates would become so unduly long as to bring Parliament itself into disrepute. So we do not and cannot, and nobody can, challenge either of those points.
But those of us who have put our names to this Motion think that the Ruling of the Chairman of Ways and Means on 5th June on Clause 1 of the

Finance Bill raised a serious constitutional issue, and the reason I move this Motion is to clear it up. I hasten to assure you, Mr. Speaker, that it is in no way a personal matter between ourselves and the right hon. Gentleman the Chairman of Ways and Means. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I am sure he will take it from me that we do not entertain any feelings of animosity whatsoever towards him.
We feel, however, that he gave a wrong decision on that occasion, and because that is our view we feel we must call attention to it today. We feel that the decision was wrong in the light of the duty—which we cannot escape, any of us —which is imposed on us to debate matters of fresh taxation. We say it was wrong in the light of the duty which we think is imposed on him as Chairman to give us that opportunity, which was not afforded on the day in question, and we feel that, whatever the reason for it may have been, and however inadvertent it may have been, in the decision he took he overlooked both his and our constitutional duty. We do not censure him in this Motion. Had we desired to do so we should have said so in terms. We merely express our concern at the way the decision was reached, and we invite the House to share our concern.
I think that, for the benefit of hon. Members who are not fully aware of what happened that day, I must just give a brief account of what we complain of. Clause 1 of the Finance Bill increased the Petrol Duty by 4½d. and various Amendments had been tabled. The first Amendment that had been tabled was one which moved to leave out subsection (1), and that Amendment the Chairman of Ways and Means ruled out of order.
There is no question that, basing himself on the dictum of Erskine May, that if we delete the primarily important subsection a Clause will make no sense, and that, in those circumstances, such an Amendment is out of order: of course, on that view, the Chairman was correct; but the unfortunate part is that his Ruling this year was diametrically opposed to the Ruling which he gave on the same point last year, because then, on a similar Amendment to the Clause dealing with Petrol Duty—an Amendment to omit the first subsection—debate was allowed to


proceed; and it was not only allowed to proceed but it proceeded for six hours.
It was on that occasion that the opportunity was taken—that was why, in fact, it was done—to debate the whole principle of raising the duty on petrol, and it was done, no doubt, because it was thought advantageous to have the main debate before attention was given to specific Amendments and possible remissions in detail. I am not saying, of course, that that debate did not take place this year. It did; but it took place on the Motion, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." One has no grievance that the debate did not take place. It merely would have been more convenient if last year's breach, perhaps, of the rules of order had been continued.

Mr. Glenvil Hall: May I ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman what difference it would have made this year if the practice which the Chairman of Ways and Means followed last year had been followed this year? What difference to the debate or the outcome would there have been?

Captain Crookshank: I said that in the upshot it did not make any difference. No Amendments were selected, and, therefore, it was only the principle of the duty which was discussed this year. Last year Amendments were selected. We got rid of the general debate on the principle and then discussed specific points. This year we did not discuss specific points. It turned out that it made no difference. I am only saying that the Ruling this year was diametrically opposite to the Ruling last year.
But, other Amendments were put down, concerning motor vehicles for disabled ex-Service men, chairs for invalids, oil used for industrial purposes, oil used for aircraft. None of those was selected. Three of them—or very similar Amendments— were debated last year—

Mr. Glenvil Hall: At great length.

Captain Crookshank: —but they were not selected this year. The Chairman, naturally, when asked why these were not selected, declined to give any reasons. That is the common practice, the ancient practice; but my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies), in his submission to the Chair-

man, saying he understood the Amendments were not to be called, asked:
 How are we Members to differentiate between the use of certain types of oil and the taxes which will be upon them? It may be that we are in favour of a tax upon certain uses but against others.
In reply to my right hon. and learned Friend, the Chairman made use of what I consider a slightly ominous phrase when he said:
 I would point out—I think I am right in saying this—that on previous occasions the same points have been raised."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th June, 1951; Vol. 488, c. 820.]
I do not know, of course, what was in the mind of the Chairman of Ways and Means when he made that statement, but on the face of it it seems that, because some of those specific Amendments were debated last year, it was not necessary— or he proposed not—to select them this year, because they were debated last year. That seems to me the only interpretation that can be put upon that remark.
The result was that last year—as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Colne Valley has pointed out in an interjection—we had four and a half hours' debate on these specific Amendments, and divided upon them. We had the opportunity to divide then. This year we had no debate on them at all and no opportunity to divide, and indeed the result of this non-selection of these Amendments was that this year the debate upon the Petrol Duty lasted just a third of the time which was consumed on the same duty last year.
If the Chairman was merely swayed by what happened last year, and at the time that was taken by the debates last year —and, after all, the right of the Closure is, to some extent, in his control—if he thought that, we think he was wrong in thinking so, because this year's debate arose on a Clause which increased an existing tax. It was increased by 9d. last year. It was increased by 4½d. this year, and that makes the situation quite different from the point of view of argument, because one can imagine—it may, indeed, possibly be found to be so when we come to the next stage of the Bill—that arguments against specific exemptions, which the Government refused at the time when the increase of the tax was 9d., may appear to the Government more valid when the tax is raised still higher, as it now is to Is. l½d.,


just as, to take another extreme case, arguments about the Income Tax would be very different if the Income Tax were, say, Is. in the £ from what they would be if it were 15s. in the £. It is a different basis altogether. We thought that a 50 per cent. increase on last year's increase would have been a sufficient change of basis to have warranted more detailed discussion than the Chairman of Ways and Means, by his selective power, allowed us.
Those are the facts of the case, which cannot be disputed, and it only remains to see why we feel that the curtailment of debate in this case was an error of judgment. This House is the only one which has jurisdiction in money matters, and in our view, what was stated—and it could be said by a no more experienced person—by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pick thorn) the other day is surely the right view. He said:
 May I ask two questions? The first is "—
and this is the point—
 whether the whole of this intricate law of procedure about our financial processes is not designed to make sure that no charge shall either be put or kept upon the public without annual challenge? "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th June, 1951; Vol. 488, c. 822.]
I emphasise the words "without annual challenge." I said that we did not have any detailed debates on Clause 1 of the Finance Bill this year, which contained an extra imposition, through the increase of Petrol Duty by 50 per cent. over and above what was put on last year. My submission is that that altered the basis and that, therefore, that fresh taxation should have been challenged in more detail than merely the question of whether it should be 4½d. more or less.
I think that if we consider the origins of the House of Commons, we find that historical research has now come to the conclusion—or it certainly inclines to the view—that the need of getting the consent of the Commons to taxation is what led the monarchy to develop the representative system. That is the modern reading of history on this point. It is something to which we must pay much attention. May I be allowed to quote one passage from Erskine May, on page 39, which I think puts it extremely well:
 The most important power vested in any branch of the legislature is the right of impos

ing taxes upon the people and of voting money for the exigencies of the public service. The exercise of this right by the Commons is practically a law for the annual meeting of Parliament for redress of grievances; and it may also be said to give to the Commons the chief authority in the state. In all countries the public purse is one of the main instruments of political power: but with the complicated relations of finance and public credit in England, the power of giving or withholding the supplies at pleasure is one of absolute supremacy.
That is our fundamental business in this House. It follows that if I am right, and if Erskine May is right, we should be free to debate all taxes and, above all, new taxes—and "new taxes" includes, within the phrase, increase of taxes— freely and, if need be, at length, subject to the powers which exist and which are often much used of closing the debate if necessary. If we do not cling to that we shall eventually become merely the rubber stamps of the Executive. We shall be back to a new form of dictatorial powers corresponding in these matters to those of the unconstitutional monarchy of earlier ages from which the people of this country have freed themselves.
I hope that I carry the House with me in that argument—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—I hope I do. This is not a party matter; it is a matter for every hon. Member in this House.

Mr. Monslow: I do not want to go into the merits or demerits of the case, but will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman tell the House, if the Chairman has not the right of selection, under whose jurisdiction shall the right of selection come?

Captain Crookshank: I am afraid that the hon. Member did not listen to what I was saying. In the first sentence of my remarks, I observed that it was completely unchallenged by anyone that the right of selection lay where it did— [Interruption.]—I thought that was a perfectly simple point. I was summing up what I thought was the constitutional position, which is a matter of primary importance to every hon. Member. I started by saying that the right of selection was unchallenged, but that we thought that on this occasion the Chairman of Ways and Means had made an error of judgment, and it was only because we thought he had made an error of judgment that we wanted to bring the matter


before the House today to clarify the general position. That was all.
If hon. Gentlemen opposite were not so impatient—I try to cut my speeches short—I was going on to say that, of course, it is only human for all of us to err, but we do feel that on this occasion the Chairman did unfortunately make a mistake in the non-selection of any Amendment to that Clause. I have already pointed out that we are not censuring the Chairman—we would have said so if we had wanted to do so; we merely think that he made an error of judgment, but we cannot complain even of that without bringing the matter before the House. This was the only way in which we could do so.
We feel that this incident compels the House in duty bound to reaffirm its rights as a House over the Chair or anyone else in the exercise of our undisputed right as Members to challenge any or all the new taxes. That is all. We want to reaffirm, that right. If the House thinks that we ought not to have that right, well and good; we shall have to make a fresh start on the British constitution, that being the right today. We merely want to confirm that that right is inherent and of primary importance. We believe that is the position in this honourable House. That is all that I have to say about that aspect of the matter.
The Leader of the House, like yourself, Mr. Speaker, is the guardian of the rights of all Members in whatever part of the House they sit. He may feel that it is possible or desirable to accept this Motion. If he does, it will remain in our annals as a guide for the future use of the Chairman and the Deputy-Chairman and all those in whom rests the right of selection as to how they should exercise that right, and it will show to our advantage and, I hope to that of our successors in Parliament, what at any rate this Parliament considers to be its inalienable right.
If, however, the Leader of the House does not propose to accept that line and will not accept the Motion, then it really is enough that we should have expressed our concern by this Debate. It need not be a long one. We have expressed our concern and what has been said will, at any rate, be in HANSARD. We have called

attention to the matter, and while we should prefer, because we think it right, that the Motion should be carried, we certainly would not think of dividing the House upon it. It is not the sort of issue on which we want to divide the House. If something wrong had been done which involved censure, that would have been another matter. This is merely an expression of anxiety and concern, and if the right hon. Gentleman says "No" we shall leave it as it is and pass on to other business. We would not make it a point of great difference between us, but we reaffirm, all the time, the ancient constitution of this House represented in the age-long phrase: No taxation without representation.

4.18 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies: The right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) has said that this Motion is not meant to cast any reflection, and certainly it is not intended as a censure, upon the Chairman of Ways and Means. Anybody reading this Motion must come to the conclusion that it can only mean one thing, and that is that there is a reflection on the way in which the Chairman of Ways and Means exercised the discretion imposed upon him under the Standing Order in coming to the decision that he did. May I read the Motion again?—
 That this House views with concern the decision of the Chairman of Ways and Means so to exercise his powers of selection as to exclude Amendments to Clause 1 of the Finance Bill, which would have permitted the House to debate and pronounce upon specific burdens imposed upon individuals and industries.
The Standing Order imposes a very heavy responsibility upon you, Mr. Speaker, in the House, and upon the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of Committees when we are in Committee. You have to perform a very difficult task in selecting Amendments. The purpose of the Standing Order, without a doubt, was to save the time of the House, accelerate the progress of business and improve the opportunities for real and effective debate on things that matter, so that you could, or the Chairman could, exclude what might otherwise have to be debated merely because it was there, although in fact it might be a frivolous Amendment. Having imposed that very heavy responsibility upon you, Sir, and upon the


Chairman, the House must have complete confidence in you and the Chairman; otherwise it is impossible for you to discharge your very onerous duties.
With what was said by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman in regard to the duties of this House and the Members of this House in respect of finance, and our having to exercise a very careful supervision upon taxation, we are all in agreement, but it is just as well that we should consider what has happened. I frankly confess that when the Chairman gave his decision I was taken by surprise. It seemed to me, and that is why I put a question, that no opportunity would be given to us to distinguish between the general principle and certain exceptions; but I could not challenge and would never dream of challenging the bona fides of the Chairman.

Mr. Churchill: Who is doing so?

Hon. Members: Read the Motion.

Mr. Davies: I am speaking for myself. I expressed my surprise at the decision but that did not go so far as to challenge the bona fides of the Chairman.

Mr. Churchill: Mr. Churchill rose—

Mr. Davies: I will certainly give way to the right hon. Gentleman, but I was only saying what was in my mind. In expressing that surprise, I was in no way challenging the bona fides of the Chairman.

Mr. Churchill: But the right hon. and learned Gentleman was attributing to us a challenge to the bona fides of the Chairman. He was saying that in his own mind he would take a different course from that. It is the fact that we have not challenged the bona fides of the Chairman. What does bona fides mean? I know it is Latin but there are enough public school men opposite who ought to be able to translate it. In my belief, it means good faith, common honesty, decent Parliamentary behaviour. Nobody has attempted to challenge that in any way. What we have challenged is his judgment in this matter and the manner in which he interpreted the rules of the House.

Mr. Davies: I dealt with the point. I would never challenge the Chairman with regard to his judgment.
The power has been given under the Standing Order since 1919 to you, Sir, and to the Chairman, to select Amendments; and in making your selection and by-passing, if I may use the term, Amendments that you do not intend to call, neither you nor the Chairman are bound to give any reasons. Therefore, how could we possibly challenge the judgment which you are exercising? What is happening here is that what is now being said, in effect, is that the Chairman was guilty of an error of judgment in that he was preventing the House from debating and pronouncing upon specific burdens imposed upon individuals and industries.
The Standing Order gives that power to the Chair. If it is necessary to alter that power, there is a way of doing it, and if I may refer to a Motion which stands in my name, I did propose the right course.

[That a Select Committee be appointed to consider the meaning and effect of Standing Order No. 31 (Selection of Amendments) and to report what changes, if any, are necessary.]

If the House is content to leave it as it is now, all well and good. If, on the other hand, hon. Members think that the power which has been given to you, Sir, and to the Chairman, especially in matters of finance, gives too great a power to the Chair to exclude debate, then the right thing to do is surely for the House to have this Standing Order reconsidered. The way in which it can do that is by the appointment of a Select Committee, which would then report back to the House, having heard the evidence of such people as come to give evidence before it. That is the correct and right way.

It is not right to challenge the decision that was made by the Chairman or to suggest in any way that his action was due to any error of judgment. For those reasons, I sincerely hope that the House will reject this Motion, or, as I should prefer, that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will withdraw the Motion, That would be far and away the better thing to do.

4.25 p.m.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): It is a good thing that we have been able to arrange for this comparatively early discussion of this Motion, for clearly it could not be


allowed to stand on the Order Paper for any length of time that would embarrass the occupant of the Chair. I listened with great care to what the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) said with regard to this Motion, but I could not think that at any time he really thought that it would be possible for me to advise the House to accept the Motion. I am certain that if this House did accept the Motion, the present occupant of the Chair of Ways and Means would feel that so considerable a reflection had been made on his conduct in the Chair as to make it plain that he no longer retained the confidence of the Members of the House.
It is undoubtedly a tremendous power that is given to the occupant of the Chair when he is given the right to select Amendments.
It was not easily granted by the
House to the Chair. It arose out of a very contentious Finance Bill, that of 1909, which I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) will remember, when, owing to the large number of Amendments that appeared on the Paper, the Prime Minister of the day, Mr. Asquith, found it necessary to ask the House temporarily to grant to the Chair, in respect of any Motion, Clause or Schedule that might be under discussion, the power of selecting Amendments.
In those days, on each occasion when it was proposed to use this power a Motion had to be moved by the Minister in charge of the Bill asking that the Chair should be clothed with such powers. It had to be put without Amendment or without debate, and when the Chair was so armed this process of selection took place. It was urged in favour of that procedure that it was better than either the Closure or the Guillotine. I am sure that all of us who have had experience of seeing the Guillotine in action will agree that of all forms of dealing with Parliamentary discussion the Guillotine is quite the worst—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—although it may sometimes be necessary. But I have never concealed from the House that in my view, of the three—Closure, selection and Guillotine— the Guillotine is certainly the worst.
When the House was considering this matter it had the advice of Mr. Arthur James Balfour, speaking for the Opposi-

tion He opposed the amendment of the Standing Order, claiming that the Chairman and Speaker would be unable to carry out the duties thrust upon them. The experience of over 40 years has shown that this very drastic power can be used in this democratic assembly with the approval, generally speaking, of all parties in the House.
We have all had our favourite Amendment not accepted and have temporarily felt that perhaps a little more reflection on the part of the Chair might have brought a different conclusion, but I am certain that in the long run all of us who have seen this power in action over a great number of years will say that it has been used with discretion and to the advantage of the general body of Members of the House.
It was first used on 9th August, 1909. In 1914 a Select Committee on Procedure considered the question of giving permanent power to the Chair to select Amendments; but the work of that Committee, for obvious reasons, was never completed, and when we came to the end of the war the matter again came up for consideration.
On 19th February, 1919, Sir Gordon Hewart, who was then the Attorney-General, moved that the Standing Order should be enacted in almost its present permanent form. There was considerable discussion in which there was some opposition. The composition of the House had changed somewhat considerably since 1909, and there was some opposition in the House. I think the principal and most influential opponent was Lord Hugh Cecil. The House unanimously adopted this Standing Order in what is practically its present form, and it has remained a permanent part of our machinery ever since.
When the House appoints an occupant of the Chair, it knows by experience the tremendous duties in this respect that it is placing on his shoulders. I am bound to say that I think that the occupants of the Chair, in dealing with these matters which sometimes at the moment arouse very considerable heat, have discharged their duties in a way that entitles them to the respect of the House, and that has been generally accorded to them.
There is no doubt that on Clause 1 of the Bill this year there was a very


considerable amount of feeling. I ought to make it quite clear that in all the discussions that take place about the selection of Amendments, the Government, and individual Members of the Government, take no part at all. We are not consulted by
the Chair. We do not tender advice to the Chair. It would be effrontery on our part to do so. I do not object to the view that is put forward that in these matters it is the duty of the House to exercise a strict and effective control over the Executive, and the Executive ought never to take the step of going to the occupant of the Chair—whether it be Mr. Speaker or the Chairman of Ways and Means—and saying, "It will be awkward for us if this particular thing is discussed, or is discussed in this way, and we would suggest to you that some other course should be pursued."
It is clear that, outside this House, there are people who think that the Government have control over the Chair. I am sure that every hon. Member will agree that what I have said is not merely sound doctrine but is the actual practice followed by
the House. Therefore, we did not know what was going to happen to the Amendments that were down to Clause 1 of the Bill. As a matter of fact, I was sitting in my room when Clause I was called and, somewhat to my surprise I confess, I saw appear on the indicator the words "Clause 1 stand apart." I had no knowledge at all as to the course that was to be pursued.
With regard to the first Amendment, which was in the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Lyttelton), there can be no doubt that that was out of order this year on what the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Gainsborough called the dictum of Erskine May. After all, I sometimes feel that the dicta of Erskine May appear to be more powerful in their effects on the House than the actual Standing Orders. I do not think that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will disagree for one moment that, clearly, on the statement made on pages 534–5, that Amendment was out of order. It appears to me, therefore, that the Leader of the House might very well have put this Motion on the Order Paper with regard to last year's action.
I do not think that if an error was made last year, it follows that the error

should be repeated this year when it was discovered that an error in fact had been made. [Interruption.] The right hon. and gallant Gentleman raised the question of the first Amendment and even if I merely confirm what he said, it is only courteous to him that I should allude to that part of his argument. As far as that goes, I do not think there can be any ground for viewing with concern what the Chair did this year in respect of the Amendment to omit Clause 1 (1) of the Bill. I hope that we can leave that position there.
The Chair has the advantage of being advised by certain people who are not the servants of the Government but who are the servants of the House and are directly responsible to the Chair for the action they take and the advice that they tender. The Chairman of Ways and Means—and, I imagine, Mr. Speaker with regard to the Report stage of Bills—has consultations with these people. They tender advice.
Let it be made clear that Mr. Speaker or the Chairman or Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means is responsible for the action taken on the advice. I am sure that none of the occupants of the Chair would desire to say, "Well, we were advised and we shelter ourselves behind the advice." These advisers are technical people of great experience who, in my experience, have never been accused of any partiality in the advice that they tender, and the Chair, having received that advice, has to reach a decision on the various points raised.
There were the subsequent Amendments. There again, there was no consultation at all between the Government and the Chair. The decision is that of the Chair, and any knowledge I have as to the way in which it was reached is because of a communication that has been made to me by the Chairman of Ways and Means since the conclusion of the Committee stage of the Bill. I do not want to trouble the House with the whole of the letter that I received from the Chairman of Ways and Means, although I am willing to read it if the House thinks that that would be desirable. Perhaps if I read what my right hon. and gallant Friend the Chairman of Ways and Means has said with regard to the subsequent Amendments to the one to omit subsection (1), that would


be the best way of bringing before the House the exact reasons that swayed the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. He said:
The remaining amendments put down by H.M. Opposition were precisely the same both in wording and form as the amendments put down by the same hon. Members to last year's Finance Bill.

Mr. Churchill: Is it not a different year?

Mr. Ede: I do not think that that interruption on the part of the right hon. Gentleman is quite fair. I am not now giving my own view. I am reading the remarks sent to me by the Chairman of Ways and Means. If necessary, I will make my own comments on them afterwards; but I do not think that I should be called on to defend them or to explain them in the course of reading them.
 On that occasion, all were selected, called and debated at length and either withdrawn, negatived or voted upon. They were all amendments embodying the same point, i.e., the exemption of certain types of user from the increased petrol tax. In last year's debates it was clearly demonstrated and not contradicted that it was impracticable to impose different rates of tax on petrol according to the persons using it, since petrol is taxed before its use is known. Therefore, to waste the time of the Committee in discussing amendments which in their then form were quite unworkable and in respect of which no effort to change the form of content had been made between last year and this, would have been to vitiate the whole principle of selection as carried out during the past thirty years.
That was the view formed by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Chairman of Ways and Means. Curiously enough, it follows a previous Ruling by a previous Chairman, who subsequently rose to the high position of Speaker of the House—namely, Captain Fitzroy, who in 1925 adopted that same practice and declined to call any Amendments to a Clause of the Finance Bill dealing with Supertax. He did not select any Amendments on Clause 13 which proposed to reduce the Supertax, but suggested that the Amendments should be discussed on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." There were five Amendments only, two of which appear to have been out of order.

Lieut.-Commander Gurney Braithwaite: As the right hon. Gentleman is quoting this as a precedent, can he tell us whether in that year the Supertax had been raised?

Mr. Ede: I do not think that is relevant to this issue. Specific Amendments were ruled out in just the same way as they were this year.
The House is faced with a Motion which has been placed on the Order Paper. I think, if I may be allowed to say so with every respect, that no exception can be taken to the way in which it was moved by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. It was on the Order Paper; it was his duty to bring it in front of the House, and nothing that he said should exacerbate any feelings in the matter.
We have entrusted this power of selection to the Chairman. It is quite clear that, if from time to time his method of selection is to be brought before the House, it must make the position of the Chairman intolerable, unless—and then it ought to be intolerable—it can be alleged that he acted in either a partisan spirit or in the absence of good faith in the selection that he has made. I believe that in this case the Chairman of Ways and Means acted in good faith.
We have armed the right hon. and gallant Gentleman with these powers. Those of us who sat in previous Parliaments when we armed him with these powers had had experience of his work, and I think it should be made quite clear to him that he retains the confidence of the House in the discharge of his duties. I would hope, not that this Motion should be put and negatived nemine contradi-cente, but that, having expressed their views to the House, and possibly after further debate if that is felt to be necessary, right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite might feel that, having ventilated the subject, they could then ask the leave of the House to withdraw the Motion.
I want to make it quite clear that we on this side of the House share to the full what the right hon. and gallant Gentleman said in the closing words of his speech. It is undoubtedly the first duty of this House to exercise a vigilant control over all matters of taxation. In modern circumstances, with the complicated Bills that have to be brought before the House, if we abandon this process of the selection of Amendments we shall be stultified by the very extravagance of freedom that would be allowed.
It is regrettable that any restriction should have to be placed on freedom of


debate, but in the course of the last 70 years or so this House has learned by bitter experience that certain necessary restrictions have to be imposed if free debate is to take place at all. Very largely, in operating those restrictions we rely for the preservation of the essential and elemental freedom upon the character and conduct of the right hon. and hon. Gentlemen whom from time to time we call to the Chair of the House or to the Chair of Committees.
I do not complain—it would be wrong of me to complain—that from time to time matters like this should be ventilated in the House. But, having said that, and having assured all sides of the House that in this matter, as far as the Government are concerned, we are outside the battle, because we are not consulted, and we bring no pressure to bear on the Chair, I hope that the House will feel that, the matter having been ventilated, the Motion could, by leave, be withdrawn.

4.47 p.m.

Mr. Churchill: The Leader of the House has spoken in that usual strain of temperate, reasonable moderation which endeavours, by carefully selected stepping-stones, to reach a conclusion which suits his own side. [HON. MEMBERS: "Cheap."] Far from complaining of that, hon. Gentlemen opposite ought to treat it as a compliment to one of their leading Parliamentarians. I do not intend to take up much of the time of the House—although, of course, if I am interrupted I shall go on for much longer—because of the other matters which press upon our attention, but I must say a few words in reply to the statement which the Leader of the House has just made to us.
We were enormously relieved to hear his declaration, or assertion, that there was no collusion between the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for instance, or the Government Whips, or himself, and the occupant of the Chair.

Mr. Bowles: Did the right hon. Gentleman think that there was?

Mr. Churchill: That he should have dwelt at such length upon that, and made it one of the foundations of his entire argument, certainly gave me a feeling of surprise, because I should have thought everyone knew that it would be grossly improper for any Minister to try to get

at the Chairman of Committees, who, though a party man and appointed by the Government of the day, and charged with certain, I will not say overriding but underlying responsibilities for advancing Government business—that is so, and has long been understood—is, nevertheless, certainly to be kept free from all appeals and addresses made to him, publicly or privately, by the Ministers of the Crown. I was astonished that the right hon. Gentleman should devote so much time to relieving our minds of a suspicion which has certainly never entered them.

Mr. Ede: The right hon. Gentleman will recollect that in response to an interruption he made I made it quite clear that I did not think the suspicions resided in the House, but that it was as well to take the opportunity of relieving the suspicions of certain people outside the House.

Mr. Churchill: I was astonished, nonetheless, that the right hon. Gentleman should have devoted so much of his speech to that subject. In these matters we are primarily concerned with the opinion of the House, and we cannot always provide against ideas which may arise or may be floating about through the public who take an interest in political affairs. At any rate, we did not suggest at any time that there was collusion, and I am very glad to reach a point on which we can have general agreement between the two sides of the House.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) the Leader of the Liberal Party, who gave me the impression that he was very much surprised at the Ruling given by the Chairman of Ways and Means, seemed to disapprove very much of the course that has been taken in putting this Motion upon the Order Paper. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must be careful not always to want to have everything both ways.
The fact is that he was surprised, as most people were, as experienced Members were, and as the Home Secretary himself has told us he was, to find that all the Amendments to Clause 1 had been swept away by a decision of the Chair and that immediately we came to deal with the Motion, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." That is a criticism upon the decision of the Chair. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes, of course


it is. It is not the final stage of a criticism, but it is surprise at an action or a decision, and is the first foundation upon which one gradually builds and which eventually leads up to the Motion we have put upon the Order Paper.
There was general surprise at the decision, a surprise in which the Leader of the Liberal Party joins. There was the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary sitting in his rom. I will not say he was staggered; I will keep to the words he has used—he was surprised. We on this side of the House have a duty to carry out. Not only was there surprise on the part of my hon. Friends, but there was indignation because all these Amendments of a different character were swept on one side, and immediately we came to a general debate upon the Motion, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
I am bound to say that I thought it was a wrong decision on the part of the Chairman of Ways and Means to sweep them out of the way in that method. As I have said, I do not doubt that he wished to do what was right, and that he sought the best method of correctly interpreting his difficult, discretionary duties.
I make no imputation upon his bona fides, a word which was dragged in by the Leader of the Liberal Party, nor his good faith. Nothing in the speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend, in moving the Motion, suggested that, but we think we were unfairly treated. One may be unfairly treated—[Interruption.] I hope the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) is not going to get very indignant. One may be unfairly treated just as much by an error of judgment as by want of good faith or malice. We do not impute malice. There was an error of judgment, which resulted, in practice, in what we consider unfair treatment of the Opposition in regard to important Amendments on Clause 1. That is what has brought us to this point today.
What is the point of the argument— which has been brought forward in a letter which was read to the House—that the Amendments were the same old Amendments that were put forward last year? Each year is different. We live on the principle of annual finance. That is the foundation of this House and its whole existence, which has been fought

for over the centuries. What is the use of saying that because these Amendments were moved last year, they should not be moved the next year or the year after? There is nothing in that. The circumstances of every year are entirely different, as are the circumstances of every day if we can measure them accurately.
Each year taxes are altered, and, therefore, each tax is altered in its general incidence and bearing. It is suggested that because an Amendment was moved last year it should be improper, out of order or unnecessary to raise it again in the succeeding year. That is a most injurious objection to put forward. Taxes may continue the same this year as last year, or they may be increased owing to other events which have occurred. I am astonished that such a false argument should be cherished.
It does not depend on whether a tax is increased. That aggravates the case, but the mere fact that it should be suggested that the House should not have the fullest right to raise the same question on our finances year after year, if it wants to, is one which betokens a lack of appreciation of the general principles and sense of the House. One might as well ask why should we have the Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill, which comes on every year. These matters must be judged and considered in relation to Parliamentary custom and experience.
In our view, on this side of the House, the Chairman of Ways and Means, while in no way being guilty of any moral fault, did commit an error of judgment, which came as a surprise to those who are experienced in the procedure of this House. This error of judgment reflected hardship upon individuals and affected or marred our discussion on an important part of the Finance Bill. Those are the reasons that led us—and still lead us—to present this Motion to the House. I am very glad it is to be disposed of today. I do not think I have said anything which would inject a note of personal bitterness into our debate. We are dealing with a constitutional issue, and it is our duty to deal expressly with any constitutional issues.
There can be no question whatever of our responding to the suggestion of the Leader of the House that we should withdraw this Motion. If it is to be negatived let it be done by the House. We have placed it on the Order Paper. It is a record of the feelings and actions


of the Opposition at a particular phase in the present Finance Bill. Let us hope that the moral will be drawn, and that the general principle on which the House of Commons has been conducted will be carefully observed in the future, the stricter because on this question they have been brought to sharp, precise and even meticulous attention.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Bellenger: It would be unwise for the House to continue this debate at any length, particularly in view of what was said by the Leader of the Opposition in his closing words. I much prefer the speech of the right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank), who undoubtedly gave expression to the grievance, real or imagined, which the Opposition have about their Amendments being ruled out of order. He presented the case in a form and manner of which the House of Commons can be proud. In any other Parliament that I know of, a Motion like this would excite party feeling and passion. If ever there is an occasion when party feeling should not enter into our debates, this is an outstanding one.
I regret that the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) has just said that the Opposition intend to leave this Motion on the Order Paper until it is settled, not by a Division, but by being negatived. What, in fact, will that mean? This Motion of censure will be on the records. Although the right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough tried to persuade us that this was not a censure Motion, the words uttered by his Leader and the words of the Motion—
 views with concern"—
are, in form if not in substance, a degree of censorship. It would be very serious if we allowed that to be the considered view of a portion of the House of Commons, although it is not the unanimous view of us all.
My right hon. Friend the Chairman of Ways and Means has served this House faithfully in his present position. On no other occasion has any hon. Member questioned his decisions. Even if the right hon. Member for Woodford is right that his decision on this occasion was an error of judgment, I ask him whether he thinks it fair to put his opinion in this form on the Order Paper?

Earl Winterton: Is the right hon. Member aware that there have constantly been Motions of this kind on the Order Paper in the past, sometimes in criticism of Mr. Speaker? There is nothing novel about it.

Mr. Bellenger: That may have been so, but in the time that I have been in this House, some 15 years, I do not remember an occasion when a Motion was put on the Paper criticising Mr. Speaker or the Chairman of Ways and Means. Perhaps it might have been different in days gone by.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter (Kingston-upon-Thames): The last occasion, speaking from memory, was about three years ago, when the then Member for Oxford placed a Motion of this kind on the Order Paper.

Mr. Bellenger: My recollection there is at fault, but that does not alter my view that these Motions should be used very sparingly; otherwise, as the Leader of the House has said, we shall bring the Chair into a very difficult position, especially if the occupant of the Chair is to be forced to give his reasons for rejecting Amendments. It would be preferable for the Opposition to withdraw their Motion. I regret that if it goes to its natural conclusion it will be some sort of suggestion that the Chairman of Ways and Means has not the continued confidence of some hon. Members.

5.6 p.m.

Mr. Pickthorn: The most difficult duty of a private Member is to decide when he ought to try to speak. I speak today under a deep consciousness that it might very well be wiser for us all to refrain and let the thing go. I find it especially difficult to decide that I want to say because, if I may say so without sounding fulsome, of the admirable tone and temper of the speech as made from my own Front Bench.
But the Leader of the House has really made it necessary that one or two questions should be put to him which have not been put. I would not try to tie him to a strict interpretation of words when he might not have meant to accept their full implication, but in his opening he seemed to throw over the Chairman of Ways and Means the œgis of Cabinet solidarity. He said that it was inconceivable that His Majesty's Government should have accepted the suggestions of


my right hon. and gallant Friend who opened the debate because, if so it would be necessary for the Chairman of Ways and Means to resign. I am not arguing that point, but I am arguing that the right hon. Gentleman came as near as makes no difference to saying that the Chairman of Ways and Means is covered by the doctrine of Cabinet solidarity.

Mr. Ede: I do not quite understand what the hon. Gentleman is leading up to, or what meaning he is giving to his own words. I tried to make it clear that the Chairman of Ways and Means and the Cabinet have no connection whatever.

Mr. Pickthorn: That is the second point to which I was coming. I thought I had made the first point clear. [An HON. MEMBER: "You never do."] I cannot make my meaning clear to everyone, but I hoped that I had made it clear to the Leader of the House. He used language which, if he reads it tomorrow in HANSARD, will make him agree, I think, that he seemed to be speaking for the Cabinet and as though for then it was a decisive argument that to accept any Motion of criticism, in their view, about the Chairman of Ways and Means would necessitate a change in the Chairmanship.

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Ede: If I thought that the Chairman of Ways and Means had been guilty of some conduct that would lead to his forfeiting the confidence of the House, I should say so. An effort was made by the right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough to say that this was not a Vote of Censure and that even if it were passed it would make no difference to the position of the Chairman of Ways and Means. My own view is that if it were passed it will be impossible for any man to whom it had been directed to remain Chairman of Ways and Means.

Mr. Pickthorn: The right hon. Gentleman began by saying that he could not accept my right hon. Friend's suggestion because it would involve a change in the Chair. That seems an extremely dangerous doctrine.
The second point put by the Leader of the House, because, as he said, this position has been challenged outside, was that the Government take no part in the

matter at all and that the Chairman of Ways and Means has the advice only of persons for whom we all have the profoundest respect and who are not in any way in the employ or under the direction of the Government but of the House of Commons. I think I am fairly reporting his words.

Mr. Ede: Mr. Ede indicated assent.

Mr. Pickthorn: The question I desire to put, in order, as the right hon. Gentleman says, to make it clear to those outside is: Did he plainly mean to assert that the Chairman of Ways and Means has the advice of the servants of the House and of no one else at all?

Mr. Ede: The Chairman of Ways and Means has the right to take advice from whom he chooses, but the House has provided certain professional advisers who are at his disposal. They were the persons to whom I was alluding. What other advice he seeks I neither know nor care.

5.11 p.m.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: It is desirable that some back benchers should express their opinion about a matter which concerns every hon. Member in the House. I profoundly regret that the Motion was placed on the Order Paper and, having listened to the speeches so far, I feel that, unless the Motion is withdrawn, it will leave the Chairman of Ways and Means in an intolerable position. Unless the Motion is withdrawn now that the whole matter has been ventilated the Opposition will have done a great disservice to themselves and also to the House.
Hon. Members opposite have been at pains to say that the Motion does not censure the Chairman of Ways and Means. They say that they make no accusation against his good faith and that they are merely criticising him for an error of judgment, but the speech of the right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) did not give the House any indication why he criticised the judgment of the Chairman of Ways and Means, and he did not say who should have the power and right to decide what Amendments should be selected if it was not the Chairman of Ways and Means. In the interests of the House and of


orderly debate, the House has, since 1919, given to the occupant of the Chair the most complete discretion as to what Amendments should or should not be selected, and the occupant of the Chair is entrusted with that power because the House has confidence in his judgment.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman said that he thought there had been an error of judgment, but, if the Chairman of Ways and Means is not to decide this, who is to decide it? Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to decide what Amendments shall be selected? Is the Leader of the Opposition to decide what Amendments shall be selected? Is the House itself by a vote to decide what Amendments shall be selected?
We should never be able to carry on our Parliamentary business if every time an hon. Member felt aggrieved at the decision of the Chairman of Ways and Means or of Mr. Speaker in selecting Amendments a Motion of this kind were to be put down. If there is to be a criticism of the judgment of the Chairman of Ways and Means, it ought surely to be related to earlier decisions of occupants of the Chair as to the selection of Amendments. That has not been done.
This power to select Amendments is no new power. For 30 years the occupants of the Chair have had unreserved discretion and have not given any reasons for the exercise of their discretion. It has been said over and over again by Mr. Speaker's predecessors that it is not necessary to give any reasons. If the occupant of the Chair does not have to give any reasons for his decision, how is it possible to criticise the decision?
The only reason which has been adduced by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman and others who have supported him was that the Chairman of Ways and Means said during the discussion that one of his reasons for not selecting the Amendments to Clause I was that the same Amendments had been considered the previous year. We have heard that in arriving at that decision the Chairman of Ways and Means took the professional advice of the Clerks at the Table and others which was open to him. It is also perfectly clear from the records that on previous occasions, the fact of earlier discussions is a recognised ground of non-selection. Apart from the instance

in 1925 given by the Home Secretary, there was, not only in 1925, also an occasion in 1935 when Sir Dennis Herbert gave precisely the same reasons for his refusal to select Amendments which had been put down by certain of my hon. Friends who were then in Opposition.
It is of the essence of Parliamentary government to have confidence in the Chair, and as the Opposition have heard the explanations which have been given, I hope that they will not do a disservice to our Parliamentary institutions by allowing the Motion to remain on the Order Paper but will withdraw it.

Question put, and negatived.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— [Mr. William Whiteley.]

PERSIA (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY)

5.17 p.m.

Mr. Eden: In the course of our exchanges across the Floor at Question Time yesterday the Leader of the House remarked, with accuracy, about the topic that we are now about to discuss.
 We recognise the great importance, the over-riding importance, of this issue, and we should be quite willing to provide time for a discussion of this matter."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th June, 1951; Vol. 489, c. 529.]
When I listened to the Home Secretary saying that and pointing out that the Government would grant time, I expected that the Government would also open the debate by giving some guidance to the House as to the present position and also by telling us something of their policy and intentions.
As the Foreign Secretary has now entered the Chamber, I would repeat that, in the light of what the Home Secretary told us yesterday about the overriding importance of this debate, I had expected that the Foreign Secretary himself would have opened it and given us an account of the Government's view of the present situation. I know that a number of statements have been made in the last few days but, after all, this is an international issue of the gravest significance in a setting which may influence the whole future strategic development of the Middle East and far beyond. I really had thought that the Government,


having admitted the gravity of the danger and having given us their time for the discussion, would have opened the debate with a statement by a responsible Minister of the Crown, telling us his view of the situation.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Herbert Morrison): Might I point out that I take the view that I have made not only one statement but a series of statements and have been as informative to the House as I possibly could be. The Opposition are making the criticism, if any, today. The Opposition asked for the facilities and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House gave them. It seems to me perfectly natural that it is for the Opposition to make their observations and their criticisms, and for me to listen to the House—I am the servant of the House, on both sides—and at the end to reply to the observations which are made. It is not as if I had said nothing already. I have made a series of statements, and it is really upon those statements that the House is proceeding to the debate.

Mr. Eden: It is true that the Foreign Secretary has made a series of statements about the Notes exchanged with the Persian Government, but it is not only those Notes that we have to discuss. There are far, far wider implications about this business than what eventually happens about nationalisation or otherwise in the immediate Persian oil problem.
I repeat, I had hoped that the Foreign Secretary would have led off with general guidance to the House as to how he sees the repercussions of events as they are already, possible events of the future in the Middle East, and what should be the policy and guidance of the Government for the House about it. However, if the Foreign Secretary is not prepared to do that, I must do the best I can.
I began by saying what I considered the international repercussions of this business are likely to be, and that is what I want the House, to start with, to concentrate upon. For we must understand this: that if the supplies of crude oil from Persia and the supplies of refined products from Abadan should, for whatever reason, cease to flow, the consequences upon the economy, the life, and I think the political and strategic future of wide areas

throughout the world must be far reaching and may be calamitous. That is the setting—I do not think I have exaggerated any word of that—in which I see these events.
Now let us look at it a little in detail. Take, first of all, the countries that will be most affected merely by the supply of oil, and in giving my survey of how I see these implications, the order in which I put matters has not any significance. Let us take the countries which are likely to be most affected. India and Pakistan and South-East Asia will certainly be immediately affected in their supplies and I think, to a lesser degree, Australia and New Zealand. Then there are the countries of the Mediterranean area who, for the last two years, have been without supplies from the refinery at Haifa. They, I understand, are to a considerable extent dependent upon what they get from Abadan. What is likely to be the effect upon their economy of the stoppage of these supplies, should it take place?
Then, moving nearer home, there are the countries of Western Europe and ourselves. I think I am right in saying that about a quarter of the oil and oil products we use in this country is drawn from Persia or from Abadan. That is quite a high percentage; and I believe in Western Europe about 50 per cent. of the supplies used are drawn from the Middle Eastern area generally, not all of them of course from Persia. That also is a very high figure. No doubt other countries will do what they can to help make up for the loss of further supplies, should it occur, from Abadan and Persia. But what they can do is not by any means certain, and the House will no doubt have observed of late that the United States herself is now a definite importer of oil and that there are not surplus stocks of supplies available.
What will be the effect upon the economy of this country, upon industrial output, upon full employment, upon the balance of payments, upon the re-armament programme—not only ours but the whole of Western Europe—should we have to attempt to fulfil all those various tasks without these essential supplies from the Middle East, from Persia and Abadan? I do not know the answers to those questions, though I am absolutely certain that each one of those countries will be beset with problems of


the utmost complexity should these supplies be cut off. What I imagine is that the Government themselves have weighed all these matters and considered them, and that they will have their place in whatever decision the Government may take about it all.
There are, of course, other problems. There is the question of the position of the Royal Navy in relation to these supplies, and also of aviation fuel. I have no secret information to divulge, but I think it is common knowledge that the greater part of our stocks of aviation fuel—and not only ours but the whole of Western Europe—come from Abadan. How are those to be replaced? All these
factors have, presumably, been weighed by the Government in considering this very critical situation. I repeat, I had hoped that in the earlier stages the Government would show the House the picture of what arose and how they propose to deal with it.
That is the first chapter. Next is the contribution which, under efficient management, Persian oil could make to the whole economy of Middle and Far Eastern Asia. Today, the output of the Persian oilfields is in the nature of 35 million tons and Abadan in the nature of 25 million tons. But that is not the most important factor because those fields are capable of yet further expansion under efficient management.
What I had hoped to see—the vision that certainly has often been in my mind—was that the output of this vast oil area would be available as the foundation upon which an improvement in the standard of life of Africa, South-East Asia, and other parts of the world could be built. But if we are not going to have this oil how shall we be able to carry out the Colombo plan, or any other of those schemes upon which the Governments of the Commonwealth and others have agreed? Every single one of those factors is affected by this essential consideration.
I have given two great chapters for consideration but there is a third chapter, which is the most serious of all. That is the effect in Persia itself. If, for whatever reason, these refineries close and the Persian Government no longer receives the revenues it has hitherto been drawing from them, then I see no possible future save the economic collapse of Persia and

almost certainly of the Persian State. We know how precarious the economy of Persia is today. We know how much she depends upon these revenues. For my part, if they cease, for whatever reason, I believe that it will be to play into the hands of the Tudeh Party, which is quietly waiting to take over control of the country at the first opportunity. Anarchy would ensue.
It is not as if the Government in Teheran today had a writ to run all over a
country which was well administered and where conditions were happy, secure, and stable. That, unfortunately, is not the position. There is an insecure, unstable administration, dependent for its revenues upon what the oil company can provide. If those revenues cease, the consequences to internal order and security need not be described by me.
There is one sentence I read in the paper this morning which struck me as a rather typically Persian way of putting the situation. One of the employees of the company is reported to have said this:
 I shall never believe the business is really nationalised until the firm owe me two months' salary.
That is a pithy summing up, in a phrase worthy of Sadi, of the fundamental truths of present day Persian economy—and not only present day either.
So what will happen? If these revenues are not available, Persian economy will inevitably collapse and, with it, the whole political structure of the country. That is precisely what the Tudeh Party is waiting for, and the international repercussions of a Communist control of Persia do not require any exaggeration. They do not even require any very graphic description. The consequences for Persia's neighbours need not be rehearsed. A complete transformation of the whole strategic position throughout the Middle East would inevitably result.
Then there are the effects of all this upon the neighbouring countries producing oil. To put it at the very lowest, it will not make the task of statesmanship much easier in those countries where resistance is being offered to clamour to pursue similar policies to those in Persia. The fanatical extremists will not be the more easily withheld from the same kind of policies as are on the verge of wrecking Persia. I should imagine that whatever else we may disagree about, nobody


can nave a doubt that what happens in Persia will have its immediate repercussions throughout the Middle East and beyond. This, indeed, has been very obvious for a long time, and many will feel that once again failure to anticipate the future has bedeviled the present. Much of this is the legacy of Middle Eastern policies—or lack of policy.
Now the company has made an offer, which the Foreign Secretary described to us yesterday. It was an admirable, even a generous, offer. Maybe it or something like it might with advantage have been made rather earlier.

Mr. Harold Davies: Hear, hear.

Mr. Eden: But when making that observation, it is only fair to say that the supplemental agreement which the company offered as long ago as the summer of 1949, some two years ago, which was accepted by the Government but not ratified by the Majlis, offered to Persia, if I am right, rates of payment as good as those being received by Saudi-Arabia and Iraq.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Davies indicated dissent.

Mr. Eden: The hon. Member shakes his head, but I think I am right; the Government will tell us. Whether I am right or not, it was unfortunate that that impression was not successfully got across. The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), I see, is arguing with his neighbours, some of whom are shaking their heads at him. They are obviously in disagreement between themselves, and I will leave them to it while I continue my speech. It is unfortunate that if that offer was as good as I have said, it was not made clearer to Persian opinion at that time. I think I am stating the view of the Foreign Secretary about that offer of two years ago, because in his own note he says that it offered
a more advantageous return per ton of oil than was enjoyed by any other Middle Eastern government.
It is worth looking for a moment at the origins of this offer. They are in part connected, hon. Members may be surprised to learn, with dividend limitation. I know a little about this in relation to the Middle Eastern view, because I have heard about it when I was out there. The 1933 agreement gave the Persian Government a number of advantages and

payments under a number of heads, but over and above that there was a provision —I am quoting the gist of the agreement —for a payment equal to 20 per cent. of any distribution to the ordinary shareholders in excess of £671,000.
Then it goes on to say that at the expiration of the agreement, 20 per cent. of the difference between the general reserve when the agreement began and the general reserve at the end, would be paid to the Persian Government. In other words, the company not paying an increased dividend but placing it to reserve, the Persians would eventually get an equivalent sum; but they did not get it then.
Let hon. Members put themselves for a moment in the position of the Persian Government and the Persian people about this, because these observations were addressed to me at that time. As they saw it, the company was earning 150 per cent. or thereabouts, but they were still paying 30 per cent. His Majesty's Government were getting a good rake-off, not as a shareholder, but from taxation —Income Tax, Profits Tax and this, that and the other form of tax; and although some of the Persians knew that eventually they would get in reserve, whenever the concession came to an end, an amount equivalent to the extra which the ordinary shareholders would have had, that was not much immediate comfort.
I have no doubt whatever that that was one of the factors which caused this uneasiness. At any rate the company, to try to meet it, then began these discussions, which after delay resulted in the supplemental agreement of 1948. It is, perhaps, worth while—I do not want to attach too much importance to it—to note that situation as we go along. So much for the realities of the situation as I see them.
What should our present action be? In my view, evacuation would be disastrous. It would be an abject surrender to the threat of force. The Government have taken—and, I think, rightly taken —the legal issue to The Hague Court. The issue they have taken is not the question of who owns the oil in Persia—it has never been disputed by us that it is Persian oil; the issue they have taken is whether the Persians have a right unilaterally to take over our installations. They have now asked for what amounts to an interim injunction about this.
Meanwhile, while The Hague Court is considering that, it is clear that the British staff must stay. It is as much a Persian as a British interest that they should do so. But if these men are being asked to stay, then it is the inescapable duty of the Government to take any steps that may be necessary to protect them. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] The Government may be sure that whatever those steps may be, we shall be ready to give them our support. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

Mr. Harold Davies: There was not such a hearty "Hear, hear" that time.

Mr. Eden: Then let the hon. Gentleman take the action; we will support him in it. If we do not, he can make all the complaints he likes in every constituency in the land.
As things are, we have the impression that our own people have no means of self-defence should disturbances break out again. There have been disturbances recently—not very recently, fortunately, but recently—in which three British lives were lost. That makes all the heavier the Government's responsibility to see to it that the necessary protection is at hand to meet any danger that may suddenly arise. That, as we see it, is their first charge.
I observe in "The Times" of this morning that the Middle East Defence Committee of the Commonwealth meets in London today. I wish it could have met a little earlier than this. I hope that these matters are first on their agenda and will be taken urgently into consideration by them, and that they will devise plans and prepare their execution of those plans, whatever decisions they may arrive at. But it is very late. For fully three years—perhaps longer—there has been a vacuum in our Middle East policy and in our Middle East defence plan. It may be that if these preparations had been made earlier these events would never have developed as they have done.

Mr. George Wigg: Mr. George Wigg (Dudley) rose—

Mr. Eden: I will make my point and then the hon. Member may interrupt. Certainly it is true that the manner in which we have been treated
by the Egyptian Government has had its repercussions throughout the Middle East and not least in Persia. The stoppage of our

tankers for more than two years from going through the Canal, known, of course, in every bazaar in the Middle East, has had its inevitable reactions upon the opinion in which we are held.

Mr. Wigg: I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman this. In 1932 the positions were reversed, he was Foreign Secretary, and a situation arose in Persia in which the possibility of using British troops was mentioned. George Lansbury asked him whether he was prepared to use British troops in exactly the same situation as this and the right hon. Gentleman said that the responsibility for safeguarding British property devolved on the Persian Government. Why does he advance the exact opposite today?

Mr. Eden: I did not think I was putting the exact opposite—

Mr. Wigg: If the right hon. Gentleman reads HANSARD he will find that he is—

Mr. Eden: I think that if the hon. Member studies my speech he will see that I have not put the exact opposite. George Lansbury, to the best of my recollection, offered me support then and I am offering support now and the only difference is that I know what my policy is, but I do not know yet what the Government's policy is.
I will sum up what I have to say. It is impossible to divorce these events from the trend of policies in the Middle East in the last few years. The Government must know and I know that hon. Members think it, although they did not vote on it, that the Egyptian policies and, above all, our weakness in respect of the Canal and the passage of tankers through the Canal have had their reaction on the events, the calamitous events, we are now discussing.
The right hon. Gentleman knows that I have had, and I hope I still have, some friends in Persia. I hope against hope that wiser counsels will still prevail. If my voice can reach any of those who have been my friends in past years in that country I would beg them to believe that in true co-operation between us lies happiness for both our countries and the peace of the world. Surely good sense as well as good will can still prevail, but we shall not avoid trouble for ourselves, or for others, by shirking the realities of the challenge when it confronts us.

5.43 p.m.

Mr. Gunter: I am sure the whole House appreciated the speech made from the Opposition Front Bench, coming as it did from such an authority on Persian affairs. I am bound to say that I feel we are in danger of overlooking sometimes the far-reaching consequences of any great disaster on the Persian Gulf if the Persian Government disintegrates and that country becomes completely disrupted.
In the bewildering years before the war we saw, amidst our bewilderment, bastions falling one by one, and I am of the opinion that if there is an elimination of British interests on the Persian Gulf, if, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) has already indicated, we lose our interests and power and prestige in that part of the world, the consequences for ourselves and for the peace of the world will be very dramatic indeed. It would be almost a tragedy without parallel in history, if it was found in the next decade that that historic land of Persia, Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, came under the control of Russia.
I believe that all our efforts through Western Union and all our efforts with the Atlantic Pact would mean practically nothing if not only the resources of oil were withdrawn from us but in addition the important strategic interests were lost. It is a fascinating feature of history that, however much the centres of power change and empires rise and fall, and however different may be the ideological battles which disturb us from time to time, there are certain areas of this globe that still retain their great strategic importance, and this area where the dispute at present rages is one of those areas.
Alexander the Great, no less than Hitler, appreciated the importance of that area. It is a matter of speculation, we know, although we may draw our conclusions, but if the Germans had passed through the Caucasus during the early years of the war and succeeded in reaching the Persian Gulf the position of this country and of the whole world might have been desperate. Therefore, I am one who believes that we should try to sum up and get into proper perspective all the things involved in this present dispute.
It has been said by eminent people, and by less eminent people, that one of

the most stupid things to do at present is to look for a Communist under every bed. With that sentiment I am in complete agreement. It is a mark of cowardice when we in industry or anywhere else automatically look for a Communist under the bed, but what concerns me at present about this situation is the fact that the lusty Russian desires to get into the bed. It is not a question of Communism; it is a remarkable thing that the strategy and the aspirations of Czars of Russia find great similarity in the designs and ambitions of the present ruling power of Russia. It is a remarkable thing when we read the history of the events of the past century how those designs and how those manœuvres, not only on the Russian side but on our side as well, have a similarity to the present position.
I submit that we cannot properly understand this position unless we pay great regard to some of the events and some of the manoeuvres being made in Persia. The right hon. Gentleman made reference to the Tudeh Party. The present activities of the Tudeh Party in Persia form a classic for all future revolutions. They are employing tactics in Persia at present dissimilar from those employed in any other Asiatic country. The right hon. Gentleman said they were quietly waiting—they are certainly waiting and they are quiet, but there is vast activity. The right hon. Gentleman knows better than I do that the tribes of Southern Persia are at present in a state of great unrest and have neither faith nor belief in the Persian Government. We all know that propaganda from Azerbaijan Radio Station is having its effect on the Kurds in Northern Persia.
I submit to the House that what the Tudeh Party is waiting for and working for is that as a consequence of the present dispute such confusion will arise in that country that that very small but very well disciplined party will be able to enter and take control of Persia. It is a marshalled and a disciplined party, and let no one under-estimate their power in Persia at present. There can be no doubt that the Tudeh Party await these developments with great joy. Coupled with that is a belief in their own failure as Persians— the well-known incapacity of Persians to keep the vast machines of Abadan going if we get out. That is not a matter of


which the Tudeh Party are in ignorance. They know that in the absence of foreign technicians the conclusion to be drawn from the crazy moves of the Persian Government is that they can move in. It means this, and let us have a look at the map of the country, that from the Caucasus to the Gulf, from Afganistan to Turkey, there is the possibility of a great new satellite state being set up.
Let our American friends weigh very very carefully what they say and do in this respect, because I believe that there is still hope of a settlement—I choose my words carefully—if the Americans at the present time will stoutly and robustly come forward in support of our point of view. If they do not, as the right hon. Gentleman indicated, the effect upon all the South Arabian oil supplies will be devastating for the world. If Persia goes it is impossible that the same conditions can prevail in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is not so far away and may undoubtedly be affected if this happens. It could bring about a great disaster, not only so far as essential oil reserves are concerned, but also so far as world strategy is concerned.
I believe, as was once intimated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. A. Bevan), that Russia is in some dilemma about oil. The obtaining of vastly increased supplies of oil would be to Russia a prize worth playing for with high stakes. In addition, the control of the Western flank of the sub-Continent of India and Pakistan is an objective which I have little doubt she would play for with all she possibly could.
I would say a word about some statements which have been made regarding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, for it is as well that the world should know what the British people have to be proud of—and perhaps to be ashamed of—in this matter. There is a great necessity for us to let world opinion and particularly American opinion know what we have done and what perhaps we have not done, so that the picture may be seen in its proper perspective.
I cannot stand here, and I will not stand here, and defend all that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have done. That cannot be done. There have been great blemishes upon their operations and administrations. But, whatever we may think about those blemishes—and I as a

good Nonconformist do not believe that infallibility rests on this earth, but is the product of another plane—there are, after all, blemishes on all forms of administration. Having stated that, in my opinion they might have chosen their staff and personnel with some greater regard for the effect of such staff upon native
opinion; having said they might have been more generous in past years, I still believe that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has for a long time been the most stable and efficient unit in the public life of Persia.
I believe that if the Persian Government had used the revenues that accrued to them from the oil companies for the purposes of social amelioration in the past they could have avoided the appalling misery and poverty which now prevails. But whatever we may say about exploitation, and there has been exploitation, the housing and social conditions of the employees of
the oil company is without any comparison in the Persian nation at the present time. There is nothing like it anywhere else in Persia. Therefore, we do ourselves very little service by denigrating, and sometimes making use of slogans, about what the oil company has or has not done.
It may not be entirely relevant, but I would say that had I been in charge of the operations of the oil company there would not have been a very great incentive to me to increase the amount of royalties paid to the Persian Government, for the reason that those which were paid were dissipated quite corruptly. I do not think we serve any great purpose by denigrating the oil company at the present time.
Whatever happens in the next few days in Persia, let no one imagine that the painstaking efforts of the Western world to maintain peace will not have received a devastating blow if the Tudeh Party in Persia step into a vacuum created by the final disruption and disintegration of the Persian Government. From that standpoint I would say again what I have said outside this House, that in my opinion the oil supplies and the strategic position of the Persian Gulf is a far greater danger and menace than Korea is, or ever has been. It is easy to say these things now, but perhaps it will be seen in history that one of the greatest mistakes of the Western world and the United Nations has been to allow so much of our armed strength to be drawn to Korea;


whereas the real vital sore spots in the world at the present time may be left unguarded.
I say to the Foreign Secretary with great humility that I do not believe any good will come from evacuation at the present time. I believe that would be interpreted in the Middle East and in world events as a sign of weakness. It may be that the Foreign Secretary can tell me, because he knows far more about it than I do, that that is the only possible step to take. I would have some reluctance in believing it, believing, as I do, that world peace and the values we esteem so much would surely have suffered a devastating blow.

5.58 p.m.

Mr. Duncan Sandys: My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) said what I believe every hon. Member of this House is hoping, and that is that wiser counsels may prevail in Persia. The attitude the Persian Government have taken is unexplainable by any process of logic or reason. I was very glad to hear the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Gunter) make a speech which I believe was appreciated in all parts of the House and which was actuated by thoughts which are in the minds of British men and women throughout this country. It will also be an encouragement to those in Abadan in these difficult times.
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have greatly enriched and benefited Persia. They have provided immense revenue for the State and, as has been stated by the International Labour Organisation in its report, they have provided conditions of life for those engaged in the industry such as do not exist in any other part of Persia. If the Persian Government should drive out the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or paralyse its activity by turning off the valves, as they are threatening to do, they will be doing, on a vast and tragic scale, what is described colloquially as cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. If the Company were to leave Persia, or cease to operate, there is no doubt the extraction and refinement of oil would come to a stop for a very long time.
There are only two countries, America and Russia, which would be in a position to provide the technical skill required to fill the places of the Anglo-Iranian per-

sonnel if they withdrew. The Americans, I am sure, would be unwilling, not only on account of their feelings of solidarity with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but also for other reasons, to accept conditions which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had found unacceptable. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Russians would be ready and glad to provide the technicians needed. But there is one thing they could not provide and that is the fleet of tankers with which to export and sell the oil.
No doubt, as a long-term policy, the Russians might decide to construct pipelines to carry the oil from Abadan up to the Caspian Sea, some 500 miles or more away; but that would certainly take a number of years. I am told that it might take four or five years to carry through a project of that kind. Meanwhile the stoppage of oil production and sales would result in a disastrous decline in the revenue of the Persian State, which, I understand, derives something like 18 per cent. of its total income from oil.

Mr. Harold Davies: Will the right hon. Gentleman permit me to point out that this revenue picture has been over-painted? The World Economic Report said conclusively that in these areas, one-tenth of the national income of Iran was derived from the oil industry royalties and in connection with oil, and that only one-third of that one-tenth is actually related to the oil royalties.

Mr. Sandys: I understood that it was about 18 to 20 per cent. But no one will dispute that the loss of the revenue from oil would have a most serious effect on the capacity of the Government to carry on, and would lead to all the consequences to which my right hon. Friend referred.
However, it is probable that Russia, in order to get control of Persia, would be only too glad to subsidise the Persian Treasury during the interval while the pipelines to the north were being constructed. If the Persians were to accept such an offer they would find that they had sold themselves body and soul to the Soviet Union. That would hardly be a triumphant conclusion to an operation which started as an assertion of national independence. Persia has, in fact, everything to lose and nothing to gain by


rejecting the proposals of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which are not only financially advantageous, but which, by recognising the principle of nationalisation, also go a long way towards satisfying national pride.
If conditions in Persia were, even by Persian standards, moderately stable, there would be little difficulty in arriving at some reasonable settlement on the basis purely of Persian self-interest. Unfortunately, we are dealing with a Government whose members are living from day to day in fear of assassination, and with a Prime Minister who, as far as one can gather from the newspapers, conducts his business from his bed in a police-defended Parliament building. In such conditions, we must not be surprised at some of the strange things that have been happening. Moreover, we must also remember that, from one day to another, we may be faced with an entirely new Government, which, in its turn, will repudiate everything which may be agreed with the present Government.
In these circumstances, we should do well to concentrate our attention upon discharging our essential and vital British responsibilities. We have three principal responsibilities. The first is to protect British Nationals. In this connection, I should like to remind the House of a passage in the statement made by the Foreign Secretary yesterday. The right hon. Gentleman said:
 It is the responsibility of the Persian Government to see to it that law and order are maintained and that all within the frontiers of Persia are protected from violence. If, however, that responsibility were not met it would equally be the right and the duty of His Majesty's Government to extend protection to their own nationals.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th June, 1951; Vol. 489, c. 526–7.]
I hope I am right in understanding that statement by the Foreign Secretary as meaning that, if the Persian Government do not protect all within their frontiers from violence, he will regard it as a British responsibility to extend protection to British nationals within the frontiers of Persia so that they may be able to continue to go about their lawful business in Persia. I would not consider it to be protecting British nationals within the frontiers of Persia to send aeroplanes to take them out. I hope we may have that point clarified in the Min-

ister's reply. I am not, of course, referring to the question of evacuating women and children. I am sure we should all be in favour of that. But in view of all the rumours we do want to be assured that there is no question of evacuating wholesale the essential technical personnel who carry on this business. If such an assurance were given, I believe it would have a steadying effect upon the situation, and that it might, even at this late hour, have some influence on the attitude of the Persian Government.
The second British responsibility is to preserve our vital strategic and commercial interests in that area. The effect of abandoning our position in Persia would, I submit, be disastrous. In the first place, we should lose about 30 million tons of essential oil each year, which in itself would be very serious. But what is more important is that the example of Persia would undoubtedly whet the nationalistic appetite of neighbouring countries.
If the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were to be forced to leave Persia through lack of support from the British Government, what grounds would there be for resisting similar demands from all the other oil-producing countries such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia? We should very soon find that our position in this area upon which we and our allies depend so much for our essential strategic resources, would be seriously threatened.
The third and last British responsibility in this area is to deny this essential oil to the Soviet Union. Oil represents one of the greatest of Russia's strategic needs. It is one of the bottlenecks in her defence preparations. Russia at present produces about 45 million tons of oil a year. If she were to be able to lay her hands on another 30 million tons of oil in Persia, she would be increasing her supplies by nothing less than 66 per cent. at one stroke.

Mr. Wigg: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us what actual steps he proposes we ought to take now to achieve the objects which he has in mind?

Mr. Sandys: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to deploy my argument. I will certainly not evade that point.
If through inaction we were prepared to allow the Russians to increase their oil


supplies by no less than 66 per cent., then, I submit to the House, we are wasting our time in taking measures to stop up small gaps in Hong Kong and other such places, and are at one stroke going to abandon the immense benefits which the oil represents. Therefore, I ask the Minister to give us some assurance on that point also when he replies.
I shall now deal with the point raised by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). Without the detailed knowledge of the situation which the Government alone possess—they obviously possess a great deal more knowledge than they have given to the House, and I do not complain about that, because, in a delicate situation of this kind, there are some things that can be said and others that cannot—it is impossible for us to say what precise action should be taken at what precise moment. In particular, it is very difficult for us to say whether the moment has come or is going to come when it will be necessary to send British troops into that area.

Mr. Crossman: Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East) rose—

Mr. Sandys: I am not going to shirk the issue. All action involves risk. But I would submit to the Government that in this present case inaction also has its risks, and that the risks of inaction may be greater than those of action. If we were to send troops into Southern Persia, there is no doubt that the Russians under the treaty would have the right to send troops into Northern Persia and occupy it.
But what is the alternative? Were we to abandon the South, oil production would cease, the revenue would fall and, as I and my right hon. Friend have already said, there would probably be an economic collapse in Persia. This would almost certainly result in the coming to power of the Moscow-inspired Tudeh Party, which would mean in effect that the Russians would become the masters of the whole of Persia.
Therefore, I submit to the House that if we should be faced with the unhappy choice of dividing Persia or of leaving the Russians to dominate the whole of that country, I have no doubt in my mind that the lesser of these two evils is partition. Our policy in the past has rightly been to promote a free and independent

Persia. If through the folly of the Persians we are compelled to give up that policy, it will certainly not be Britain's fault.

Mr. Harold Davies: This is a very vital change in British policy vis-à-vis the United States of America. Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that we should come to an agreement to divide Persia's sphere of influence between the Russians in the North and the British in the South?

Mr. Sandys: Had the hon. Gentleman listened to me instead of talking all the time he would have heard that I said that if we found ourselves compelled to send troops into the South, the Russians might exercise their treaty rights to send troops into the North. I went on to say that if we had to choose between the alternatives of having either a divided Persia— I am not suggesting that we should necessarily occupy a large area—or of Russia occupying or indirectly controlling the whole of Persia, the first alternative would, in my opinion, be the lesser of the two evils.
I have heard it said that if we were obliged to send troops into the Abadan area we should be giving the Russians an excuse to start a world war. All I can say is that if the Russian Government thought that the opportune moment had come to challenge the Western world in a major conflict, I do not think they would be at a loss for an excuse. They could easily manufacture some pretext which would serve their purpose. I cannot believe for one moment that the planners in the Kremlin would be led by an incident on the Persian Gulf to embark upon such far-reaching action if they regarded it as premature.
In any case, I submit that there is hardly a spot in the whole world which, from the Russian point of view, would be strategically less advantageous as a starting point for a war than Southern Persia. For the Russians to dispatch an expeditionary force to Southern Persia and to maintain it at the far end of interminable lines of communication across mountains and desert would be an act of military madness almost unprecedented in history. Therefore, I suggest that we should not be unduly deterred in discharging our duty by vague anxieties which are quite unsupported by any objective study of the situation.
To sum up, I consider that we have three vital responsibilities in this area. The first is to protect British nationals and to enable them by that protection to carry on the job they are doing in Persia at the moment. The second is to preserve our vital strategic and commercial interests which, if abandoned, would have disastrous repercussions on British prestige and influence throughout the whole of the Middle East. Thirdly, it is our responsibility to deny these important oil supplies to the Soviet Union.
As I have said, without detailed knowledge it is not possible to judge whether the situation today is such that troops should now be sent into the Abandan area. On the other hand, I am perfectly prepared to say that if the only alternative is scuttle, with all the grave consequences which that would have both now and in the future, then I certainly think we should not hesitate to use troops or any other appropriate measures that may be necessary in order to discharge our responsibilities to our own people and to the rest of the free world.

6.19 p.m.

Mr. S. N. Evans: I think it would be a mistake to allow fears of Russia to obscure the other very important considerations which we are considering at the moment. I very much wish that in this vitally important matter of Persia we could have a bi-partisan policy, because I am sure that if we had, British influence abroad would be very much stronger. Let me say at once that the interests of the British people do not change with every transference of political power. Whether we have a Conservative, a Labour, a Liberal or even a
Communist Government, the problems of the British people remain the same. The problem is how to procure an income which will enable us to import all those things we must have if we are to feed and clothe our people. I make no apology for expressing the hope that even now there will be a bi-partisan British policy in this matter.
It seems to me that there are three important considerations involved here. First, there is British prestige. We are still a great and powerful nation, although we do not always give that impression. The second is the income derived from Anglo-Iranian; and here let me say that if that

income were ever lost, our prospects of standing on our own feet would be gone and 10 million of us might well start looking for somewhere else to get a living. Such is the economic importance of the position. But not least is the fact that the Persian question is a test of Anglo-American relations—a test of that Anglo-American amity, collaboration and solidarity which is of such vital importance to world peace and prosperity.
I do not intend to go into the strategic aspects. I do not under-estimate them, but I think it would be a mistake to put undue stress on them. I fear that the present situation in Persia has arisen, or at any rate the present acute position, not least because of the play of oil politics. I am very much afraid that certain American oil interests have been playing around with international dynamite, like a juggler playing around with tennis balls at the London Palladium. If he drops one he catches it on the rebound and the act goes on, but if he drops a stick of international dynamite it does not rebound, it does not bounce—it explodes.
It is important to remind our American friends that over many years they have been able to draw vast quantities of oil from this area—not from Persia itself, but from adjoining areas—without the expenditure of a dollar, without sending one G.I. Joe. That task has been carried out
by the British people. Quite obviously, if our largest single asset in the world were filched from us, for whatever reason and by whatever means, we should not be able to afford to play that police role in the Middle East which we have played for so long.
There has been some talk—although not here this afternoon—of an analogy drawn between British nationalisation and the action which has been taken by the Persians, and I should like to spare a moment to deal with it. In the first place, we have conceded the right of the Persians to own their oil. What concerns us is what happens to the oil.
Our position in Persia, if I may use a homely simile, is like that of a man who has been invited to share a large house with another person on the basis of a 21-year lease. Three rooms have been allotted to him and the lease has been drawn up. The man proceeds to modernise the place, to electrify it, to put in new grates, central heating, all


sorts of amenities; and he proceeds to furnish it with durable furniture, including refrigerators, washing machines, television and so on. At a certain point, despite the 21-year lease, the owner says, "Out—and leave the furniture where it is." The fact of the matter is that the Persians have not a leg to stand on, either in law or in equity.
My hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) reminds me that there is a law against it here. I hope The Hague will say that there is an international law in the matter, too. But meanwhile, we have the immediate problem. It should be clearly understood, not least across the Atlantic, that Anglo-Iranian Oil is a gigantic enterprise, solely the product of British brains, sweat and ingenuity, and if our American friends want us to be partners and not pensioners, it is their job to reinforce the British position at the moment.
Personally, I am a little worried about the situation which might arise if we abdicate. I do not intend to try to do the Foreign Secretary's job for him. He has
information which is not available to any of us. But I must say that if we voluntarily abdicate the effect on British prestige from the Suez to Shanghai, from Abadan to the Falklands, would be disastrous. That is one consideration. What worries me is that, if we do abdicate, if we withdraw our personnel, and the oil fields and the refineries stand idle for a month, this situation might well arise—and that is what bothers me.
The Persian Government would have no income. Quite obviously, they would be on the verge of bankruptcy. They would have to get someone in to run the oil fields and refineries, and I am afraid that some honest American broker might say to the British, "We must get these oil fields going again, otherwise there will be economic and political chaos in Persia. We do not want the Russians in, nor do the Persian feudal aristocracy. But the Persians do not want you in. We think we had better go in ourselves." I do not think we ought to cast doubt on the motives of those making the suggestion, but I can conceive that we should be told that we should not take a dog-in-the-manger attitude in the matter and that the Americans would be happy to pay

us liberal, generous compensation. Indeed. we might be invited to name our own figure.
But again, the consequence would be that sterling oil would have finished and once more we should be dependent on dollar oil. Instead of Abadan being an asset to the British people, contributing to our living standards, the dollar problem would have been aggravated. I fear this because of the antics that preceded the present acute situation. I do not think that there can be any doubt that some interests have acted with considerable irresponsibility. Had it not been for the prompting of the Persians from those same American oil interests, I do not believe that the present situation, in its present acute form, would have arisen. That is why I am worried at the prospect which may present itself if we voluntarily abdicate, leaving the oilfields without personnel of any kind.
Quite frankly—and I say this as one who has spoken vehemently in the past for Anglo-American amity and collaboration—in this matter I fear our friends rather than I do the Russians. I do not think the American oil interests have ever reconciled themselves to sterling oil. I do not think they like the competition that sterling oil, drawn from Persia, presents. I think that all the time they are thinking of a restoration of a dollar oil hegemony. Therefore, I do not trust their judgment in this matter. They are playing the traditional oil magnates' game. I understand that, and I am not too reproachful of it. I am not going to accuse of duplicity the people who have largely created this situation. I believe that they are playing the only game they understand, and I fear very much that, if we get out of Persia, eventually we shall see that it is our friends and not our enemies who take our place.
This brings us to the question whether we should take steps to protect by military force our personnel at present in Persia. This is a question which must agitate the minds of us all. My view is that the Foreign Secretary should continue to show great patience, but that, if it does come to a showdown, there should be no reluctance to dispatch those forces able to safeguard British interests at Abadan until a more accommodating spirit is forthcoming from the Persian Government. In this matter I should like


to think that we were going to get 100 per cent. American support.
I take the view that Anglo-American relations suffer from a high degree of cant and hypocrisy—a pretence that there is high altruism on one side and self interest on the other, and I believe that until cant ends nothing else can begin. Carlyle said that many years ago. We are the only strong, loyal and dependable friends that the Americans have, and we are entitled to their moral support—their 100 per cent. moral support—without mental or any kind of reservations at this moment. I hope very much that it will be forthcoming.
I do not want to take up any more time, except to say that, if I have spoken rather plainly, I do not seek to indict the State Department or the American people. I think nevertheless that this Persian business is an odd time and connection in which to put on a Nelson act. Certainly I do not seek to level any reproach at the American people. I believe that the American people are a great and generous and fair-minded people, and I think that if they knew precisely what has been happening, what has been done and said to bring about this situation by some of their own nationals, they would rise in their wrath from Maine to the Pacific Coast.

6.36 p.m.

Lord Dunglass: The hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans) made an appeal at the beginning of his speech for a bi-partisan foreign policy in this respect, and for unity in this House; and I should like to assure him straight away that, if we are satisfied, as we hope to be, that the Government are protecting British interests, they will receive support from this side of the House. I would go further and, in this case, agree with the hon. Member that in this matter we can say, without presumption or arrogance or boasting, that the British interest is also the American interest and the interest also of the free world.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Gunter), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) did this House great service, I think, when they put this particular question of the Persian oil crisis

into the international setting, and it seems to me that, from their review, two salient facts have emerged.
The first is that the economic welfare of the whole sterling area rests on the orderly development of the oil resources of this area of the Middle East, and that any interference with it must have the widest economic implications. The second fact which surely emerges is that the security of the whole free world would be jeopardised if Persia should become a satellite State of the Soviet Union, with the Soviet Union in effect controlling the production of Persian oil, in effect controlling the Abadan refinery, and possibly, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham said, with the diversion of Persian production to Russia itself.
If those are facts—and I think that they have been established to the satisfaction of the House—then it seems to me, if that is a true estimate of the economic and strategic position, that it must be a cardinal point of British foreign policy to remain in Abadan and to remain in control of the technical processes of the refinery. In this debate today, it seems to me, it is this question of the Abadan refinery and in whose control it remains that is the one which really matters.
The Foreign Secretary, when he has been talking to us lately about the possible use of troops, has talked in terms of the protection of British lives. I understand the delicacy of his position. He can have no complaint that hon. Members have not used restraint, and I shall try to use it, too. However, I want to put to him a most definite question on the Government's foreign policy, and, if possible, to get from him a more positive assurance. Will he say that it is Government policy that there should be no evacuation of technicians from the Abadan refinery, or will he put it more positively, in this way, and say that it is His Majesty's Government's policy to maintain the Abadan refinery under British management, with British technicians in control, and that His Majesty's Government will prevent physical interference with British technicians in the performance of their legitimate functions?
None of us, I think, can shirk the full implications of this. If we insist that there shall be no evacuation, then it follows that we must be ready, if necessary, to protect our people in their legitimate functions


in Abadan. I want the right hon. Gentleman when he replies to say that the protection which His Majesty's Government give will not only be if the lives of the British people in Abadan are threatened, but will extend to them if the Persians try to take physical control of the refinery and interfere with them in their legitimate duties.

Mr. Crossman: Does the hon. Gentleman mean that in the event of the Persian Army and police, who are at present protecting the area, giving opposition, we should forcibly bring our troops in against the opposition of the army and police of Persia, because that would be war?

Lord Dunglass: The Foreign Secretary is responsible, and he must take the responsibility of the timing if troops are to be sent in. I am facing the implications of the statement I have made, that we should not evacuate the technicians; and I should be prepared myself, if they were interfered with in their legitimate duties, to send in troops to protect them. I cannot speak for the Foreign Secretary, and I am speaking only for myself in this matter. I do not want to complicate the issue. This, I think, is the central point.
It is not merely a dispute between a company and the Persian Government. It has a much wider significance, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will even now take every opportunity to impress upon the Americans the vital importance that the British should remain in Abadan and have American support, and that it really is to their interest. If we stay in Abadan the Persians may in a very short time get tired of this experiment in socialisation, but if we get out of Abadan our chances of getting back are very small, and we shall have surrendered one of the essential bases of power which the free world has at the present time.

6.44 p.m.

Mr. Crossman: I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass). I think that in this debate it is an advantage to be a back bencher because we can sometimes speak more openly and frankly than those on the Front Benches, and I think the hon. Gentleman has done the House a service in facing up to the full implications of this problem. We all, on both sides of

the House, agree on the importance of Persia and the effect that this matter may have not only on the oil companies there but on the whole of the Middle East, including the possibility of a British base at Suez.
Equally, I think we are agreed that one of the objectives of our policy is to prevent a coup d'etat by the Tudeh Party in Persia. The Tudeh Party is the only efficient politically organised machine in the whole of Persia; there are no other genuine political parties; everything else consists of factions, groups and conspiracies among a rich and corrupt ruling clique. Against that ruling class stands one well organised party, underground, but none the less well organised for that.
When we are facing this problem, it seems to me that we should not make a sharp distinction and say that there is no choice between dangerous—because it will be dangerous—military occupation and abdication. I want to argue that I do not think that these are the only two alternatives. It is not only a choice between diplomatic catastrophe and weakness and what I would call gunboat psychology. It is all very well to talk about putting British troops in to protect British technicians in their work, but that means putting them in against the armed opposition of the Persian police and army.

Lord Dunglass: I said if the Persians interfere with our technicians.

Mr. Crossman: Let us suppose that there are difficulties in continuing the operations of the refinery or the oil company. In that case the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that whether the Persian Government invites us to assist in maintaining law and order or not, we should put troops in. Surely he is not suggesting that the Persian Government are going to ask us to assist in the preservation of law and order. In that case, we should have to make a forcible entry into Persia. We should have to shoot Persian soldiers who would certainly oppose us—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Do hon. Gentlemen opposite say that if we send British troops in they will not be opposed? I reply to them that a responsible Government must act on the supposition that they are opposed.
The House should realise that when we talk about sending troops to protect


British personnel, what is being
suggested is the armed invasion of one province of Persia against the will of the Persian Government. Maybe, in certain circumstances one has to undertake the invasion of another country, but I think that we ought to be clear what we are proposing—the invasion of a country whose independence we have solemnly promised to maintain, and we are to do it against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Persian population. They may be misguided but they happen to be inspired by an intense nationalism which is chiefly directed against ourselves.

Brigadier Rayner: There is all the difference between invading a country and sending in troops to protect our own installations.

Mr. Crossman: There is all the difference from the point of view of the invading country. I will give the hon. and gallant Member an instance. The Chinese, the other day, invaded North Korea to protect their installations near to the Yalu river. [Interruption.] I would seriously suggest to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite that when they are advocating this course in Persia, they are very seriously undermining the whole of our moral case in Korea, which was that countries are not entitled to use violence and force in the protection of their national interest on the territory of other Governments and nations.
Are we going to say that because it is a British interest in Persia, we have the right to shoot our way into Persia, whereas if it is a Chinese interest in Korea they are aggressors? Are we to hold the view that only Communists are aggressors when they defend their national interests by force in countries that do not belong to them? That, in fact, is the argument behind the suggestion from the other side of the House.

Mr. Cuthbert: I think that my hon. Friend was saying that if the Persian Army could not protect our interest there and the lives of our British people, then we must send our troops in.

Mr. Crossman: I would agree with the hon. Gentleman so far as the Foreign Secretary's statement goes. In order to protect British personnel and to enable them to leave the country we are entitled

by international law to protect them; but I take exception when the hon. Gentleman extends the protection of personnel to the protection of installation.

Earl Winterton: May I ask the hon. Member a question? I have been listening to his argument with the greatest interest and it seems to me to be completely in a roundabout. He has said that if we send British troops into Abadan they will be fired on. Do I understand that the hon. Member is prepared to face that if they are sent to protect British nationals?

Mr. Crossman: I was replying to the intervention which preceded that of the noble Lord. I would say that a great deal would depend on the timing. If we send in the troops to do the job of maintaining and protecting the oil wells, then I say we are—I will be frank—committing an act of aggression against a friendly Power. We have no right to send our troops into somebody else's country against the wishes of the Government of that country because we have a factory there and are not satisfied with the nationalisation terms on which it is being taken over.
I would, therefore, reply by saying that everything depends on whether it is proposed that we should protect the installations—in which case I can see no right in international law to do so—or whether we say that in the last resort, if our personnel are in danger, we may have to protect them. I see a great distinction: between those two actions and I was, anxious to point it out.

Earl Winterton: Name it.

Mr. Crossman: There is a world of difference between occupying a province of Persia which means running our oil wells under British military government and sending troops in to rescue British people who are in danger of their lives. I am certain that the Persians will understand that distinction even if Members opposite do not; so will anyone else outside this country.
Having dealt with that point of the risk which I thought hon. Members opposite were somewhat under-rating in their advice to the Government, I wish to develop further the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans). I was surprised that


the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), in discussing the occasion and the development of the dispute, while mentioning taxation in this country as one of the aggravating causes, never mentioned the activities of the American oil companies. It is a pity that the Opposition should imply that everything is always the fault of the Labour Government when they know as well as I do that a series of most unfortunate interventions by our American allies took place in Persia.
It is surely far better, when we are assessing the situation, that we should assess it frankly. What are the causes? Talking a few days ago to someone high up in the oil world who should know, I asked him "Would any of this have happened if it had not been for American oil company intervention?" He said "Of course not. Of course the whole negotiations would have gone through." What was happening? I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington that the Anglo-Iranian Company put forward a supplementary agreement which was as good as the 50–50 basis of the Araneo agreement in Saudi-Arabia, from the Persian point of view. Some ill-disposed people in Teheran were concerned to stop that agreement.
After all, Anglo-Iranian produces sterling oil, which is not very popular with dollar oil magnates next door. They were concerned to make it as difficult as possible for General Razmara to sign the agreement to which he had pledged his honour and in consequence of which he was shot. A deliberate attempt was made to stir up Persian public opinion in Teheran by certain agents of certain oil companies. There is really no doubt on this issue.

Mr. Eden: As the hon. Member has mentioned me, I would say that I did not state that because I did not know about it. It is entirely news to me that American companies tried to stop the signature of the initialled agreement. If I had known of that, I would have said it. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will tell us later whether he has any information on that score or not.

Mr. Crossman: All right, I will go into details to make the charges precise. There is first of all a gentleman

about whom I need only repeat the report in the "New York Herald-Tribune." He is Max Thornberg, an ex-Standard Oil man, and he was out there in Teheran as the chief adviser on nationalisation to the Persian Government. He had to be slung out by the State Department after an official protest from us.
Secondly, there was a great deal of whispering by Americans that if the British were got rid of the Persians would find available to them American technicians. I am not saying that this was done formally in Teheran. As we know, the whisper is everything in the Middle East. What is significant is that the Persians were led to believe that if they did not sign the agreement with Anglo-Iranian they could get a better deal from one of the American oil companies.
That was certainly the reason General Razmara found it so difficult to deal with the Majlis. Let us have no illusion about the Majlis. It is a tiny collection of very rich gentlemen who have prevented any social advance in Persia or any advantage from the oilfields coming to the Persian people. Parliamentary democracy is being used in Persia not to help the common people but to obstruct social change and defend the privileges of a decadent minority.
The Majlis were alarmed by
General Razmara because he intended not only to get more money from the British but to use it for raising the standard of living of the people instead of putting it into the pockets of the wealthy. When they felt that some American company might help them to get a better deal and receive bigger profits, their resistance to General Razmara and the Anglo-Iranian offer was greatly increased.
In the third place, I would add an even more serious charge. Mr. McGhee made a most unfortunate impression in Teheran during his visit. We know that Mr. McGhee, who was primarily an Oklahoman oil tycoon and a millionaire, is a very high official in the State Department who visited the Middle East on a tour of inspection. It is common knowledge that, in American parlance he "shot his mouth" in Teheran about the weaknesses of Anglo-Iranian. Whether he was right or wrong in his criticism of Anglo-Iranian, the impression he made on the Persians was that if the British


were kicked out they could rely on somebody else and they might do a little better.
I say that because if we are to succeed in the Middle East we cannot have this sort of division and disloyalty between Britain and America. If we ever behave in the same way in any other part of the world, I hope that it will be exposed in Congress. It is far better to have this out in the open. The crisis that has developed in the last four months—in which the State Department had in the end to make it clear that American technicians would not be available to the Persians—was a crisis created by American oil-parties in Persia. It was not the Russians who stabbed us in the back. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury said, the fatal thing was the belief among the Persians that they could find some Americans who would help them through their difficulties when they chucked out the British occupier of the house at Abadan.
In the Middle East a whisper grows into a fact within an hour; and people always calculate from a phrase or an expression what is the real policy of a Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington knows what I am talking about. Persians see everything in terms of that sort of Philip Oppenheimer diplomacy. So what would they conclude when they hear Mr. McGhee from the State Department saying nationalisation was a good idea? What he said in Teheran and Cairo, where he made it quite clear that in his view it was not necessary for the British to retain their Suez base, was a singularly unfortunate kind of assistance to us in this moment of grave difficulty with the Persian Government.
It is not fair to the British Government for hon. Members to speak as they do and omit the main reason why this position has grown up. The reason is not the Tudeh Party, the Russians or the Communists. It is traditional oil politics, which disregard national interests and think solely in terms of commercial profits, of one company against another of dollar versus sterling. It is that which has let us down in the Middle East.
I turn to the practical problem of what should be done. I have given my reasons why I think that, unless we really get to a

much more serious situation than that which we are in at present, we should think twice before advising a military occupation of this area. I doubt whether the Chiefs of Staff would strongly and enthusiastically support such a proposal. We have already got one war on our hands at the end of a terribly long line of communications with the enemy on a short line of communications. If we move troops to protect the refinery there would be a possibility, which the Chiefs of Staff would regret, if hon. Members opposite do not, of a war against the Persians and a possibility of a war against the Russians who, in such a situation, would be entitled to enter Persia and to assist the Persian Government in throwing out the aggressors.
That is what the 1921 Treaty entitles the Russians to do if there is a threat to Persian sovereignty. Who could deny that a British occupation of a province of Persia would be a threat to Persian sovereignty? We should, therefore, be asking the Russians into Persia and giving them absolute legal justification for assisting the Persian Government in throwing us out.

Earl Winterton: That would start a third world war.

Mr. Crossman: "That would start a third world war" the right hon. Gentleman so joyfully said.

Hon. Members: Withdraw.

Earl Winterton: I must really ask the hon. Gentleman, out of a sense of decency to an ex-Service man like myself, not to make such a charge. Nobody in his senses could joyfully wish for a third world war. It is a monstrous charge to make, and I hope that he will withdraw it.

Mr. Crossman: If the hon. Gentleman asks me, I will certainly withdraw: but I did note that this intervention was made with an extraordinary lack of horror. However, if the noble Lord is correct, and that would start a third world war, he has given the final argument against what was said by the hon. Member for Lanark.

Earl Winterton: One of the hon. Gentleman's faults is that he never attempts to understand the arguments of his opponents. What I was intending to convey—and I apologise if I interrupted him—was that, if the Russians did that,


they would start the third world war, and I do not believe that they intend to start the third world war in Persia.

Mr. Crossman: I suggest to the noble Lord that he is being a little unrealistic. In that case, we should have taken the initiative. We should have committed the initial act of military invasion and the Russians would be reacting legitimately to a military initiative on our part. They would be acting legitimately under the 1921 Treaty, under which the Persian Government can invite the Russians in to protect Persia against armed aggression.
They could do this. But I suggest that it is likely that the Russians would not do so. They would do something much more clever. They would take the case to the United Nations. They would accuse us of aggression against Persia at U.N.O. They would move a resolution saying, "What is this? Here are the British invading a Province of Persia which does not belong to them." Is it thought that the Moslem bloc would not vote for such a resolution? Is it thought that the Latin-American bloc would not vote for it, as well as the Eastern bloc, and the Indians?
If we did what the hon. Gentleman wanted and occupied the oilfields to keep them running, we should be branded an aggressor by a great majority in U.N.O. Then we should either have to withdraw or tear up the covenant. It is quite irresponsible of hon. Gentlemen opposite, who have been assuring us that the war in Korea is fought on behalf of the United Nations Charter and against aggression. No hon. Member on this side of the House has suggested a military occupation for the purpose of maintaining the plant. [HON. MEMBERS: "What is the difference?"] They have enough responsibility to know what it would mean.

Lord Dunglass: The hon. Gentleman has often referred to what I said. I think that he is unintentionally misrepresenting me. I limited any intervention specifically to follow interference with our technicians. The hon. Gentleman must face the fact that if he does not want evacuation—and I take it that he does not—and if he wants to stay there, he ought to tell us what he would do about it.

Mr. Crossman: I am willing to answer. To start with, let us deal with the alternative, not of evacuation, but of economic blockade. That is what an evacuation of the personnel would mean. We would say to the Persians, "Right, Feel what it is like for a few months not to have our personnel there producing the oil." That is the purpose of evacuation, and it is thought that, by such a blockade of Persia, they will come to their senses and negotiate.
That, too, is a dangerous policy and for this reason. This was tried long ago
by the American and British companies in Mexico. There, in the 1930's, we did evacuate; we took all the technicians away and we let them confiscate the oil. The result was that for nine years no oil came out of Mexico. They merely produced enough for their own home consumption and we refused to tanker any of it. It was only in 1947, nine years later, that any oil came out. Nine years is a bit too long to wait for oil to come again out of Persia.

Mr. Paget: There was no Tudeh Party in Mexico.

Mr. Crossman: I am afraid I have not got much time, but, I will reply to the hon. and learned Member. There was not a Tudeh Party in Mexico; there was a Communist and Trotskyist Party in Mexico. It should not be believed that there was a lack of revolutionaries in Mexico.
I suggest to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary that he should not be bullied, or pushed into neglecting the possibility of further negotiations. In my view, the offer which he made yesterday, if it had been made immediately after Razmara's death and accompanied by a top rank mission to Teheran, might well have saved the position at that time. I think it was a grave error that that was not done, and we shall pay very heavily for failing to do it. We shall retain less in any settlement. But what is important in Persia is not who gets the money for the oil; it is the flow of the oil to the Western world which really matters.
If we are to bicker about 25 per cent., 30 per cent. or 35 per cent., we are bickering about a quite secondary consideration. What we have to ensure is the oil is produced, refined and moved by


tanker. To achieve this we have got to pay a far higher price in nationalisation and in loss of profits than most hon. Gentlemen opposite believe. I think that the fault of the Anglo-Iranian Company has been that it has taken too much money out of Persia and put too little back into Persia—schools and houses for the Abadan oilfields and the workers there do not help the rest of the Persian people. It is a grave defect that the Government did not make this offer in 1946 at the time of the Azerbaijan question or, alternatively, immediately on Razmara's death.
But these suggestions for concessions
to Persian views are not approved by the Opposition. Without much bigger concessions there can be no further negotiation, and further negotiation is out of the question once we talk of using troops against a country with the nationalist hysteria of Persia. We have either to break the Persians by force of arms, or to treat them as equals and negotiate with them as people who have equal rights with western nations. I believe in the second course. I believe that negotiation is not ruled out, provided we cut our losses in pounds, shillings and pence, and concentrate attention on getting the oil to flow.

6.59 p.m.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: When the Leader of the House announced yesterday that we were to have this debate today on the Persian situation as a matter of urgency, I frankly confess that it never occurred to me that we should not have the benefit of a statement from the Foreign Secretary at the start of the debate, a good deal fuller in nature than the statement he made yesterday, in order to facilitate our deliberations. The absence of such a statement puts all hon. Gentlemen, no matter on which side of the House they sit, in considerable difficulty. The speech of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) was a very good example. If I understood him aright, he is prepared to take adequate measures to defend British lives.

Mr. Crossman: I will make it quite clear. I concede under international law full justification for using the Army, Navy and Air Force to protect British personnel

who are in danger in a foreign country, in order to bring them out of that country.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: The hon. Member would take adequate steps to defend British lives in the process of evacuation.

Mr. Crossman: Evacuation of them.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: That is what I understood. He would not be prepared to take any other measures to defend the oil installations themselves.

Mr. Crossman: Only on one condition: that we were invited to do so by the Persian Government. [Interruption.] Certainly. Otherwise it is intervention.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Carrying the hon. Gentleman's argument to its logical conclusion, he would be prepared in extremis to evacuate from the Persian oilfields altogether. He told the House a few moments0 ago that he thought we might be invited back. I think that is a very empty hope. I have no doubt whatever that were we to evacuate it would not be we who would fill the vacuum so created.
I must say that I do not think that any hon. Member should be surprised that the negotiations between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government have broken down. It would seem from what I have been able to follow from the Press, and from other scraps of information that have come back to me from those out there, that at no period since this crisis arose has there been prevalent in Teheran an atmosphere in which we could negotiate in the ordinary sense of the word. The atmosphere was so highly charged that it was, as the bankers say, not negotiable. Ever since the assassination of Dr. Razmara for opposing nationalisation it was perfectly clear that the atmosphere was getting more and more highly charged, until it reached the stage when no Persian Prime Minister dared to make any sensible concessions in the hopes of getting an agreement.
Now that situation, difficult enough in any case, has, I think, been further aggravated—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) has already said—by the whole story during the last three or four years of general weakness and vacillation, and the absence of any effective policy in the


Middle East. The Middle East is one of the places, but by no means the only place, in the world where weakness is despised and where strength is respected. There is not the slightest doubt that the absence of any effective policy in the Middle East by right hon. Gentlemen opposite merely created in the minds of the Persians the impression that, in the end, when it came to getting tough, His Majesty's Government would accede to almost any demand.
There was one further difficulty which I think I ought to mention. The actual issue of nationalisation forced His Majesty's Government to bat on a rather difficult wicket—though the Persians would not use that phrase. After all, for years hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have been preaching nationalisation as the cure of all economic evils, and they can hardly blame the Persians, or indeed anybody else, if from time to time they take a leaf out of their book.
I think that some of the speeches to which we have listened this afternoon, in which the great contribution made by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the general economic life of Persia has been recognised, might well have been made a good deal sooner, and a good deal more often. Unless my memory is at fault, there has been in the past a good deal spoken, written and broadcast, to which the Persians have no doubt paid attention, about companies like the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which have come in for a lot of criticism from hon. Gentlemen opposite. All sorts of charges of exploitation have been bandied about, and that has not helped the situation at all.
In view of all this, I ask the right hon. Gentleman one question which I think is of supreme importance. When the crisis first arose, and as the difficulties so quickly built up, how soon were any close conversations entered into with the United States authorities, either in Teheran itself or between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company? How soon was an attempt made to get a settled policy over this particular issue of nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company installations? As my noble Friend the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) said, in Persia, as in other parts of the world, it is absolutely essential that on these major issues, which are so highly inflammable in every sense of the

word, Britain and America should have a joint policy and should march hand in hand.
The Foreign Secretary, having listened to the speech of my right hon. Friend and, indeed, to the other speeches made this afternoon, could not, I think, be in any doubt as to the consequences of withdrawal, and when he winds up this debate I hope that we shall get from him an assurance that any idea of evacuation is not in his mind. The consequences of withdrawal seem to follow one after another as night follows day.
First, a vacuum is created which, as I have already said, does not remain a vacuum for any length of time. Indeed, in the Middle East today I should think that the most dangerous thing we could possibly create would be a vacuum. Secondly, the Persian economy will collapse. Thirdly, the Tudeh Party will exploit the chaos so created, and the inevitable result will be that Persia will sooner or later—and sooner than later—slip into the Soviet sphere of influence without the Soviet Union losing a single soldier. That will be the pattern of conquest—if that is the right word—or the pattern of Soviet domination of the Middle East. That is what happens.
But that is not all. In addition, of course, the whole stability of the sterling bloc will be completely upset, because that depends to a very great extent on oil. And the whole of our strategic position in the Middle East, the whole of our defensive plans in the Middle East—and this involves America just as much as it involves us—would be completely reversed. So I do not think that anybody could possibly be in any doubt of the consequences of complete evacuation from the oil fields and refineries.
I agree that we must all face the alternative. If it is not the policy of His Majesty's Government to evacuate, the policy then must be to stay there. But that, as my noble Friend said, carries certain quite definite implications. If we stay in the oil fields and work the refineries, the Government, as I think the Foreign Secretary recognises, have a definite obligation to protect the lives of those so engaged—I, myself think that they have an equal obligation to protect the installations as well—and this evening we want to hear a little more detail about


what plans have been made for giving that protection. Only in this evening's papers it is reported that there have been riots in Abadan. I think one of the offices was entered by the mob. As far as I know, no life was lost, and I do not think that very much damage was done. But this may be only the beginning.
British civilians are there. Have they been organised into any sort of local defence force? Has any plan been made for their own mutual protection? Have they got any small arms or ammunition? Is it the intention of His Majesty's Government to send troops? Can we be assured that sufficient troops are available, and are they in the right place? Are sufficient aircraft available to get them there? These are some of the things we want to know, not merely we in this House but the country. What is more, the relatives of those out there want to know what plans have been made.
We need an assurance that all these difficulties—and no one would deny that they are very great indeed—have been carefully thought out and that there is an effective plan for protecting British lives; and unless His Majesty's Government mean to evacuate, which I sincerely hope they do not, there is need to protect British installations as the only alternative to complete evacuation. We want far more information of a much more re-assuring nature than we have had hitherto.
Finally, I beg the Foreign Secretary to realise that the greatest disservice he can do both to Britain's own position in the Middle East and to the cause of world peace at this very critical time, when everything depends upon a firm decision, is to fail to make perfectly clear tonight what the policy of His Majesty's Government is.

7.21 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies: The points that were raised by the hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe) have been raised in every debate on foreign policy throughout the last five years. Members opposite are continuously asking: Have we troops? Is our Navy ready? Have we a plan? They would make commitments with a minimum amount of motive force and power, but they are forgetting the social implications of everything that

is now running right throughout the Asian world. We cannot bring to that kind of world the gargantuan atavism of militarism to solve that social problem. Our policy should now be one of maintaining the negotiations.
Are the Opposition prepared to say that at all costs we should go into Persia? If they use the argument that there is no effective Government, I reply that the Government in Persia is just as effective, if not more effective, than the Singman Rhee Government was in Korea. What the Opposition would be doing, if they committed this country to that kind of policy, would be committing in reverse an act of aggression because they want control of the oil.
The question is not so much who gets the profits from the oil but whether we can keep the oil flowing for the Western world. With the use of the United Nations organisation, that can be done. Otherwise, if there was a move on the part of Britain into Persia at the present moment, and it was taken to the United Nations, it would result in an adverse vote for us, despite the strength of the United States.
It is only fair to Persia to correct the misinformation that has been given to the House today about the value of these oil royalties. May I quote from the United Nations Economic and Social Council Report publication, the "Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East"? It refers to the importance of oil in the economy of the Middle East for national income purposes and states:
 In Iran direct payments by the oil industry to the Government, together with local expenditures such as wages and purchase of materials, do not exceed 10 per cent. of the national income; of this total royalties represent a third. Similar proportions obtain in Iraq.
In Bahrein and in Kuwait, on the other hand, the proportion is much bigger, because it is the main income. It would be incorrect, therefore, to assume that the economy of Persia would collapse because in an interim period Persia would not get oil royalties.

Mr. Wakefield: I understood the hon. Gentleman to say that oil royalties do not exceed 10 per cent. of the national income. Would he say what proportion they are of the revenues of the Persian Government?

Mr. Davies: They represent one-tenth of the national income, but one-third of the one-tenth is actually oil royalties and plays a big part in the balance of payments of Persia in international trade.

Mr. Paget: What about Persia's revenue?

Mr. Davies: I am simply quoting what a United Nations publication says on the proportion of these royalties to the national income, and no further argument will gainsay that fact.
May I therefore, in the brief time that I have left, point to the picture of Persia receiving enormous benefits. Let us take the royalties paid by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1947. In 1947 the Company paid Persia £5,261,861. They also paid in taxes £765,389, but paid £15 million odd in taxes to the British Government. In 1948 the Company paid £6.7 million in royalties to Persia and £1.3 million in taxes and they paid £28 million in taxes to the British Government. In 1949 Persia had in royalties £10 million and in taxes £2 million, while the British Government had £22 million. The trading profits of the company in this period were as follows: In 1947, £42 million; in 1948, £70 million; in 1949, £65 million; and £10 million worth of shares were given freely as bonus shares to the shareholders of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
This House must face the issue. This is no longer the Victorian world. It is agreed that the Persian people have a right—it has been agreed on both sides of the House from what I have heard today—to own their own oil, and what we are seeking is a formula by means of which the transition of ownership can be peacefully brought about and the Western world and the British people given the right of access to the oil. We have got to get rid of secret clauses in any agreements. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) in this House in 1914, speaking on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, refused to give the House the secret price clause for the sale of oil to the British Navy. In "The World Crisis" he reveals that the British Navy has been enabled to buy oil at £7 million below world prices.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite must realise those days are gone. There must be a

formula and co-operation. Therefore, I am delighted to be able to support my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who refuses to give way to the pressure that is coming from the Opposition for some demonstrative action and some display of force. If we are asking The Hague Court to judge this, it does not help us at the present moment to be talking in terms of battleships, aeroplanes or military forces.
There are three or four points that should be noted. Mr. McGhee, the United States economic adviser of the Middle East, and Mr. Loftus, have repeatedly said that the position in the Middle East has nothing at all to do with the Kremlin. An article in "Fortune" n of March, 1951, points out that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been slow to realise what was taking place in Persia and had simply followed a policy of "business as usual" without realising the social changes that have taken place.
The Arabian-American Oil Company have completed since 1938 its 1,068-mile oil pipeline. It was finished last October. America is now pushing into the Mediterranean Sea 15 million metric tons of oil per year. There has been intense competition in the Middle East between dollar and sterling oil. Much of the trouble has been created by private American oil enterprise following the old policy of
"Private enterprise ad lib" which forced Mr. Harold Ickes, petroleum adviser to President Truman, to say: "It is time we looked into matters to see who is governing this country, the oil companies or Congress."
There are three policies at work. The defence departments and the State are taking one line of policy, the home department is taking another, while the private oil men are following a third policy. There has been no co-operation by them with the British Government, or with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The lack of patriotism of the oil industry in the Middle East was shown in April, 1948, when an American independent committee, the Brewster Committee, which investigated its ramifications was forced to the conclusion that the American-Iranian Oil Company had overcharged the American navies from 30 million to 38 million dollars more for oil than was necessary at the height of their deadly war against Nazism. Let us not


whitewash this position, which arises from the struggle for oil markets, access to those markets and areas of investment. On both sides of the House we must be prepared to recognise those facts.
I believe that the only course that is now left for us is to use the United Nations as an instrument for securing international law and order to solve these problems. The importance of the oil area is demonstrated by the facts which are found in the statistics of the United Nations organisation. They show that the average production of American oil wells is 12 barrels a day and the average production in the world is 21 barrels per day, while the average production in the Middle East is 3,728 barrels per day.
The richness of this area in the modern world is the factor which must be remembered. I hope that we shall do our utmost to use international instruments rather than those of atavistic militarism. In that way we shall retain the comradeship of the Persians and their friendship. They are a cultured people, and if we retain their friendship we shall also retain leadership in the Middle East.

7.35 p.m.

Mr. Wakefield: I venture to intervene in this debate because I have spent a good many years of my life in the Persian Gulf and in the countries immediately adjacent to Persia. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) is not in his place as I should have liked to correct him on a number of mis-statements which he made. But I do not wish to engage in any kind of personal reprobation.
Our first duty is to clear our own minds about our major objective. That objective is, I think, to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia and to prevent it from coming under Communist control. That is the thing to keep in mind the whole time. The second thing is to make the Persians understand that their real interests coincide with ours. If that can be done, and if, in all this ocean of disagreement, we can find even some small island of agreement, and can extend it, a great deal will have been achieved.
It is extraordinarily difficult in present circumstances to make the Persians understand where their true interests lie? What is the situation in Persia? At the head of the constitution is

the Shah, a young man, reasonable and well-intentioned, but unfortunately a constitutional ruler. It is a hard thing for me, who has tried for so many years in Indian States to substitute constitutional for unconstitutional rule, to have to confess that it is unfortunate that any ruler should be constitutional.
But in present circumstances in Persia it would have been of immense value if there had been a Ruler competent to speak on behalf of the country. That was the position in 1933 when Persia was under the arbitrary rule of Reza Shah Pahlevi. There was one man then who was able to see reason and with whom it was possible to make a bargain. But now that the Shah is a constitutional ruler, he is in the hands of his Prime Minister and the Majlis, a collection of wealthy industrialists and landlords who in no way represent the interests of the ordinary people of Persia.
The administration of Persia is futile, inefficient, and corrupt. Throughout the country there is poverty and frustration. The voice of popular discontent has grown louder and louder in recent months and years. Members of the Majlis, in order to avoid the odium which their own irresponsibility has incurred, have made the foreigner the scapegoat. I know that American oil interests played an unfortunate part in earlier negotiations in Teheran, but I cannot believe that Max Thornberg, whom I used to know personally, took the part which the hon. Member for Coventry, East alleges.
The major factor in the present unfortunate position is the way in which members of the Majlis have evaded their responsibilities and made the Britisher the scapegoat. They have told the people of Persia that it is the foreigner, the Britisher, who is draining away the riches and wealth of the country. That has been the basis of the cry for nationalisation, supported by the mujtahidin (the religious leaders) and by the fanatical organised religious body, the Fidayan Islam, and by other bodies of patriots in Persia; while behind the scenes the Tudeh Party is zealously fanning the flames of fanatical chauvinism. That is the picture in Persia today. It is not surprising, of course, that negotiations against that background of emotion and suspicion, have not succeeded.
The members of the Majlis have become the captives of a movement which they themselves started. They are overwhelmed by an avalanche which was of their own creation; and so Dr. Mossadeq —doctrinaire, xenophobic, incorruptible— has become the instrument of the country's will to rid itself of foreign exploitation, which in Persia is so widely and so stupidly believed to be the real cause of the people's sufferings. The difficulties of conducting negotiations in those circumstances are immense, and I am not surprised that so far negotiations have failed. But in the final resort—I emphasise "in the final resort," because one hopes that matters will not drift to such a position—the choice lies between complete withdrawal from Persia and military intervention for the protection of personnel and property.
Already in the House this afternoon the implications of those two courses of action have received some discussion but I may perhaps be allowed to say what I think from my own knowledge of Persia, of Persians, of the Arabs and of the Arab States, and of various countries in the immediate vicinity of Persia. I will not touch on the economic results of denial to the Western world of the oil from Abadan; but I do say that if a complete and total withdrawal is effected, there are some consequences which will follow with absolute certainty. In this connection I endorse what was said by the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Gunter). I do not know what personal knowledge he has of that area, but I felt that he summed up with great wisdom and clarity the issues with which we are confronted.
One of the certain consequences of withdrawal is the financial and economic collapse of Persia. The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) has said that the oil royalties and connected payments constitute only 10 per cent. of Persia's national income, but the proportion which they constitute of the revenues of the Persian Government is, of course, very much greater. The Persian Government are already in difficulties for money, and if they are denied any further monetary help from oil they will collapse, and there will ensue throughout Persia a financial and economic collapse, which, as the hon. Member for Coventry, East, said—and I agree with him in this—will

certainly result in the Tudeh Party seizing power.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East, said, and I agree with him, that that party is the only well-organised, active and really dynamic political party in Persia. If there is collapse and disturbance, it is that party which will obtain power. And, of course, the moment the Communist-sponsored Tudeh Party obtains power, the whole of Persia will become incorporated in the Communist bloc. Russia will then control Persian oil. She will get the warm water port in the Persian Gulf after which Russian imperialists have been hankering for half a century and more. She will, most important of all, establish herself astride our vital lines of communication to the East. And, finally, she will find herself in a position to infiltrate into the neighbouring Arab countries.
These I regard as the consequences certain to follow withdrawal. But let us also consider the alternative, military intervention, and let us consider its consequences. First, I consider the dangers arising from such a course of action to be very grave and great. If we employ force to protect our personnel and installations, there would undoubtedly be a revolt in Teheran. Dr. Mossadeq would be thrown from power. Again, the Tudeh Party would establish control. The Russians would come into the north of Persia, as they arc entitled to do by treaty, and we should get a situation something like that in Korea in the sense of the north and the south being divided, but something also infinitely more dangerous than Korea because this conflagration would come in a part of the world which is of vital interest and importance both to Russia and to ourselves.
I do not say that Russia would intervene with Russian troops—she would not need to do so. She could use the Uzbeks, the Azerbaijanis, and the Kurds—in fact, half a dozen of those eastern tribes who are already incorporated in the Russian system; and they would have the object of liberating Abadan from the British. There is that danger, and it is no good our blinking our eyes to it.
But if there exists the danger, there is also the hope of some compensating advantages. It is just possible—I will not put it higher than that—that the Majlis would welcome a solution which they


themselves cannot propose. In the East, people are sometimes quite relieved to be able to concede to force what they dare not concede to reason. The Persians do not like responsibility, and it may be that they might be glad to feel that fate was bringing something which they would not have the courage to bring for themselves: they might be relieved that the decision was taken out of their hands. I do not say that that is more than a possibility, but it is-—and I say this with some knowledge of the Persian make-up—a psychological possibility.
There is hope in another direction. If we made this stand, it would encourage our friends—and, goodness knows, they need encouragement. We have friends in Iraq, where also we have common interests in oil with America. We have friends in Kuwait—Sheikh Abdullah es Salim is as good a friend as we have in the Middle East. We have friends in Bahrein— Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa is the friend of Britain, and has proved it. In Qatar and in Saudi Arabia we have friends, and there again are American interests. All the way down the Trucial coast to Muscat, the Arabs are watching this issue.
It is true to say. I think, that in foreign politics strength acts like a magnet on all the elements around it and draws them to it. If we can show strength in the Middle East we shall find an immense accretion of power to us and confidence in us. Finally, of course, if we were to maintain ourselves in the Persian oilfields and in Abadan, we would protect our immensely important line of communications to Australasia.
If, in the ultimate resort, a decision has to be made between these two extreme courses, I have no doubt at all where the advantage lies and which way the decision should be made. But I also think that the decision should be delayed until the last possible moment. I do not know what the Government's policy is—we have not heard much about it—but if they are frightened of having to take this decision between two terribly grave courses, they have my utmost sympathy. They should delay decision until the last possible moment. Forbearance should be carried to the utmost limit. It should be carried indeed almost to any limit. But there is one point beyond which we must not go. We must not make any concession which would impair our physical power to

occupy, if we have to do so, the Persian oilfields and Abadan. Up to that point almost any concession can be justified: beyond it, none.

Mr. Awbery: Before the hon. Gentleman sits down will he tell me if he is of the opinion that the people of this country would go to war with Persia, in order to prevent the Persian Government from nationalising the oilfields?

Mr. Wakefield: I cannot conceive that this country would ever go to war with Persia. I know the Persians far too well to think that Persian soldiers would ever fight against us. I saw them the last time in 1941 when we went into Khurramshahr and Abadan, and I saw the way their soldiers welcomed us although ordered by the Shah to fight against us. We and the Persians are friends, and I differ from the hon. Member for Coventry, East, in some of the assertions he made about the views of the ordinary Persians towards us.

7.51 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Roberts: I shall begin my short remarks by paying tribute to the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. E. Wakefield), for his well-informed speech and for the moderate way in which he expounded his case. While I disagree with some of his conclusions, I do so with diffidence, because I cannot pretend to have the first-hand knowledge that he has of Persia, the Middle East and the East.
The first thing we must do is to try to make plain to ourselves, to make plain to Persia, and to make plain to the world the principles on which we should act in this matter. First of all, it should be made clear that we must concede the right to the Persian Government to nationalise its oil and any property within its national territory. We must concede that right to any sovereign State. The Government have done so, and they were quite right to do so.
When we have made that concession, however, it is important to remember that when the particular nationalisation concerns the subject matter of a treaty between the Persian Government and a British company, we have a right to insist that nationalisation should be carried out on terms to be agreed if possible, between the parties, and that compensation should also be agreed so far as possible.
For that reason, we are right to say that the unilateral method adopted by the Persian Government and the high-handed manner in which they have broken off the negotiations cannot possibly be justified. In my view, the British Government have made a reasonable offer. They offered an immediate payment of £10 million and £3 million a month while negotiations were going on. That was the limit of reasonableness to which we should expect the British Government to go at this stage.
The next question which faces us is— what should now be done? The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West, put two bleak extremes before the House—one was evacuation and the other was the use of force, though not immediately, in order to occupy the oilfield and the installations. For my part, I think that it would be wrong for us to evacuate Persia at the present time. It would be nothing less than a surrender to an act of force on the part of Persia. On the other hand, the opposite extreme is even more to be criticised. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West, recognised the great dangers of marching into Persia at the present time, and in my view those dangers are so great that we ought not to incur the risk.
Three consequences would follow if we marched into Persia to try to protect the oilfields. First, I cannot believe that there would not be resistance. Resistance is in accordance with the temper of Persia at the present time—apart from what intervention there might be by Russia. If there were resistance and fighting it would be quite impracticable to obtain the oil, since therefore it would be impossible to secure the object of the intervention.
The second consequence was indicated by the hon. Member for Coventry, feast (Mr. Crossman), namely that we should certainly be arraigned as an aggressor before the Security Council by the Soviet Union, if not by Persia herself, which would be an undesirable position for this country to be drawn into. The third consequence is the most grim of all, that we cannot rule out the possibility of world war breaking out as the result of such a move, and we ought not to take such a move in face of this grim possibility.
What then should be done?' Somehow, we must find a way between those two extremes. We must affirm and affirm again our readiness to negotiate". We have strong factors in our favours The position of the British tanker fleet is one of them. The existence of that fleet in our possession will deprive to a large extent the Persian Government of advantages it will obtain from nationalisation. We must go on offering reasonable terms. We are right to go to the International Court, and we should persist with the reference.
We must also do a very important thing which has not been sufficiently referred to in this debate: we must try to win on the widest scale the greatest possible measure of support amongst the public opinion of the world. Nothing would be more disastrous than for this country to be condemned by world public opinion for its actions in Persia as we were condemned in 1899 for entering into the South African War.
Let me say, in passing, that in my view, all this talk of intervention by American oil interests does not get us anywhere in this present dispute. It is clear, at any rate, that the American Government are not a party to it.
Lastly, it would be wrong to conclude a speech on this matter without some reference to British personnel in Persia at present. Our thoughts should be with them in their dangerous position. If they get in danger of their lives we must assist them by all effective means. We are far more likely to succeed in that effort, far more likely to win world public opinion, if we show moderation and wisdom in all our actions.

7.58 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I was a little surprised when the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) opened his speech by a complaint that the Foreign Secretary had not spoken first in this Debate; because in 1932, when the D'Arcy concessions were cancelled, and the right hon. Gentleman, as Foreign Secretary, came to this House to make the announcement that the dispute had been referred to the Inter' national Court, the Leader of the Labour Party, the late George Lansbury, tried to move the Adjournment of the House and to get a debate but his efforts did not meet with success. So why it should


be good on one occasion for the Government of the day not to want to make a statement and bad now, 1 do not understand.
There were other complaints from from the right hon. Gentleman, the chief of which was about the weakness of our policy in the Middle East. In that, of course, he has been supported by many hon. Gentlemen opposite. I do not think there is any truth in that complaint. Indeed, I think that they have done little service to this country in constantly groaning about what they call the weakness of the Government's Middle Eastern policy.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington mentioned the fact that the Commonwealth defence conference was meeting and he suggested that an opportunity should be taken to get the representatives of the Commonwealth countries who are assembled in London to back us up in a joint policy, the inference being that we cannot do it on our own. What are the facts? There is not one single Commonwealth country other than ours which has compulsory military service. Indeed Australia, which has a representative here, has to come to this country for recruits because it cannot get them in Australia.
I would be so bold as to say that the representatives of the Commonwealth countries are in no position whatever to make a contribution of either men or equipment to help to meet the difficulties in which we may find ourselves in the Middle East. The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington knows that, but of course he was batting today on a very sticky wicket.
No one previously in this debate has drawn the attention of the House to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman wrote an article which was published in the "Daily Telegraph" on 25th April. I will read one extract from it. The right hon. Gentleman said:
 In present circumstances, merely to dispatch British forces would provide no solution. It might even so inflame Persian feeling as to damage the prospects of negotiation. And that is the only way finally to settle the business.
I thought that the right hon. Gentleman, aware of what he had written in April, wished to distract the attention of his hon. Friends behind him, who were anxious at

the moment that British troops should go into Persia, from the fact that he had himself only a short while ago said that such a step should not be taken. I thought that the right hon. Gentleman's "Daily Telegraph" article was statesmanlike; it was honest and courageous, far more courageous, if I may say so, than his speech today.
I should have thought that every hon. Gentleman opposite would have read it. Clearly they have not done so, otherwise some of them would not have said some of the things that they have said today, because the right hon. Gentleman goes out of his way to say, to quote him again, that the present ferment does not owe its origin to Communism. He is most anxious to point out that there are other causes. Indeed he said, later in the article, that Persia was at present blazing with anti-British feeling. He pointed out, I thought with great courage, why.
He pointed out that in 1907 there had been an attempt by the Russia of the Czars and this country to carve Persia up into spheres of influence. He recalled, in his "Daily Telegraph" article, that in 1919 Lord Curzon had concluded a Treaty with the Persian Government which turned Persia into a protectorate. He says that memories of these things are very long indeed and that the memory of what happened in 1907 and what happened in 1919 is poisoning Anglo-Persian relations at the present time.
I entirely agree. What we have to do is negotiate, and I should have thought that one of the ways of bringing about effective negotiations was not to talk about putting British troops in or to talk about our weaknesses, but to try and associate with ourselves in our negotiations those countries which will be the principal sufferers if the Persians succeed in taking over the Abadan refinery, and oil ceases to flow.
Hon. Gentlemen seem to think that the major part of the oil from Abadan comes to this country. That is not true. Five-sixths of the oil that goes to India and Pakistan goes from Abadan. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that if the Haifa refinery could be got working again the inconvenience to this country would be very little indeed, but it would be a disaster to India, Pakistan, South Africa and East Africa if the oil that comes from Abadan did not flow.
I wish to say a few words to those hon. Gentlemen opposite, particularly the hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. de Chair), who at Question time yesterday seemed most anxious to send British troops into Persia—I think he used the words—"in case they were wanted." I do not wish to misquote him but I do not wish to weary the House by quoting from HANSARD; I gathered that to be his intention. He thought that British troops ought to be on their way or should arrive in case the need arose. He seems to forget, and hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to forget, that the Persians have a considerable military force at their disposal, some 130,000 men organised into eight infantry divisions and four brigade groups.
They should note that the Persian army has an American mission; so indeed has their gendarmerie. The Persian army and gendarmerie have been trained and equipped by the Americans and have been supplied with American equipment as a result of the Americans, with great generosity, making them a loan of some millions of dollars. In order that the equipment should be plentiful, they were supplied at reduced prices.
It also seems to be forgotten that American missions still exist in Persia. Indeed, if my advice is not wrong the Persian army is under the direction of a very distinguished American soldier, Colonel Schwartzkopf. What kind of position shall we find ourselves in if we send soldiers into Persia to find themselves faced, not with out-of-date bows and arrows and weapons of that kind, but by a disciplined force supplied with first-rate American equipment, including armoured fighting vehicles? If hon. Gentlemen opposite or on this side of the House think that putting British troops into Abadan is a picnic, I hope they will go and try it before they urge somebody else to do so.
I wish to say a word or two more about the American position in this matter. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Wakefield), said that he did not think that the influences that were at work in Persia had been associated with the American Government. I wish I could believe that, because I am one of those who think that Anglo-American cooperation is not only desirable but inevitable; it is inevitable because of the facts

of history and geography; it is one of those things that happen, and we have to get along together because otherwise, the result will be disastrous.
I have gone to very considerable trouble indeed to try to trace the wanderings of Mr. George C. McGhee, who is not a private citizen; he is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs. Not only is he a high official in the American State Department but, of course, he is an oil man and, if that were not important enough, he is a millionaire. He was a millionaire before he was 30 and, to quote his own statement, he deliberately chose to engage in the oil business because that seemed to be the best way of getting rich in a hurry.
There is another thing about George C. McGhee which the House might be interested to know. He was a Rhodes Scholar and got the best kind of tuition because his tutor at Queen's College, Oxford, was the present British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks. Mr. McGhee is certainly some wanderer. I read the columns of the Press and traced step by step where he has been and what he has been up to. On 28th February, 1951, he turned up in Cairo and had conversations with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salah-El-Dine, and a couple of days later "The Times" reports him as being in Colombo.
On 7th March the "Manchester Guardian" said he was in New Delhi seeing Mr. Nehru and the Indian Cabinet. On 15th March he was in Karachi seeing Liaquat Ali Khan. The "Daily Mail" of 17th March said he had gone to Persia to urge Persia to accept the 50–50 profit-sharing offer of Great Britain and got an assurance that Persian oil will continue to go to Western consumers.
The "Manchester Guardian" of 19th March says that he is to advise the State Department whether or not to change their non-intervention policy and the "Daily Worker "—that good old Liberal paper— said he had gone there to act as a mediator. I do not know what he was doing at any of those places. The Foreign Secretary does because on 2nd April "The Times" reported that Mr. McGhee arrived in London late on the afternoon of 1st April, a very appropriate day. He would not comment on Persia, but said he was to have talks at the Foreign Office


before leaving for the United States the next day.
Yesterday afternoon when I heard there was to be a debate today I thought it was a pity. Perhaps I am wrong, but I think this debate is charged with infinite possibilities for trouble. A wrong move, a mistake and the most dreadful consequences may flow. But, if a debate has to take place, I think it essential for the democracies of this country and the United States that we should be told the truth.
I do not believe this debate can take place in a realistic atmosphere unless we know what Mr. McGhee said to Salah-El-Dine and what he is saying now. We must know what he said to the Egyptian Government and we must know what he said to the Persian Government, and it would also be interesting to know what he said to the Indian Government. I should like also to know what the Foreign Secretary said to him—[An HON. MEMBER: "Ask the Foreign Secretary."]—I asked the Foreign Secretary yesterday afternoon if he would make available particulars of the talks Mr. McGhee had on his travels. I know my right hon. Friend had not been briefed; perhaps I got him on the wrong foot, but he said it was a matter of great delicacy. I quite agree, it is a matter of great delicacy.
What I think Mr. McGhee did was that in Persia he gave the Persians the impression that if we got out American technicians would go in. That is the first thing. The second thing is that I am sure that he gave the Persians the impression that, as far as American policy was concerned, they could go ahead with nationalisation. I have some slight evidence to support that because, when the Washington Talks on Persian oil began, in which there were two parties—on the one hand, Sir Oliver Franks and on the other Mr. McGhee—statements came to this country.
I looked up "The Times" and the "Financial Times." The "Financial Times" started its article by saying that American policy is that nationalisation is the irrevocable policy of Persia and that we have just to make the best of it: "The Times" correspondent, of course, let the little pussy-cat out of the bag because he talked of the "tendentious lectures" given to the British Government

by the State Department, and I thought that the phrase "tendentious lectures" probably covered a multitude of words, if not a multitude of sins.
Certainly it is time the people of this country knew for a certainty that, while it is clear that the Soviet Union is waiting on the sidelines watching the fun and waiting to take advantage of anything that happens, simple creatures inside and outside the House—perhaps I should not refer to hon. Members as "creatures"— are very simple indeed if they believe that behind the trouble in Persia is a Red plot. I do not think there is anything of the kind. If any hon. Member thinks that, he should have a look at Mr. McGhee's timetable, his travel itinerary. He should go to the Library and get one of those admirable documents got out by the Library staff on Persia which contain a chronological table of happenings, and look up Persian events, and he will find that things only began to "hot up" with the arrival of Mr. McGhee.
I am sure that Mr. McGhee, being an oilman, has gone to the heart of the trouble. The trouble about oil according to every informed document I have read, is in terms of one word, price. The Americans have about one-third of the world's oil resources but, unfortunately for them, they get their oil as we used to get our coal before we nationalised the industry, by letting inefficient numerous high-cost producers obtain it. The daily average output of American oil wells is, I believe, 11 tons as compared with the Middle Eastern oil output of about 4,000 tons a day. That gives in a simple way the significance of the high-cost American production and the low-cost Middle East production.
The fact is that there is the Gulf Agreement by which the price of oil all over the world is determined by the price in New Orleans. Therefore, if that Middle Eastern oil, which is sterling oil within the control of this country, has access to world markets, it produces for us a great number of dollars and, because our oil technology is very efficient and the Persian oilfields are low-cost producers, it puts the Americans in a very difficult position. Public Affairs Paper 98, produced by the Library of Congress, will give hon. Members ample information on this point.
I now turn to another point and my own suggestions for the future. I remember very well that when I was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Defence, when he was Minister of Fuel and Power, in September, 1945, he set about negotiating an oil agreement with Mr. Ickes of the United States. That agreement was published in a White Paper, Command 6683, and signed on 24th September, 1945. This agreement provided for the establishment of an international agreement and it set out, between the United States and ourselves, machinery whereby the oil of the world could be used for the benefit of the whole of the world. Unfortunately that agreement was never ratified, not I believe, because of any failure to act by our Government, but because the oil interests in the United States prevented it from coming about.
The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington is quite right when he says it is no good putting troops into Abadan, quite apart from the terrible consequences which must flow. What we have to do is to find some small point on which we can begin to talk, because ultimately the solution can be found only by negotiations on the lines set out in that White Paper. I have made this point before but I wish to make it again, because I consider it is most important. The first step to be taken in those negotiations is to ask India, Pakistan and representatives from East Africa and South Africa to sit round the table; because whether we or the Persians work the oil, or whoever works the oil, the natural place for that oil to flow is into India, Pakistan and Africa.
I have heard nonsensical talk about the possibility of the Russians working the oil of South Persia. I have never heard such rubbish. I spent many years in those parts of the world, which accounts for my interest in this matter. I knew successive British Governments; Lord Curzon was one of the villains. He tried to do the Russians down over North Persian oil. There was established a North Persian Oil Co. It "went west" and did not work the oil. Then the Americans had a go with the Sinclair Oil Corporation and they turned it in. Later on the Americans had another go, in 1937, but they made no progress. The reason is

that the only place for the North Persian oil to go is to the Soviet Union.
What hon. Members do not seem to realise is that the Soviet does not need to go into Persia because the northern oil is part of the Baku sedimentary basin. Likewise the oil of South Persia could not be taken to North Persia. It is nonsense to think about it because the difficulties of the terrain are so enormous. The oil of North Persia will go underground and be pumped from Baku and the oil from South Persia will be taken by pipe or sea to the countries I have mentioned.
I will say to the Foreign Secretary that I hope the whole House will be behind him in saying quite frankly to the Persians that the responsibility for the protection of British lives and property in Persia is that of the Persian Government. In doing that we are in line with what was said by the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington when he stood at that Box as Foreign Secretary, and so there should be common agreement between us on that point. Then we should say to the Persians that, so far as this country is concerned, when we went into the United Nations we put on one side for ever the right to use British Forces to go into the country of another nation. If we go into Persia or into any other country it can only be as a result of a United Nations decision, otherwise we lose the moral basis of all our actions.
I hope that the Persians will accept the good will implicit in the action of the Foreign Secretary in going to the International Court. I hope that within the next few hours he will ask Mr. Nehru and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to join with him in going to the Persians and getting them to accept the simple fact that sooner or later negotiations have to come about. If he does that, once again he is in line with the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, because that is what he meant on 25th April when he wrote that negotiation is the only way.

8.25 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander R. H. Thompson: It behoves everyone of us on an occasion of such historic importance as this to pick his words very carefully. Whatever may be the result, there is no doubt that at this time the Government are faced with a very cruel dilemma; and the consequences of almost


any course of action which they may pursue may be disastrous. I shall try to weigh my words very carefully, and I Will try also to be brief.
We have heard two possible alternative courses of action open to us summarised pretty well by hon. Members on both sides of the House. We realise, at least I hope we realise, that the simple evacuation of Persia, with all the loss of strategy, military and economic, which it entails not only for us but for those who think like us in the Western world, our friends and allies, would be disastrous. I believe that the Government are anxious to avoid that if they possibly can.
We have also heard a very obvious and glaring risk which must face us if we take the other alternative, that of putting our troops in to defend—I will not split hairs about what we should be defending, our people or installations, because that would be difficult to distinguish if we ever took that step. We have also heard from several speakers hopes expressed that there might be a third way, that of negotiation.
It seems to me that we have to examine every possible means of negotiation before we reject it; but I have not heard very many constructive suggestions as to the precise lines on which o negotiations should be conducted. People who advocate negotiation do so, I think, because it resolves for them the awkward choice between evacuation and armed intervention, though they may not have any very clear 'idea of where we go from there.
I do not believe that this situation is of the choosing of the Persian Government. For some time, in my opinion, they have not been masters in their own house. The cooler and wiser heads view with something like horror the situation which has now arisen, which is frankly beyond their control. If that is so, what is our best approach to the Persian Government? First we have to find somebody with whom to negotiate. I do not believe that we can negotiate fruitfully with Dr. Mossadeq, or the party which he is supposed to represent, because I do not believe they are free agents. I believe that they are men with pistols almost literally pointing at their backs. I do not believe they can follow any course of reasoned negotiation and compromise except at the risk of losing their own lives. That is why I do not think we should get very much further with Dr. Mossadeq.
With whom, then, shall we negotiate? I should like to make a suggestion. The Shah is a constitutional monarch, and, for constitutional reasons, is perhaps not supposed to interfere in these matters, but I believe that a time comes when a country which has got itself into a state of chaos and is quite obviously getting nowhere requires somebody who is supposed to be sufficiently big to be above petty factions and strife, and who may step in and help with an arrangement to work out the situation. I suggest that it might be possible to make a direct approach to the Shah to see if a settlement, which I am sure is desired as much by the Persians as ourselves, cannot be arranged.
As for the position of Russia, I think the Persians are really much more worried at the prospect of the Russians taking over the oil installations or achieving some measure of control and authority over the whole country than about anything we might do, and I think that this provides a limited field where we see eye-to-eye and where, possibly, we might get together.
The next thing is that I do not believe we have sufficiently exploited the value of the cards which we and the Americans really hold in our hands. One of the tragedies of this whole business has been that it has gone on rapidly worsening, while the Americans and ourselves, apparently, have had no cohesive and joint policy in the matter at all. It was perfectly obvious, I think, since Boxing Day of last year, when the Majlis refused to ratify the new oil agreement, that trouble was brewing, and it became painfully obvious when Ali Razmara was assassinated, yet British and American policy in the Persian dispute does not seem to have existed up to now. I think there have been well-intentioned, but very misguided, interventions by the American Ambassador. He may have meant well, but I do not think he has helped the matter at all.
If we can tackle this matter together, it seems to me that we can arrive at an accommodation with Persia, because I think that what really started the matter was that the Persian Government were completely
"broke" and had to get some money from somewhere. With our tankers and our technical know-how, with the Americans' very comprehensive


and elaborate plan of economic aid to Persia, with all these assets on our side, it does seem to me that if we can find somebody with whom to negotiate—and I have made my suggestion in that respect we ought to be able to say to the Persians,
"If you simply turn down everything, the only possible prospect is that you will get somebody else to take over who will be a very much harder master than ever we have been."
Therefore, I feel that we should pursue this path of pointing out to the Persians what they stand to lose in the way of American credits, technical assistance, arms and the rest, while, on the other hand, they lack a tanker fleet and all those things necessary in running this business. If so, there might yet be a chance in a reasonable way of saving the situation, but we must act quickly. So often, the path of negotiation seems to mean doing nothing in particular while continuing to hope that tomorrow the Persians will be a little more accommodating than they are today.
The situation is worsening very rapidly, and I hope we shall hear from the Government later on this evening that, while they are still willing to negotiate and will protect British lives, when it comes to the point, they will go on quite frankly to say that they are sending a Commission, or an individual, with full authority and power to Persia to negotiate, if possible with the Shah.
I should like to have an assurance that the Americans and ourselves, whatever differences we may have had in the past on this matter of oil politics and so forth, are really pooling our knowledge and resources in this matter, because, together, we are a very formidable combination, and I think that the Persians, now that they have got over the first flush of whatever we may like to call it, are beginning to have second thoughts. I hope particularly that this evening we shall receive an assurance that something along those lines will be done.
The other two alternatives I do not honestly like to contemplate. It seems to me to be useless to talk of building up a defence system, based in part on Persian oil supplies. Equally, it seems to me that if we put in British troops it will be very difficult to represent what

we do as a protective action, at the same time saying that what others do is aggression. That may be legal hairsplitting, but I think it would have to be 3 case of the absolute last ditch before we take that stand. I have indicated the possible alternatives, and I hope that the suggestions which I have made will find some acceptance by the Government.

8.36 p.m.

Mr. M. Philips Price: This is the most serious debate which this House has had for a very long time, and what we say today may perhaps have some influence on the Government's thinking, while the Government themselves may be faced at any moment with the need for action which may have very serious consequences.
I entirely agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, West (Lieut.-Commander Thompson), that we must try to find a possible peaceful way out wherever we can, but I am very much afraid that we may be suddenly faced with some critical situation resulting from some action by the Persian authorities in Abadan which might make necessary much more forceful action than that which the hon. and gallant Gentleman contemplated.
The debate today has shown that some hon. Members on this side of the House are not prepared to go as far as other hon. Members on both sides of the House in taking military action in Persia in certain eventualities. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), apparently would not go beyond the position of protecting British lives for the evacuation of the personnel in the Abadan refineries and oilfields. He said we would become an aggressor if we did so, and would appear before the United Nations, on which there is a majority against it. I feel that I should be quite prepared to go with our case before the United Nations, and I have very little fear of what the result would be.
What are the facts? The first aggressor in this matter was the Persian Government. It has torn up the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's agreement of 1933, in spite of the fact that we have offered negotiations and very much better conditions than ever before, and are prepared to go on negotiating if they are not satisfied with the terms. I think that was an act


of gross aggression. Are we worried in case we may get some South American republic voting against us in the United Nations, or Mr. Nehru saying things about us? I say that I snap my fingers if that is the line they take. It would, indeed, be a policy of scuttle if we ran away on this matter.
Some of my hon. Friends do not agree that we should protect the installations, but one cannot draw a line between lives and installations. Some hon. Members do not know what the position is out there. I know. I have been over the refineries and the oilfields. Do they realise that the Persian authorities are now threatening to jam the pipelines? This may cause explosions and fire. The protection of the installations means the protection of lives as well. If we do not protect the installations, we cannot protect the lives. That is a point which some of my hon. Friends do not seem to understand.

Mr. John Hynd: I do not think my hon. Friend should be allowed to get away with that. What has been said by some on this side is that we should protect lives from explosion and other acts of sabotage, but that we should not send troops into Persia for the purpose of maintaining our control of the oilfields?

Mr. Price: If the Persian authorities jam the pipelines and there are explosions and fire, the lives of the people there will be endangered. Are we to run that risk just because they take indirect action against lives by interference with the installations? That is the point. Will my hon. Friend answer that?

Mr. Hynd: Certainly. That is not the point at all. The point at issue is whether we should send troops, not to protect lives, but to maintain our control of the installations and the oil wells.

Mr. Price: Of course, I am quite prepared to admit that we do not want to take any provocative action immediately. The situation is a very dangerous one. If we were to take any action at the moment, the Persians might do something which, in turn, might force us to take further action. We do not want to go in first as a preventive measure if that can be avoided. On the other hand, if we do not watch the situation very

closely, we may find ourselves in the position I have mentioned.
During the course of this debate a number of points have been raised in connection with American oil magnates and a sinister individual whom I met in Teheran last October and who has, I agree, been no help in this whole situation. But I think it is an oversimplification to say that the intervention of certain Amercian oil magnates is really at the bottom of this trouble or has even played a very important role. It has undoubtedly played a role, and has encouraged the Persians. I have had over 40 years' experience of Persia; I went there first in 1912. To my mind, the matter is much deeper than that. I feel that it is political movements that are governing the situation which we have to consider. Therefore, I will put before the House certain propositions which I think govern the situation as regards the internal position of Persia.
My first proposition is that the Persian nationalist movement is directed against all foreigners, as much against the Russians as against us. That is the impression I got when I discussed the matter, not with Mr. Mossadeq—I could not see that gentleman; perhaps he was in hiding at the time—but with some of his supporters in Teheran. It must be remembered that they and people with a similar mentality tore up the Russo-Persian Oil Agreement in 1947 when Qavam-es-Sultaneh was Prime Minister, and right away through these last few years there has been a strong rising of nationalist feeling in Persia. Naturally, the Russians are going to make very good use of it. Part of the Communist thesis, as laid down quite early on in the days of the October Revolution, was that the nationalist movements in Asia should be used to strike at the Western Powers. But do not let us think it is just a Communist plot. It is something much deeper.
My second proposition is that this Persian Nationalist movement is a Persian variant of the general anti-European movement which runs from Suez to Singapore, right through the Arab world to India. Only the Republic of Turkey is immune from this. That is why they are so anxious to make their contacts with the West. It is not a movement which can be ignored. There are some hon. Members on this side of the House who think we must do all we can to work with the


Persians and to meet their demands as
far as possible. I am completely with them in that. But I must point out that these Persians are very irrational and almost uncontrollable on political issues. The nationalisation of oil is only one issue in this matter, and perhaps not a very important one. Even if we agreed to nationalisation—indeed, we cannot do otherwise—I doubt very much whether that line would do now. I do not think it would have done even some time ago.
The Persian mind today has got into such a state that it is almost impossible to deal with it unless one is very firm. Only the other day, I asked a Persian well up in the oil world what the Persians would do if they tried to run the great Anglo-Iranian oilfields, how they would get on in the world market. They are so naive that his reply was, "Oh, you would lend us the money to do it." It is just as if the fourth form of a public school had put itself in the position of the headmaster.
My third proposition is that there are various elements behind this Persian nationalist movement. There is a very sincere element with which I tried to get in touch in Teheran and Tabriz when I was there last autumn. It consists of university students, young intellectuals, teachers, journalists and civil servants, all of whom are growing up in the towns of Persia as industry grows. It is true that there have been no real reforms in Persia, but nevertheless these industrial developments have brought with them this type of intellectual who are fervent nationalists, and we have to recognise that fact.
Then there is something else. There are the old corrupt territorial magnates and merchant princes. There are the hundreds of families who have ruled, or, rather, I should say, misruled Persia for generations. These people have joined the anti-foreign movement in order to divert attention from the need for internal reform in Persia itself. The intellectual dishonesty of men like Mr. Mossadeq, the Prime Minister, knows almost no bounds. He said the other day that the poverty of the Persian peasant is due to the Anglo-Persian Company. Everybody knows that Mr. Mossadeq and his class are responsible for the poverty of the Persian peasant.

If Mr. Mossadeq must be a parasite, he need not also be a hypocrite.
The fourth proposition I make is that the extreme Persian nationalist movement may not last, and probably will not last. If these Persians show any signs of wavering and of being ready to negotiate or talk with us there is a religious murder society in Persia known as Fidayan Islam. They will lay them low just as they laid low the late Prime Minister, Mr. Razmara. If that should happen, and if chaos further develops in Persia, there is only one party which will benefit—the Tudeh or Communist Party, and that means that Russian influence will become supreme in Persia.
We may think that if the Tudeh or Communist Party come into power, if we walk out of Abadan, and if they call in Russian experts they will not be able to run the machinery. I do not know. I am not too sure. In 1945 I happened to be in Baku; I think I am the last Englishman to have been there. I went over the installations in the oilfields there and I also saw the technical college which the Russian Government have there. They have a very fine college, so far as I can see—although I am not a technician. There were a lot of young people there— Tartars, and Mohammedans from Eastern Russia who were being trained in this very job. I see no reason why Russia should not be able to run the oil installations of South Persia.
I quite agree with some of my hon. Friends who argue that the oil cannot be used for Russia itself, That is quite right. There are two ranges of mountains and high plateaux for 800 miles in the way, and they cannot get the oil across. The oil must go outside, but I should not like to be sure that the Russians would not use any position they can get far down south if they are given the opportunity.
It is no use wringing our hands now and saying that things might have been different. I am quite prepared to admit that the Anglo-Iranian Company might have been a little less superior and a little less patronising in their attitude towards Persian public opinion. But they have done the right thing now in making their recent offers. The installations out there are marvellous and the Persian workers in the oilfields and in the refineries are looked after far better than are the


workers in any other part of Persia. That is perfectly true, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said in his various statements.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that because the company were so successful these sensitive Persian nationalists see it as an affront that a foreign concern, with a 60-year agreement, should work the great oil reserves on which so much of Persian prosperity depends. We must take that into consideration. It does not, of course, justify the Persians in tearing up the treaty and in refusing all attempts to negotiate or talk with them. On the other hand, no matter how good their intentions, we must not allow the company to ride the high horse in a delicate and dangerous situation of this kind.
Will it be necessary to intervene by force? Like everybody else, I hope not. One of my hon. Friends talked about American officers and said if we met any trouble in Persia and there was a clash, we should meet American officers. I do not think we should. According to my information when I was there, it seems that American officers are advising the gendarmerie, and there are one or two American officers attending to transport matters, but apart from that we should meet no American military commanders if there were trouble. I hope we shall not have to take this action. If we did, it would indeed send a shudder right through the East. On the other hand, I am not at all sure that a little healthy growl from the lion would be a bad thing.
What I am more concerned about, however, is the morning after the night before—not so much the action we take now, but the action we may have to take following present action. You can do anything with bayonets, it was said, Sir, except sit on them. We may have to use armed force to protect the installations as well as lives. But that is a military matter, and I do not think that there are many of us in this House who can really say whether that is possible or not. It is for the Government to say. They know. All I can say is that I think the House ought to say to the Government that, if they can do it, and they are faced with a position in which there is no other way, then they must do it. It even may mean occupying a position which will protect the oil field, which lies 120 miles up in the foot hills of the mountains, and

where the pipe line comes down to the coast, where the great refinery is, and the harbour.
But it is still a possibility that we may yet find friends in Persia. We have plenty; but they are terrified by the murder gang, Fidayan Islam—terrified that they will go the same way as Razmara. We must do everything we can to encourage those people, remembering always that if we do come out of Abadan the Power of the North may go in.
I hope very much that we shall have unity with the United States over this. I believe that the State Department understands and is with us. There are these people, certain former oil magnates, whose importance, I think, has been over-estimated, but who may still be capable of mischief. We must watch them, and rely on the State Department. Whatever happens there will be difficult times ahead, in which we must show courage, courage and yet more courage. Finally, I would quote the Persian poet, Omar Khayyam, about our troubles which may not be so dangerous as they appear:
 As like snow upon the desert's dusty face,
Biding a little hour or two, is gone.

8.58 p.m.

Brigadier Head: I think the whole House will agree with me that we have listened to a most interesting speech by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price). I can assure him that I listened much more closely to the speech he has just made than the one he made some six years ago when I was sitting in exactly the same place waiting to make my maiden speech. To be quite frank, I then hardly listened to a word he said. We know very well that the hon. Gentleman has a particular knowledge of this matter and that country, and he has given a very helpful and a very well-founded contribution to our debate here.
I came down to the House earlier today without any very preconceived ideas, or for that matter, a preconceived speech, because I was hoping that we should hear something from the Foreign Secretary on which we could base arguments and criticisms. That was not to be, and what few thoughts I had in my head concerning the situation have, in my opinion, been more cogently expressed than I could have expressed them by the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Gunter). If I may say


so, without appearing patronising, I have not heard a more logical or sensible appreciation of the Persian situation than that which he made.
The House may therefore wonder why I have risen to my feet at this moment. It has seemed to me that, by and large, this has been one of those pleasant occasions when the House of Commons has got together, and very much closer together, over a matter of common difficulty. From both sides of the House there have been expressions of
opinion which have been directed entirely to the good of this country. I cannot, in any respect, say the same of the speech of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man).
Some of my opinions will hang on my comments on the hon. Member's speech, and in case hon. Members think I am taking advantage of him, I would say that I did send him a special note to say that it was my intention to deal, perhaps not altogether in rosy terms, with the remarks that he made. However, his presence or not is entirely his matter, but I think it only fair to myself to say that I did say that I would make some critical remarks upon his observations.
I do not know the motives which underlie the remarks of the hon. Member for Coventry, East. The most charitable explanation, I think is that he, a very brilliant and intellectual political debutante, has never yet been given that most attractive request to come and snuggle on the Government Front Bench. Whether that is so or not, that is the best reason I can think of. I personally think that his speech was damaging, not because it was so important in our assembly, but because the hon. Gentleman has a very wide circulation for his opinions. I would like to go through one or two of the things he said, because I think they could have an unfortunate effect among what is not unimportant in this matter, the very large majority of people in this country and elsewhere who are really uninformed on this subject.
It would appear to me that the two qualities most required at the present time regarding the Persian situation are, firstly, clear thinking and, secondly, determination in action. The hon. Member for Coventry, East, so far as clear thinking is concerned, was about as much good

as a dust storm at a picnic. So far as determination and policy are concerned, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that his backbone was entirely indiscernible to most of us.
The one cardinal quality in this dispute, it seems to me—and perhaps one could criticise the fact that there has not been enough of it—is Anglo-American solidarity. It is only thus, with the cold war going on from Korea to Scandinavia, that we can surmount all our difficulties. Every single remark made by the hon. Member for Coventry, East, was calculated—I will not say deliberately—to do everything to disrupt Anglo-American solidarity.
There is a column which I read sometimes, not every day, in the "Daily Worker" which has gossip about how beastly the Americans are and how they are doing horrible things in this country. All I can say is that the hon. Gentleman's remarks about America were worthy of the gossip column of the "Daily Worker."

Mr. Crossman: I am sorry that I came in too late to hear the first part of the hon. and gallant Gentleman's accusations. If he is challenging any of the facts, that is one thing, but if he is suggesting that we should suppress the truth, which has received grave damage as the result of irresponsible action by American oil companies and by an American diplomatic official I do not think we shall get partnership by suppressing the truth.

Brigadier Head: I have never been in favour of suppressing the truth.

Mr. Crossman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is.

Brigadier Head: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would have the courtesy to wait for me to finish my sentence. What I am saying is that the hon. Gentleman did not support his remarks with actual details. Only one individual was specified. All I would say to the hon. Gentleman is that if one goes muck-raking there are always horrible facts about persons— if one is an expert muck-raking. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that this is a national cause and that even the most abject and determined muck-raker should consider abstention at this time. Implicit throughout the hon. Gentleman's speech is the fact that his policy is to leave Abadan.

Mr. Crossman: No.

Brigadier Head: The hon. Gentleman says "No." The hon. Gentleman stated quite clearly in his speech, "If you want to bring in troops to evacuate, I think it is tolerable; but if you want to bring in troops to maintain your position in the oilfields, then I look upon it as aggression."

Mr. Crossman: Mr. Crossman indicated assent.

Brigadier Head: I am glad to have established that. I will go further, though the hon. Gentleman did not. May I, for the moment, turn into Mr. Mossadeq or any other person who is running this business in Persia at present? There are about 5,000 unarmed employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company there. The Persians do not know whether to go ahead, cause riots and push them out, or to go easy. The hon. Gentleman's policy has only one logical conclusion for them, and that is to stir up malice, cause a row and then the British will send their aeroplanes and evacuate.

Mr. Crossman: I did not say that we should evacuate. What I said was that we should stay in Abadan. The technicians should stay there. We should attempt to seek—[HON. MEMBERS: "How?"] How? They should stay there, and it does not help the cause of Anglo-Persian relations to assume that the Persian Government are determined to stir up riots and kill our people. That is exactly what the hon. and gallant Gentleman is now asserting about the Persian Government. I believe that the Persian Government, who have got soldiers and policemen in that area, are seeking to keep the peace. It does not enable them to keep the peace if hon. Members make assertions that they are deliberately causing riots.

Brigadier Head: I am only attributing to the hon. Gentleman his own remarks— not mine. What, in effect, he is saying is that the Persian Government are going to keep order and, therefore, we should not suggest that such a thing might happen because it will make it harder for them.

Mr. Crossman: That is right.

Brigadier Head: If the hon. Gentleman had not such a tortuous mind, it would occur to him that the Persian Government have stated that they intend to take over the oilfields. I only ask the hon. Gentle-

man—and I hope that he will be fair in this—if it is the policy to take over the oilfields, and there are 5,000 unarmed civilians there, how would he set about it? I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that one would follow one of two alternatives, either to inspire riots or, perfectly peacefully, to march some of the Persian platoons into Abadan, halt at the front door of an essential part of the refinery and say, "I have instructions here to take over this building."
I ask the hon. Gentleman to say what he, or the employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, would do in those circumstances. That is not a thought which he has pursued. If he thinks that, when a Government have said that the oilfields belong to them, one can remain there indefinitely with 5,000 unarmed employees, he is digging his head into the sand even further than he has ever before.

Mr. Crossman: Mr. Crossman rose—

Brigadier Head: I cannot give way again. The hon. Gentleman and I once had a very good debate in a girls' school.
What it boils down to, and the issue which the hon. Member for Coventry, East, shirked—and he really did shirk it—is this. What value do we put on the retention of our position in Persia, and how determined are we to stay? That is the real crux of the matter. I rather stick to the speech of the hon. Member for Coventry, East, because I must confess, it sent my temperature up a little.
What he hardly mentioned—and it was mentioned by the hon. Member for Doncaster much more skilfully than I could do it—was the strategic implications of evacuation from Abadan and thus Persia. This is important for oil and revenue, but it is my belief— hon. Members opposite may think I am prejudiced—that the primary and most far-reaching implications are the strategic implications. There has been great unanimity in the House, in that hon. Members have said, "If we go the oil collapses; the economy of Persia collapses; and the Tudeh Party take over" and if that happens it is my conviction that within a year or 18 months Persia will be a Russian-dominated State.
Now, on the first to the left, so to speak, is Turkey, with Kurdistan; next


comes Iraq with the Mosul oilfields, and it will not do them any good; then comes the head of the Persian Gulf with the Abadan airfield, which will be available for Russia—a very advanced air base with a very good airfield; and Kuwait is just round the corner. Does any hon. Member really believe that if there was tension or trouble with Russia we could use the Kuwait oilfield in those circumstances? Then there is a contiguous frontier with India. The strategic implications are very great. Bearing in mind those factors, which the hon. Gentleman did not mention, thinking of the strategic implications and not of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, would we in any circumstances voluntarily secede in the Middle East important strategic assets of that nature?
I say to hon. Members in all parts of the House that, in those circumstances, we must make up our minds whether or not we are going to give that away. My feeling, quite frankly, is that we hope we shall not have to give it away, but we may have to. As many hon. Members have said, we are ignorant of the military situation locally, as far as both Persia is concerned, and our own. We do not know. We do know the importance of this position, however, and I suggest that if the position is left as it is we can never be certain that it will not so deteriorate that the Abadan oilfields will be taken over before we can take any steps to prevent it, because at the present moment they are occupied by 5,000 unarmed civilians.
Not one of the least important aspects of the hon. Gentleman's speech was the way in which he trailed his coat in order to make hon. Members on this side of the House make remarks which next week could be interpreted into "Gunboat, warmongering bloodsuckers."

Mr. Crossman: Mr. Crossman indicated dissent.

Brigadier Head: If the hon. Gentleman did not, he can contradict it in next week's "Sunday Pictorial." What I say to the hon. Gentleman is that if we are to have a realistic view about this it is no good saying, "Let us leave the oil personnel there and hope for the best, and then if there are rows we will evacuate them." That is tantamount to saying that we are giving up all these strategic assets.
My belief is that the most important single factor tonight in the Foreign Secretary's speech, which is to follow, is whether or not he includes a resolute determination that we are going to stay in Abadan. I do not say that as a gunboat, blood sucking warmonger. If one has experienced real war once or twice one dislikes it a great deal more than when one started.

Mr. Wigg: Mr. Wigg rose—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) must resume his seat if the hon. and gallant Member does not give way.

Mr. Wigg: Mr. Wigg rose—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member for Dudley does not seem to have heard what I said. If the hon. and gallant Member does not give way the hon. Member must resume his seat.

Brigadier Head: I would be quite willing to give way, but I do not know if the Foreign Secretary wants to get up as it is nearly time for him to do so.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. and gallant Member has often thrown that taunt about war service to the detriment of my hon. Friends on this side of the House. Would he tell us whether his own active service was 10 days or a fortnight?

Brigadier Head: I can assure the hon. Member that it is a great deal more than that. What I am saying is that our party are always accused of being warmongers. Part of this House is covered with shields which commemorate those of our party who died in two wars. Why should such a party be called warmongers. I do not see why I should not say it. I hope I am not delaying the Foreign Secretary, but these interjections are prolonging my speech.
We must be realistic about how we are going to deal with this situation. The Foreign Secretary has not yet told us clearly whether or not we mean to stay. I will be frank. I may be wrong, but reading between the lines of his last statement, I gained the impression that we were going to stay as long as we could until things got so bad that there was serious danger of loss of life, when we would evacuate, and if necessary use troops to evacuate. If that be right, this


House should think very hard and long of the implications from such a course in the long term.
We are here tonight not to talk about oil, but to consider—and this is very serious—what the situation will be in a year or 18 months from now if the Anglo-Iranian employees go out, if the Tudeh Party take power and if gradually we get Russian domination of Persia. That is the situation—although it is a long way off, and I hope it will never come—that we should have at the back of our minds when we are considering the necessity for great determination at this present time. Has that possibility been fully envisaged by the Cabinet and by the Chiefs of Staff? I feel myself that the long-term implications of that are immense, as the hon. Member for Don-caster brought out very clearly indeed.
It is all very well for hon. Members to call us warmongers and so forth. We are not warmongers. The majority of hon. Members on this side of the House have only one object, and that is the avoidance of a war, in which everything we like and for which we have striven would go for six. If we give away this area to Soviet domination the long-term effect in the Middle East will be disastrous. In this cold war, in which we are now engaged, we shall find ourselves with an immense handicap in that area. It is for that reason that I particularly hope that in his reply tonight the Foreign Secretary will give us a strong affirmative that he intends to stay.
My concluding remark is that if the Foreign Secretary gives us what I might call the diplomatic answer, which can be read either way, not only will I be disappointed, but it will make it less likely that we shall be able to stay, because determination or otherwise on his part is exactly what the Persian people are watching closely. I do not believe that determination will be disastrous. I do not believe that the Russians will have a war unless they wish to. I believe that a show of real determination by this House of Commons, led by the Foreign Secretary at the present time, is the best chance this nation has of preventing a disastrous situation in the Middle East.

9.21 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Herbert Morrison): The debate, by the way it has gone, has justified my view that it was best I should wait till the end in order that I could absorb the various contributions that have been made and points of view which have been expressed. I have been pleased to listen to the many speeches from more than one angle—indeed, from more than two angles—and there have been a number of able contributions.
The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), who opened the discussion, made a speech of moderation in which he put before us all the serious considerations that are involved in this matter. Other hon. Members have done the same. He made his contribution for the Conservative Party while the hon. Member for Merioneth (Mr. Emrys Roberts) did so for the Liberal Party. It was a useful contribution. Hon. Members on this side of the House have put their points of view. I think that we have had a very useful discussion, including speeches from people who have had first-hand experience of the matter.
Throughout the debate there has been a complaint from hon. Members opposite —not so much a complaint as a declaration—as to the seriousness of the situation, and that something big and strong ought to be done about it. I must say that they have not been too detailed or particular about what that something is. It would be desirable, if hon. Members take that line, that they should say what it is that they want to be done, but there has not been a great degree of forthcomingness in that respect.
I should like in the first instance, for the sake of the record and for the sake of other countries needing a concise statement of the case, to put the British case in respect of this difficulty and dispute as clearly as I can. I have reported from time to time to the House on the developments and have kept the House as fully informed as I possibly could. I think it would be true to say that the only development of any significance or substance which has been reported to me since I made my statement yesterday is that the Persian Prime Minister has obtained a unanimous vote of confidence in the lower House, when about 91 out of 126 Deputies were present.
There has been what I am informed is a minor demonstration against the company's offices in Teheran, and the Persian Government have now published a decree dissolving the company's information department. That probably will be received with a certain amount of sympathy by certain sections of the British Press, who are much against information departments. [HON. MEMBERS: "Cheap from a Foreign Secretary."] I did not think, so early in my reply, that back benchers would completely lose their sense of humour. The right hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Bracken), who is a steady opponent of information departments, thoroughly enjoyed the joke.
I should like to take the opportunity, as I have said, to outline the fundamentals of our case in this dispute. The facts at
issue are known to the House, but they need, in my opinion, to be re-stated for the benefit of countries abroad. The term "nationalisation" appears to us to have been consistently misused by Persian spokesmen. Incidentally, when it became known that we ourselves were prepared to accept the principle of nationalisation, there was a great deal of denunciation in quarters opposed politically to: he Government that we should have done any such thing. But I notice today that nobody, as far as I know, has criticised the acceptance by us of the principle of nationalisation if it were so pursued by the Persian Government. I may say that the acceptance of the principle of nationalisation was also urged by the Government of the United States of America in this case.
It is the case, of course, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, that Persian oil is already in the ownership of the Persian people.

Mr. Eden: That is more or less what I said.

Mr. Morrison: I said that that is what the right hon. Gentleman said. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has been extracting, refining and selling that oil under the security of a regularly negotiated agreement, valid until the year 1993. Relying upon that agreement, the company has invested greater sums than have ever before been invested in a foreign country by a single company.
We neither desire nor intend to question the exercise by Persia of any sovereign rights which she may legitimately exercise. We maintain, however, that the action which
it seems the Persian Prime Minister is set on taking against the company is not a legitimate exercise of those rights. It is not nationalisation—it is dispossession.
The 1933 Agreement is a contract between the Persian Government and a foreign company. It was freely concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and it was ratified
by the Persian Majlis. It laid down that the position of the company should never be altered by action of the Persian Government, or even by legislation, except as a result of agreement between the company and the Persian Government, and that if the Persian Government had any complaint against the company or vice versa, if the dispute could not be settled otherwise it was to be referred to arbitration.
The essential point at issue, as I must again make clear, is not the right of a sovereign Power to pass legislation nationalising commercial enterprises carried on within its borders, nor is it the measure of compensation that the Government concerned should pay for doing so. The point is that the Persian Government in effect undertook not to exercise this right, and the real issue is, therefore, the wrong done if a sovereign State breaks a contract which it has deliberately made. If the Persian Government had any grievance against the company, it should have sought arbitration, as the company has done. It is the Persian Government's failure to accept the company's request for arbitration that has compelled His Majesty's Government themselves to make application to the International Court for the dispute to be heard by the Court.
I do not wish, however, to be over-emphatic as to the legal aspects of the matter. Indeed, it was precisely because we hoped that the dispute might be settled in amicable discussions that the company, in full consultation with His Majesty's Government, decided to send its delegation to Teheran, with what result the House knows. We remain ready to discuss all outstanding points fully and frankly, and the proposals which the company has put forward offer, as impartial observers will agree, a basis on which a


solution satisfactory to all concerned can be found. But unhappily there is as yet no indication that the Persian Prime Minister is prepared to alter his course, and whether the threats of physical dispossession that have been uttered against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company will be implemented remains to be seen.
Apparently the Persian Prime Minister is in no mood to accept the co-operation which is so freely offered. He, it seems, would prefer to do without oil than to have any dealings with the company. I wonder if he recognises the danger that may well confront his country if he continues on that course. The dislocation of the Persian economy which would inevitably follow the interruption in revenue from oil could not fail to create conditions in which the Tudeh Party would flourish and attract to its ranks the many in Persia who have long been dissatisfied with the standard of life of their country.
Let me say this, that we have sought— our late colleague, Mr. Bevin, earnestly sought—throughout the Middle East to lift up the standard of life of the poor people of those countries. It must be faced that the Prime Minister of Persia is not a left-wing Socialist or anything like that; he is a reactionary.

Mr. Eden: We do not know what he is.

Mr. Morrison: It is important to know what he is. I listened to the right hon. Gentleman, I think he might listen to me. I am entitled to put my argument in my own way. I want to make this point because there are certain historical comparisons with it.
The Prime Minister of Persia belongs to a well-to-do class which is being kept going by the working people of that country. And that Government, which could, out of the revenues of the oil company —and they were supposed to do it—have spent money for the social development of the country under the Seven Year Plan, have largely not done so, but have diverted the money. It is not the first time in history that members of the upper classes and of extreme reactionary views have diverted, or sought to divert, the attention of their working classes by preaching to them to hate the foreigner instead of having a dispute with their own ruling classes. And that, it seems to me, is what they are doing. There were plenty of precedents for it in western coun-

tries in the 19th century. It may be that Dr. Moussadeq has sown the wind and will reap a Communist whirlwind.
It will perhaps be said that it is for the Persian Government themselves to choose, and that our advice is not sought. Nevertheless, we should be poor friends of Persia if we kept silent. The Persian people themselves, I am convinced, desperately need an improvement in their standard of living. That improvement can come about only if the natural resources of their country are developed, and oil is one of the chief of these resources; indeed, probably it is the chief of the resources.
The many years of experience of work in Persia, the high technical skill, the capital, the transport, and the world-wide selling organisation that together are required to bring Persian oil to its most lucrative development can be provided only by the company. Without its aid the flow of oil and the money that comes from it will dwindle and perhaps cease. It cannot be that the Persian people desire this. Nor can it be in their interests that this catastrophe should come to pass. It is for that reason that we, from our friendship towards Persia, have every right to speak our minds, and it is for that reason that we offer co-operation which would be fruitful for both Persia and ourselves.
It is, moreover, the case that of all the employers in Persia and probably in the Middle East, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, while it may have been open to criticism in some respects, is easily and far away the best employer in Persia or in that part of the world—it is possible, of course, that that is one of its offences— and has spent much money out of its revenues for the provision of schools, health centres and in other ways. To describe that as a mere piece of imperialist exploitation seems to me to be quite wrong. It is the case that the company have paid to the Persian Government large sums of money, and I have indicated that unhappily it has not all gone in the right way.
The House must recognise that Persia has a long record of international interference behind it—foreign interference. One of the first books I read was a book about the spheres of influence of Russia under the Czars and the spheres of influence under the British. I thought that


in some of the speeches to which we have listened hon. Members have been casting their minds back to the days of imperialism, and are perhaps thinking that it is possible to do in this modern period what could have been done years ago in the period of imperialist practices. We are not in a period now when we can colonise
countries which have reached the stage of self-government. We cannot do in the 20th century what was not uncommonly done in the 19th century.
Moreover, we are part of the United Nations, and hon. Members opposite have to face the fact that the imperialism upon which they were brought up is dead.

Mr. Eden: I do not wish to interrupt the Foreign Secretary, but I have not heard one single speech in any part of the House which suggested colonising any part of Persia. Most of us know that Persia was a State even before Britain.

Mr. Morrison: All I say is that I discerned in part of the philosophy of some of the speeches that have been made, and certainly in many of the arguments that have been employed by Conservative newspapers outside—

Earl Winterton: A monstrous charge.

Mr. Morrison: I wish that the noble Lord, who is most touchy if anyone says anything about him, and is very quick to raise points of order, could really take things without making persistent interjections. [Interruption.] We have had from the popular Tory Press militaristic and the old imperialist kind of declarations, and even the "Daily Telegraph," which is so close to hon. Gentlemen opposite, the day before yesterday, or yesterday, I think, was pretty well demanding the starting up of two wars, one in Egypt and one in Persia. [Interruption.]

Mr. Manuel: On a point of order—

Mr. Speaker: Did a Member throw something across the Floor of the House? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] Is that so?

Major Legge-Bourke: Major Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely) rose—

Mr. Speaker: Will the hon. and gallant Member say if he threw something across the Floor of the House?

Major Legge-Bourke: What I did was to throw a penny at the right hon. Gentleman and suggest that he put on another record.

Mr. Speaker: That is quite out of order,, and I now direct the hon. and gallant Member, because of that act, to leave this House.

The hon. and gallant Member withdrew accordingly.

Mr. Morrison: As far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we do not wish to pursue the matter in that kind of temper and that kind of spirit. We are most anxious to negotiate a settlement based upon mutual respect and mutual understanding of interests—[Interruption.] I wish hon. Members opposite would be a little less capable of demonstrating their hatred merely because a Minister— [Interruption.]

Mr. Braine: Why not speak as Foreign Secretary?

Mr. Morrison: After all, I and the Government—[Interruption.] I do not know what all this is about; I was only going to say, "I and the Government as a whole." I hope this persistent misbehaviour, this persistent ill-conduct on a serious occasion will be noted in the country. We have been subjected to a great deal of day-to-day abuse inside and outside the House and we are entitled to put our point of view and even to make some counter criticisms.
The point has been raised, as is perfectly natural and understandable, as to evacuation. Let me say quite clearly that this Government does not wish evacuation to take place. We are certainly not seeking to evacuate the oilfields. It is our wish, as I said yesterday, that the officers and technicians of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should stay there and should do their work and continue to serve the well-being of these undertakings. That is our wish and we shall pursue that with the greatest energy of which we are capable —[Laughter.]—and I am sure that the men concerned will do so. Despite the laughter, I will once more pay my tribute to these men for the faithfulness they have shown.
One or two considerations have, however, to be kept in mind. There have been demands from hon. Members


opposite that I should give absolute guarantees and undertakings that in no circumstances will anybody be moved— nobody; they should all stay. Now, Sir, some of these officers and technicians are scattered about the oilfields, not at Abadan but round the oilfields, some isolated from the possibilities of protection. Supposing they are in trouble; supposing there are efforts to seize the oilfields and supposing they are in difficulties; would it necessarily be wrong to evacuate them to Abadan, or have they to stay there and run a serious risk of possible riot and murder? [An HON. MEMBER: "Do not be silly."] I am not being silly.
Repeatedly it is said that everybody should stay and I am putting it in this first instance to the test. I gather that hon. Gentlemen opposite, on reflection, are disposed to agree that in those circumstances it would be legitimate and right to evacuate them to Abadan— [HON. MEMBERS: "Of course."]—all right, but it has not been said so until now.

Mr. Eden: We tried desperately hard not to be partisan in our statements, but the right hon. Gentleman has just put a question which has not been put across the Floor of the House before, and he cannot complain about not having an answer to a question which nobody put.

Mr. Morrison: I like the right hon. Gentleman very much but he really is a little bit cool sometimes. When the Government have been attacked—

Mr. Eden: I did not attack the Government.

Mr. Morrison: I did not say the right hon. Gentleman had, but the Government have been attacked inside this House and outside and then the right hon. Gentleman gets up, as innocent as he can so well be —[HON. MEMBERS: "Cheap!"]—and asks about making partisan observations. At any rate, we are agreed on this point, that so far as the outlying places are concerned, it would be legitimate to move those people and evacuate them to Abadan.
On the other point, as to the bigger issue and as to military intervention and military operations, I have said that we are prepared, and we have given an undertaking that we would do every-

thing we can to protect British lives. To that I adhere, but it really would be most unwise for me to be involved in any details of possible military movements.

Mr. Brendan Bracken: Hear, hear.

Mr. Morrison: But I have been asked to say so by the hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe) —

Mr. Bracken: No, the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Gunter).

Mr. Morrison: No, the hon. Member for Windsor; I do know what I am talking about. The general purport of the debate has been that the Government should give guarantees which must involve military movements of one son and another. I would call—

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. As he has referred to me, I would say that all I asked for was an assurance that, should it be necessary to afford protection, adequate troops were available at the right place and at the right time.

Mr. Morrison: The record which I have of what the right hon. Gentleman said was that he asked for more details of the plans which have been made to give protection—that those details should be given to the House. It is that point that I am answering. I wish to quote the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, if he does not mind my doing so, because in 1932 he took precisely the same line as I have—in this House on 8th December, 1932, when this same issue arose, curiously enough, on the Persian oil business. At that time he was the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. Mr. Lansbury said:
… may I ask whether it means that if certain contingencies arise, the Government propose to take measures, armed measures, against Persia? I am asking what the Under-Secretary of State means by his statement.
MR. EDEN: I should have thought that the position is quite clear. We hold the Persian Government responsible for protecting the rights of this British company.
There was another Question by Mr. Lansbury and then it is reported:
MR. EDEN: The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, if he puts a hypothetical question, all I can say is that His Majesty's Government can only be guided by circumstances as they arise.


If I say the same today, I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman, notwithstanding the anticipation of criticism from various quarters for taking this line, is bound to say I am absolutely right in taking the
line; and I think some of his hon. Friends are wrong. Mr. Lansbury then put a Question to the Lord President of the Council asking whether, before any measures were taken, although the matter was referred to arbitration, the House would have an opportunity of discussing them. The Lord President, Mr. Baldwin, said:
 The right hon. Gentleman must know that it is perfectly impossible to answer hypothetical questions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th December, 1932; Vol. 272; c. 1793.]
That was the position of the Government of that day, and if I adopt the same position, I am sure there can be no criticism from the right hon. Gentleman for Warwick and Leamington. We are watching the position day by day. We shall do everything we can to protect British lives and we are most anxious also that the undertaking shall continue its valuable existence on behalf of the world as a whole.
There has been great anxiety expressed whether there will be such oil shortages as will give rise to a very serious situation. Undoubtedly, not only will inconvenience, but economic loss and difficulty, be caused if anything untoward should happen to these undertakings. I do not think we should under-estimate it, and other countries must not under-estimate it, because they might be in great difficulties as a consequence of such developments. Nevertheless, it would not be wise to over-play them, because I do not think it will be absolutely devastating, though undoubtedly it will be serious. The question has been raised about petrol rationing in the United Kingdom as a consequence of this situation. I would only say that I am advised by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power that that is exceedingly unlikely.
Questions have also been raised about the attitude of the United States. I have been asked what is the general attitude of the United States Government, and whether they support His Majesty's Government in the line we have taken. I would say that the United States Government have in general supported the

line which His Majesty's Government have taken. There are two things I can be clear about, and I am sure that the United States Government will in no way mind me saying them; indeed, they are pretty well public knowledge.
One is that they were in favour of our accepting the principle of nationalisation. That was made quite clear early on. Secondly, they were most anxious that every avenue should be explored, so far as peaceful negotiations were concerned, and that there should be no precipitate manifestation of military force. That is perfectly clear, and let there be no mistake about the line of the United States Government in this matter. Therefore, I think it would be fair to say that they are in general accord with the policy of His Majesty's Government. They accept the view that we have a perfect right to take steps for the protection of British lives. [Interruption.] Well, I have been asked about these things, and I thought it right to give the House the information.
Some other things have been said as to the attitude of the United States oil companies, and the right hon. Gentleman the Deputy Leader of the Opposition asked that I should deal with the point made from this side of the House. I think it would be fair to say that there have been some people, not of outstanding importance, who were associated or have been associated with the American oil industry, who have said some foolish, unwise and perhaps dangerous things in the course of their travels through the Middle East. I am dealing with people who have been or are associated with the American oil industry.
I think it would not be fair to hold the American oil companies responsible for their activities in this respect. It is only fair to say that we have had a good deal of help and co-operation from the State Department. I am saying "as a whole," because I know the point to which my hon. Friend referred about one gentleman, and I do not wish to pursue it, but, as a whole, we have had considerable help and co-operation from the American State Department, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power assures me that, as far as the American oil companies are concerned, as companies in their corporate capacity, there is no evidence whatever that they have been conspiring against us; on the contrary they


have given a good deal of help and assistance.
I thought it fail and right that I should make those observations. Those are the considerations which the Government have in mind. I can assure the House that we do not take a light view of this at all; we do not think that this is a situation which calls for anything but the gravest consideration, and we are determined to do everything we can in order that the situation shall be dealt with, and that we shall get it right.
But we are dealing with an extraordinary Government. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear hear."] The right hon. Gentleman will notice those partisan cheers from his non-party friends. In the Persian Government, we are dealing with an extraordinary Government, and it is somewhat difficult to follow them from day to day. There is the hope that they, having moved about so unexpectedly from day to day, may possibly one of these days move in the right direction. At any rate, let us sincerely hope so.
We hope very much that they will see the need and the properness of co-operation with us, and we shall be only too pleased to co-operate with them in order to arrive at an amicable settlement. I am perfectly sure that an amicable settlement can be reached on the basis of the principle of nationalisation. It cannot be reached on the letter of the law of the Majlis, which, indeed, is little more than a series of resolutions. I am sure that on the basis of the principle of nationalisation and of a working agreement with the Persian nation, the Persian Government and the company, we can work out a solution which will be to the common advantage of Persia, of ourselves and of the world as a whole.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. William Whiteley): I beg
to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND MEASURES

9.58 p.m.

Sir Richard Acland: I beg to move,
That the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Measures, 1923 to 1929 (Amendment) Measure, 1951, passed by the National Assembly of the Church of England, be presented to His Majesty for His Royal Assent in the form in which the said Measure was laid before Parliament.
I hope that the ovation with which I am greeted indicates that the House will pass without argument or Division the three ecclesiastical Measures which it is my duty to move. I think the House as a whole would wish me to save time by dealing with them briefly. The first is the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Measure, 1951. The object of this Measure is to extend certain modifications of the earlier Measure which were found to be convenient during war-time. We have had five years' experience of their working.
I do not think anybody has suffered by the modifications then introduced. The modifications extend what was a five-year period for assessment into a seven-year period and allow repairs to be authorised on the authority of the Diocesan Dilapidations Boards without requiring the diocesan surveyor to make an assessment after modest repairs. I hope the House will feel that this Measure which the Church Assembly has passed unanimously can be accepted by it.

Captain John Crowder: I beg to second the Motion.

Question put, and agreed to.

10.0 p.m.

Sir R. Acland: I beg to move:
That the Cathedrals (Appointed Commissions) Measure, 1951, passed by the National Assembly of the Church of England, be presented to His Majesty for His Royal Assent in the form in which the said Measure was laid before Parliament.
This removes a doubt which exists at the moment. The Cathedrals Measure, 1931, appointed a Commission to clarify the constitution of the chapters of many cathedrals, and that Commission was appointed for 12 years. There was power to appoint thereafter ad hoc commissions to deal with cathedral problems as and when they might arise. The original Measure made it perfectly clear that the original Commission, established for 12


years, should have its expenses paid by the Church Commissioners. It is not clear whether subsequent ad hoc commissions can also have their expenses paid in the same way. This Measure is intended to make it clear that the expenses of these ad hoc commissions can also be paid by the Church Commissioners. I hope the House will think this is a reasonable Measure.

Captain J. Crowder: I beg to second the Motion.

Earl Winterton: I was unable clearly to follow what the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) said. It was a little difficult to hear him. I want to ask him one question as I am interested in an organisation describing itself as the Friends of Chichester Cathedral which has raised a large sum of money for that cathedral. I believe there are similar bodies throughout England. May I take it that this Measure in no way affects the position of such voluntary bodies?

Sir R. Acland: I think that is so. I do not think a voluntary body would be affected in any way. If a commission were appointed to investigate the constitution of the chapter their expenses could be paid by the Church Commissioners, but I do not think a voluntary body would be affected.

Question put, and agreed to.

10.3 p.m.

Sir R. Acland: I beg to move,
That the Benefices (Stabilization of Incomes) Measure, 1951, passed by the National Assembly of the Church of England, be presented to His Majesty for His Royal Assent in the form in which the said Measure was laid before Parliament.
The third Measure is perhaps a little more significant. Part of the income payable to the benefices by the Church Commissioners is fixed and depends not upon specific investments but upon the security of the Commissioners' general fund as a whole. There are, however, some £38,500,000 worth of Government and other securities which are held at the risk of some 10,500 individual benefices.
The income of each benefice depends upon the income yielded by the stock which is held in relation to that particular benefice. Those individual benefices are,

therefore, subject to the risk that the particular stock concerned may at some future time be redeemed and a stock with a lower interest rate substituted, as a result of which the individual benefice would lose. Moreover, some 2,000 benefices at present receive annuities under the Tithe Act, 1918, and they will lose £30,000 per annum for certain when the annuities terminate, as they will between 1970 and 1977.
The purpose of this Measure is to bring the general fund of the Church Commissioners to the aid of the particular benefices which are liable to this risk. In effect, the risk is to be taken over by the general fund. The Measure provides for stabilisation orders to be made by the Commissioners under which the annuities and securities will be transferred to the Commissioners' general fund and the benefices concerned will be credited with the value of these securities as a money capital and will receive income from the general fund in perpetuity equal to the existing income from the annuities and securities.
Every benefice to which this Measure applies will therefore receive henceforth the income which it is receiving now, and if in future the particular securities concerned should be redeemed, or securities of a lower interest rate should be substituted for them, that loss, that burden, will fall upon the much broader shoulders of the general fund of the Church Commissioners, and the Church Commissioners will continue to pay to the particular benefice the same income that it is now receiving. Therefore, no benefice will lose and many benefices, as time goes on, will be in a better position than they would have been if each one had retained its separate dependence on a separate parcel of stocks and securities.
I must not disguise from the House the remote possibility that some of the stocks which are held by individual benefices may—it is conceivable that they may— appreciate in capital value. Then it is perfectly true that the benefice concerned would not reap that adventitious advantage; but, taking the thing by and large, we can say that no benefice is going to be worse off than at present and that most of the benefices are going to be considerably better off than they would be in the course of the next 5, 10 or 20 years if the stocks were redeemed, or lower interest bearing stocks were substituted.
I hope that the House will feel that the Church Assembly, at the instance of the Church Commissioners, has made wise provision in this Measure for safeguarding the future well being of the benefices concerned.

10.8 p.m.

Mr. Brendan Bracken: I should like, for a start, to tell the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) that there is no party controversy in this matter. We all know the appalling problems created by clerical poverty, and we all know that the children of parsons—

Mr. Speaker: First the Motion must be seconded, and then the right hon. Gentleman can continue with these observations.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: I beg to second the Motion moved by the hon. Baronet the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland), although I cannot rival the splendour of his appearance. As he rightly said, this Motion is of considerably wider importance than the last two to which the House has given its assent. Upon the Tightness or wrong-ness of the Measure now being presented to this House will depend the welfare of many thousands of parish priests over the coming years, and it is, therefore, only right that this House before assenting to this Motion should satisfy itself of the Tightness of the Church Assembly's decision to consolidate the income from these trust funds at its present level.
It might appear that the early years of our emergence from the Daltonian era of low interest rates were the worst possible time thinkable in which to consolidate these returns at their present level. After all, we experienced in the years 1931 to 1946 an almost continuous fall in interest rates. That uniform trend has now started to be reversed, and the question may naturally arise in the mind of hon. Members whether it is not very unwise to choose just this opportunity for fixing in perpetuity the income of the benefices concerned from these funds.
I must confess that when I first read this Measure I had the same doubts. I therefore took an expert stock exchange opinion upon the transaction to which it is suggested
by this Motion the House should assent. I should like to give to the House, very briefly, the reasons why,

in that opinion, which is one which carries great weight, the present time is the right one and not the wrong one.
In the first place, with the present tendency for interest rates to rise, it will be a very long time before they influence redemption and re-investment of the sort of securities with which we are dealing. I will quote one sentence from that opinion:
This would take many years, however, since borrowers will tend to let the issue? run to final maturity and shorts may be replaced by new shorts which can at present be issued at very low rates.
On the other hand, should interest rates turn downward again, the borrowers will still get the advantage, because they will take that opportunity to redeem. Thus the fact that this is the first occasion when interest rates are tending to rise, is no reason why we should regard it as an unfavourable time for consolidating.
There is, however, a more general consideration in regard to consolidation and that will apply in general whatever may be the temporary variations in interest rate. It is this:
 The borrower is in a position to select a period of low interest rates as the time for effecting conversions, especially for stocks without final dates.
As is the case with so many of these
stocks.
On the other hand, the holder can do nothing except sit tight on his investments and hope that they will not be redeemed, or alternatively switch into other investments where the first optional date is further ahead, but in doing so he would almost certainly lose income.
I feel, therefore, that the House upon further consideration is justified in coming to the conclusion that the measure which the Church assembly has passed and has sent to us is one which is almost certain in the long run and on balance to confer a great benefit upon benefices concerned, and that it is one to which this House should ask for assent.

10.12 p.m.

Mr. Bracken: I cannot agree with the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). To suggest that at the present time the holding of long-term Government securities is a wise matter is to my mind silly. We are living in art age of inflation. I should be the last to suggest that this House should interfere


with the decision of the Church Assembly, because I do not think that we should carry our so-called legal powers so far, but I think that the danger to the Church of England caused by inflation is so great that it is about time that someone said, from this side of the House, that the Archbishops and members of the Church Assembly should take notice of what is happening.
As 1 see it, the clergy, who are living in great poverty, may now be completely ruined by holding long-term Government securities. I would not take the advice of an anonymous stockbroker. In my judgment this is a matter affecting the whole nation. We do not want to interfere with the Church Assembly, but I cannot consider anything more unfortunate than that clerical poverty should be deepened by the unwisdom of legislation approved by this House. I would beg the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) to take much better financial advice in this matter.
1 hold that the Church endowments which were based on land and were in those days a fairly safe endowment are today based on Government securities. I once, four years ago, told the right hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton), the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, that before he finished he would turn Government securities and the pound sterling into confetti. The risk is greater than ever now. There is no division on either side of the House on this question, but I beg the hon. Baronet to consider the matter.
I do not think that the Church should hold Government securities at present. They should get into something that gives them protection. I advise them to study the investment policy of Harvard University which enables some protection to be given to great institutions, whether they be churches or colleges, against inflation. I hope that the hon. Baronet will get some wise financial advice before he comes along so glibly and eloquently— and so decoratively tonight—to tell us that it is a good thing that the Church should hold long-term Government securities. It is not. It may ruin some of the clergy who are underpaid, who have done so much for this country and to whose children we owe so much. There is a good deal of sentiment in the Church Assembly, but

there is no hardbitten financial advice available.

Sir R. Acland: I have listened with great interest to the advice of the right hon. Gentleman. I have no doubt that the men who advise the Church Commissioners would be grateful for any counsel that he can give them. But the question involved in this Measure does not raise so grave a principle as whether the Church Commissioners should hold Government securities at all. It is simply a question of whether Government and other
securities which may be redeemed at any time should be held at the risk of certain individual benefices or on the general fund and the individual benefices protected against possible fluctuation. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will feel that this Measure is a wise one.

Question put, and agreed to.

ROYAL NAVY (DUTY-FREE GOODS)

10.17 p.m.

Captain Ryder: I beg to move:
That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that the Regulations, dated 7th May, 1951, entitled the Duty-Free Supplies for the Royal Navy Regulations, 1951 (S.I., 1951, No. 803), a copy of which was laid before this House on 9th May, be annulled.
I wish to make it clear from the outset that we on this side of the House do not wish to oppose in principle the measures which are broadly outlined in this Statutory Instrument and which were approved last year in the Finance Act. Nor, broadly speaking, are we opposed to the quantities mentioned in the regulations. We feel, however, that the regulations involve a great deal of administrative detail and that there are many small matters which we should like the Government to explain to us.
The first point is that, as far as I can see, these regulations apply exclusively to ships on the home station. We should like to know whether there is likely to be another batch of regulations restricting the consumption of tobacco and spirits in ships on foreign stations, or whether we can have an assurance that there will be no further reduction in these supplies. In this connection I wish to refer to Admiralty Fleet Order 1523/51,


which brings into effect the Statutory Instrument which we are discussing. In category II are included
H.M. Ships in commission which are normally required in the ordinary course of their duties to be absent from the United Kingdom territorial waters, but not for periods as long as six days continuously.
They are to be limited to 1¼ lb. of Service tobacco.
We were assured last year by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty that men in sea-going ships would be entitled to 1½ lb. These new regulations do not seem to live up to the assurance we were given last year, although there may be some good reason for it.
It does not end there, however, because para. 6. of the Statutory Instrument says that ships in the category II are limited to tobacco supplied from naval sources, so that in addition to being limited to 1¼ lb. these men will also not be able to buy duty-free proprietary brands of tobacco. That is a point which I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will explain to us.
We now come to the habitual user of tobacco, referred to in para. 5. In para. 9 of the Admiralty Fleet Order we see that those who claim the right for this tobacco are required to sign a declaration
that I am in the habit of using tobacco and I undertake that any tobacco sold to me free of Customs duty shall be only for my own personal use, and it will not be given away. sold or otherwise trafficked.
What is an habitual user? A number of definitions are given in the Statutory Instrument. For instance, "The Commissioners" are defined. "Officers and men of the Royal Navy," "Naval establishments" and "Food" are defined.
'Food' means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs.
"Tobacco" is defined:
'Tobacco' includes cigars, cigarettes and snuff.
but not apparently chewing gum. There is no definition of an habitual user of tobacco. Has the unfortunate fellow to smoke a statutory cigarette every week in front of a naval officer, or how is it to be decided that he is an habitual smoker? Suppose he decides to train for the ship's football team and to knock off smoking for four weeks, what happens? Must he

make a declaration of a change in status as regards his smoking habits? What happens to the poor fellow who offers his girl a cigarette at a ship's company dance? As far as I can see, he will break the regulations if he offers a cigarette on Brighton beach, but not if he goes over to Dunkirk and offers the cigarette there.
This requirement to sign is obnoxious, and that is my sole serious complaint. I think it is very obnoxious to require officers and men to sign such an ill-defined declaration before they are allowed to have this duty-free tobacco, and I seriously ask the Parliamentary Secretary to think again before imposing this on the Royal Navy.
Under paragraph 9 the Admiralty are to control the consumption of alcohol in the Navy, but the Commissioners of Customs are to control the use of tobacco. I do not know whether it is the habit of splicing the mainbrace that particularly qualifies their Lordships to deal with alcoholic consumption in the Navy, but I do think that some explanation should be given of why there is this peculiar form of divided control.
I notice that the Royal Marines and the W.R.N.S. are excluded from this. I do not know why they should be bracketed together. It seems to me an unwise thing to bracket the Royal Marines with the W.R.N.S. The Royal Marines are at least entitled to their duty-free supplies if serving in naval messes, but the W.R.N.S., who may well be serving under exactly the same conditions in Service establishments alongside the men, are not entitled to these duty-free supplies, and I do not see why they should not be. I hope we are not going to be told it is merely because they do not come under naval discipline. Surely they are not to be told that, because they are not suitable receptacles for a tot of rum, they should not be allowed a good smoke.
Last year we asked for an assurance that the reductions being made in the supply of naval tobacco would be restored. In Admiralty Fleet Order Number 1270/49, paragraph 4, there appears these words:
Although the above restrictions in the personal allowance of duty-free tobacco and cigarettes are under present circumstances imperative. Their Lordships entertain the hope that when a material improvement in the economic situation occurs it will be possible


for reconsideration to be given to the privileges, with a view eventually to restoration of the tobacco concessions hitherto enjoyed.
I do not know what happens when their Lordships entertain a hope, but I should like to ask whether we can have that assurance of a year ago substantiated tonight.

10.26 p.m.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: I beg to second the Motion.
Nobody feels more strongly than I do that the concession of duty-free tobacco, spirits and other things should be extended to every possible naval establishment, and I hope that any strictures which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) and I may make will not expose us to such a supposition as that we oppose the extension of these privileges to establishments not otherwise enjoying them. But this new rationing scheme is really one of the silliest arrangements I have ever come across. Last week in my constituency it was referred to as being
"dead funny" by the serving men in one ship that I was aboard.
What I object to about this more than anything else is that it starts by regarding all hands as being criminal and puts everyone on the wrong foot straight away. For instance, it demands that everybody shall sign as being a smoker or non-smoker. There is no such thing as a light smoker. It is a matter of all or none. A man has to sign as a smoker all the time or as one who smokes none of the time. I have an authoritative report from Portsmouth that one ship there has no non-smokers. I can quite understand that attitude. It is quite ridiculous to ask men to forswear the use of tobacco or put themselves into the bureaucratic clutches to get what is available. Presumably a sailor is an habitual smoker even though he smokes only one a month or, as my hon. and gallant Friend said, one a week under proper witnessing.
I feel that this scheme twists and distorts the whole smoking arrangements of the Services. I am not saying anything about the drink arrangements because they seem to be uninterfered with. One thing I know is that as soon as the introduction of this remarkably silly

scheme is made, instead of there possibly being a certain amount of tobacco smuggled ashore, which I dare say there might have been before and which was adequately prevented by the plans in use for the detection of such things—even if one sometimes hears stories of the successful passing of certain amounts of tobacco ashore—the temptation to do so will be increased and the trafficking it is intended to prevent will be aggravated. For instance, I understand that these coupons have a market value of 3s. 8d. in one ship and 4s. 6d. in another, and in Queen Street, Portsmouth, they were worth 5s. a week ago—quite early in the month. This does not seem to me to be a satisfactory state of affairs, and I certainly do not think it is any improvement on the previous situation.
On the question of categories, I have looked with interest through the list at the end of the Admiralty Fleet Order, and though my eyesight is maybe a little defective I was unable to see where a ship like the "Theseus" comes into this scheme. She does not seem to be affected; she has not yet been compelled into this "fiddle" which is now being thrust on the Service.
Now, is the tobacco allowance a privilege or part of the pay of the men? We hear it called a privilege and yet we hear it stated that it brings the Navy pay into line with that of the other Services. I do not think Navy pay is in line with that of the other Services—it is lower. Again, I have been assured by a man who should know, a serving officer who, after spending some years ashore on lodging and provision allowances, has now been appointed to a ship, that, even with these privileges now, he is substantially worse off than he was ashore. I do not think we can consider that these duty-free privileges amount to anything in the way of an equalisation of pay.
Is this scheme intended to reduce dollar expenditure on tobacco? There is a certain amount of reason for supposing it is. If it is, can we understand that when the pinch ceases to be felt so much, this particularly silly scheme will be done away with and we shall return to the ordinary principle of tobacco being issued to those who require it when they require it? It ought not to be forgotten that the Navy has always had hitherto a reasonable amount of duty-free tobacco.


Or is it the intention to save money? The cost of printing the extra forms, which appear in facsimile on page 5 of Admiralty Fleet Order 1573 of this year, and of the extra administration, will more than swallow up any gains there may be to the Customs and Excise. It is my contention that the Customs and Excise are not going to be any better off by introducing this scheme. This is a particularly ill-considered scheme. It is creating an organised "fiddle," and I would have none of it.

10.33 p.m.

Commander Pursey: The ridicule which the mover and seconder of this Motion have poured on these Regulations would leave one to assume that there are a lot of new things in them, that concessions are being taken away from the Navy, that there is some vast difference and that new principles are being introduced. That is complete nonsense, because, so far as I can see, every one of the amounts now proposed is considerably in excess of those in force in the Navy for a number of years. The amount of tobacco allowed was for years and years 1 lb.; now it is over 1 lb.
Without delaying the House by going into lengthy details, I would say that there is no question at all that the Navy is far better off today than it has been at any other time during this century. The Navy is far better off under a Socialist Government than ever it was under Tory and Liberal Governments, which for 60 years opposed an increase of pay, although I admit that is not the subject of this Instrument.

Mr. Brendan Bracken: Tell that to the marines.

Commander Pursey: We now have an interruption from the finest First Lord of the Admiralty since Nelson was put on his pedestal in Trafalgar Square. His interruptions on naval affairs usually disclose more ignorance of them than any other hon. Member ever shows.

Commander Galbraith: Surely the hon. and gallant Gentleman's memory is misleading him. He could have obtained 2 lb. of tobacco from the ship's stores and any other amount of tobacco he liked. It was not a case of restriction to 1 lb. at all.

Commander Pursey: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has a different argument from the one I am putting forward. I am stating that the amount of duty-free tobacco allowed to the Navy was 1 lb.

Commander Galbraith: Commander Galbraith indicated dissent.

Commander Pursey: Admittedly if a man liked, ashore or elsewhere, to buy non-duty free tobacco he could buy as much as he wanted, and there is nothing to stop a naval officer or rating from buying tobacco by the ton, so there is no point in the intervention.. Now we come to the question of categories. Reference
was made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who seconded the Motion to the "Theseus." There is nothing in the Instrument about ships on foreign stations.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: The "Theseus" is now in Portsmouth Dockyard.

Commander Pursey: It is not a question of where the "Theseus" is today, but where she has been. If it was on foreign service, these Regulations do not apply. The "Theseus" having come home and transferred to a new category, I might be right or wrong—[Laughter.] —That is typical of the laugh before the statement. If hon. Gentlemen would wait for the finish they would not display such ignorance. If she had transferred to a new category by paying off her old commission, and being re-commissioned by new ratings, the hon. and gallant Gentleman is misleading this House by referring to it. If that ship's company is paid off, he has no argument so far as her previous service is concerned. If she has not yet paid off, she will be paid off and commissioned with an entirely new crew in a totally different category.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for his A B C of naval service, but I do not see where the "Theseus" differs from any other ship in the dockyard.

Commander Pursey: The hon. and gallant Gentleman's reference to the "Theseus" was irrelevant. In the second place, the "Theseus" will get exactly the same consideration as any other ship


in the same category in which she is placed, so the "Theseus" has nothing to do with the case.
Categories of ships have not been changed. Ships on foreign stations have always been in a privileged position by virtue of that fact. Other ships have concessions by virtue of being sea-going in home waters, and others on home establishments are in a different category. The reasons for that I am not going to discuss. That may be left either to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty or to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. [Interruption.] I am prepared to debate it with hon. Members and the House as long as they like to stay here. It is sufficient to say that there is no change of categories. These categories have existed for a long time, and there is no argument on that point.
On the question of a declaration whether an individual is a smoker or a non-smoker, I should have thought, judging by the arguments that we have had from the Opposition during the Budget debates about what can be done with regard to finance, taxation and so on, that the Opposition would have given wholehearted support to this measure, which is designed to prevent goods which today are subject to high duty from being misapplied to purposes other than those approved.
It would appear that the Opposition wants to open the floodgates, to make it easy for people to get this tobacco and foodstuffs and make such use of them as they think fit, to put money into their pockets. The hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fareham referred to the prices of these coupons as if this were a grand thing to do. Is it not precisely the same thing as the Customs trying to stop people taking foodstuffs from this country to the Continent. [Interruption.] Now we get an interruption from the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams), who has just arrived and who does not know the gist of the argument. In point of fact, the condition of the country being what it is, but for prevention there would be a considerable traffic in foodstuffs from this country to the Continent for the purposes of making money.

Sir Herbert Williams: On a point of order. Do foodstuffs come into these Regulations?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Colonal Sir Charles MacAndrew): I was just thinking of stopping the hon. and gallant Member. We must confine ourselves to the Regulations before the House.

Commander Pursey: With great respect, these Regulations do refer to foodstuffs. To make it clear, I would point out that the foodstuffs in question are those on which there is duty, or where it is possible for them to be sold at higher prices ashore than are charged aboard ship.

Brigadier Clarke: Is the hon. and gallant Member suggesting that the British sailor will "flog" his meat ration for a bit of money overseas?

Commander Pursey: It so happens that in the early days the meat ration of the sailor was such, and his pay was such, that he had to be given the privilege of taking meat ashore to his wife and family. This was due to his low rates of pay. So it is no good the hon. and gallant Member trying to lure me out of order on that point.
Now let me get back to the question of the declaration whether an individual is a smoker or a non-smoker. This is not the first time that serving personnel in the Navy have had to declare one way or the other. Apparently it has not registered on hon. Members opposite that they have always had to declare whether they were teetotal or not for the same reason, in regard to grog—to confine the supply of grog, which is covered by these Regulations, as far as possible to those who were going to consume it, instead of "flogging" it. In that case, they were paid a money allowance in lieu. So, there are three factors, and anybody reading HANSARD tomorrow would assume from the speeches of the mover and seconder of this Motion that something entirely new had been introduced to the disadvantage of the serving personnel; and that is absolute nonsense.
Now we come to smuggling. Hon. Members opposite should know very well that commanders-in-chief have, for a very long period now, warned the Navy that unless this smuggling was stopped, personnel were likely to lose advantages—not part, but all their concessions. If there was one commander-in-chief who took special steps in that direction it was the


Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, next to the hon. and gallant Member's constituency. Therefore, it is just nonsense for him to talk about smuggling going on and asking whether it can be stopped.

Brigadier Clarke: I did not say so at all.

Commander Pursey: It has been stated by commanders-in-chief, by the Admiralty, and by commanding officers that with the increase in the duty on tobacco, and the amount of smuggling going on, there was every likelihood of every concession being taken away unless steps were taken to stop it. It was further stated that the Navy would have to pay the full amount, as civilians, for dutiable goods.
Then the point has been made tonight about duty-free goods being counted when the emoluments of the Navy were settled. Let me tell hon. Members opposite that there is a considerable body of opinion in the Navy which favours the paying of the full price for tobacco, and everything else in that class, in order that those things shall not be a factor when pay is considered. Those who are non-smokers and teetotallers would obviously be in a better position if these concessions were completely wiped out. A higher rate of pay for everybody, when the rates are re-assessed, would be what they want.
Without debating this matter at any greater length, I would say that there is nothing new in this, in principle or in detail. This is a measure which was expected by the Service, and a large number of senior officers, commanding officers and ratings are now getting concessions continued which they had every reason to expect would be taken away; and to suggest that there is any dissatisfaction with the reasons for these Regulations is something absolutely fallacious, and something which is absolute nonsense.

Mr. Fort: Before the hon. and gallant Gentleman sits down, can he make it a little clearer to an ordinary land-lubber like myself that the Navy is not now losing a concession which it has enjoyed for a good many years?

Commander Pursey: What concessions are they losing? Does the hon. Member mean tobacco, spirits, or what? He asks me a hypothetical question, but what does he think they are losing? I thought that

I had said quite plainly that they are now getting more duty-free tobacco than for a considerable number of years. They are losing practically nothing, except that there has been a reduction in the amount previously approved. That amount, and the present amount, is in excess of what it was for a considerable period of years; these Regulations will give no dissatisfaction at all.

10.50 p.m.

Captain Soames: We have listened to a speech by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) which was as partisan and in many ways just as far from the point as was the speech of the Foreign Secretary which we listened to earlier this evening. This is not a partisan point. I, for one, would not like to see this Statutory Instrument annulled, but there are one or two points in it which could be improved and which would be of benefit to the Royal Navy.
I agree that this Statutory Instrument came about as the result of the second Report of the Committee of Public Accounts and also that it arose from the fact that a compromise was made in order to ensure that various shore-based naval establishments would have the benefit of duty-free cigarettes. In order to bring that about, this rationing was brought in on board H.M. ships. What I do personally object to—and I think there is a strong feeling within the Navy on this point—is that officers and ratings have to sign this declaration. When a man enters in service, he does not have to sign a document saying he will be loyal to his King and country, but now, in 1950, a man in the Navy is expected to sign a document that he will not give a cigarette to a shipmate.
What is all this about? I agree that it is necessary in order to achieve this compromise that cigarettes be rationed and that only a certain number of cigarettes can be sold per month to each man on board H.M. ships. But why stipulate that he has to be a habitual user of tobacco? One has not to sign a document to say one is a habitual user of sweets to get a sweet ration. One has not to sign a document and promise not to give one's sweets to one's children before being allowed to draw one's sweet ration. Why cannot it be arranged that ships carry a certain amount of cigarettes sufficient to give 600, or whatever it is, cigarettes a month to all


the ship's complement. Those taken are taken and those that are left are left.
But one is introducing something that is quite foreign to the Royal Navy in bringing in these Regulations. One is forcing a man—upon the lower deck or even officers who are very strong smokers—to get hold of a friend and say to him, "You don't smoke much but sign on as a habitual smoker and I will have your cigarettes." It would be better if nothing of this sort existed at all. If the Government feel that it is necessary and they refuse to take it away, I feel most strongly that something should be added at the end of the document, where it says, "I promise it is for my own personal use and that it will not be given away, sold, or otherwise trafficked," to the effect, "except to other Royal Naval personnel on the same ship," or some such words.
It is very hard to make a man sign a document that he swears he will not give a duty-free cigarette away to a shipmate who is scrubbing the deck. Personally I should like to see this struck out. The Financial Secretary is aware that it is a rule that is going to be disobeyed. Well, why create rules that are going to be disobeyed? Do let us scrap it or add a Clause in order to make it not illegal. Let us say that a man is not breaking his word or his bond, to which he has put his signature, in offering a cigarette to a shipmate, which has never been a crime in this country before. Why make it one now?

10.55 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Marshall: I only wish to address myself to one point in this Statutory Instrument and it is similar to what my hon. Friend has been saying. With regard to this question of the habitual smoker, I want to put a question to the Financial Secretary, and I hope that when he answers he will address himself to it.
No doubt the Financial Secretary is aware of the view that Mark Twain expressed, that "smoking is the easiest thing to give up in the world because I have done it 5,000 times." Was he an habitual smoker or not? I am putting that question to the Financial Secretary because to make a man sign an oath that he is not, in fact, to give a cigarette away is starting a practice whereby you will get other signed declarations that mean some-

thing disregarded altogether. It is the principle of the thing with which I am concerned, and I trust that the Financial Secretary will look at this matter in a very reasonable way.

10.56 p.m.

Brigadier Clarke: Recently the hon. Member for Bedford and I, with other officers, went out on an exercise with the Navy and we saw the impact of these Regulations arriving while we were out on the exercise. They caused great alarm and despondency. The men did not mind the number of cigarettes they were allowed; that was a reasonable number, and they were not grumbling about the quantity of cigarettes or tobacco allowed; but they did object to making the Navy into a form-filling bureaucracy somewhat like we have ashore here after five years of Socialist Government.
One might say, as the Parliamentary Secretary said when I spoke to him, that this was interpreting the Regulations without proper and reasonable sense, but there will be people who will do such a thing. There will be people who will interpret these Regulations wrongly and an officer is perfectly within his rights, if he sees a man hand out his cigarette case, to say, "You signed a certificate to say that you would not give cigarettes away." The Navy man should not be put in the position that he cannot give a cigarette to a shipmate or a girl friend on shore or to anyone else when he wished to do so.
All this is making life for the sailor extremely and unnecessarily complicated. Is this the thin edge of the wedge? Will there be further instructions such as this? Is the number of cigarettes to be halved next time? If this kind of Regulation on cigarettes is to be brought in, how do we know whether there will be one bottle of gin at a future date? This is the thin edge of the wedge; the Treasury are trying to deny to the sailor what has been his due for years.

Commander Pursey: You cannot get a bottle of whisky.

Brigadier Clarke: I think we should get rid of some of the paper-work attached to these Regulations. The Navy would not mind if that were ended. I say, allow them to continue having the amount of cigarettes and tobacco now allowed, and I ask the Parliamentary


Secretary to the Admiralty to cut out the paper-work and trust the Navy.

11.0 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Douglas Jay): It is only because of the well-known bashfulness of my hon. Friend the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty that I intervene tonight, because I am sure he is much better qualified to do so than I am.
I much appreciated, if I may say so, the spirit in which the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) introduced this Prayer. He did not, I think, seriously question the purpose of these Regulations, or claim that the amounts embodied in them were seriously wrong. He recognised that we are extending the scope of this privilege to a larger number of establishments, and I think to 6,000 more persons than enjoyed it before. This is, of course, a valuable privilege. It enables the personnel in category A, the sea-going vessels, to get 20 cigarettes a day in the case of the blue liners at a price of 5d. for 20 as against the 3s. 6d. which the ordinary member of the public pays.
The hon. and gallant Gentleman first asked me whether these Regulations— and indeed the whole scheme—were confined to home stations. That is the case. Naval ships in overseas stations are entirely outside the arrangement. They are treated for these purposes just like merchant vessels, and I can assure him that there is no question of any action affecting their privileges in this matter. Secondly, he asked me about category B, where the ration is 1¼ lb. and not 1½ lb. in the period. The distinction is this. Category A consists of vessels of the Home Fleet and ancillary vessels. Category B consists of sea-going vessels not included in category A; that means, in effect, Coastal Defence, training craft, and other vessels of that kind in home stations.
The main point raised was the question of this undertaking that the individual is an habitual user. The actual words in the declaration—which is not part of the Regulations we are now considering but part of an Admiralty Fleet Order which, whatever we do, is subject to decision and revision by the Admiralty —are "I am in the habit of", and so on. I do not myself feel that needs a further

definition. I should have thought it was a matter of common sense, which could be left to the individual, to decide whether or not he was in the habit of being a smoker. It is the case that the old-age pensioner who gets the tax concession for tobacco also has to sign a declaration of this kind, and I think that generally that has proved a reasonable working arrangement.
The hon. and gallant Member for Gosport and Fareham (Surgeon Lieut. -Commander Bennett) painted a rather lurid and disturbing picture of abuses which he found already springing up in the first week or two of this scheme. Well, I hope he was exaggerating; I hope he was being unfair to some of the personnel concerned. If practices of that kind were to break out on a large scale the whole of this scheme would, as I see it, be in danger.
After all, there is another side to the matter. It was the Public Accounts Committee in 1948 who first raised this matter and laid a duty on the Government, and in particular on the Treasury, to do something about it. In their Report the Public Accounts Committee said they
hoped that steps will be taken at the earliest possible date to define by statute the conditions under which issues of tobacco…may be made to the Navy without payment of duty. The increase in the duty on spirits and tobacco during and since the recent war has, of course, greatly enhanced the value of these concessions to the Navy and has given an additional incentive to smuggling and black-market activities. Your committee were glad to learn that the Admiralty and Customs and Excise Department were examining this aspect of the problem with a view to deciding whether existing safeguards were adequate.
I think that in those circumstances we were bound to do our best to elaborate a scheme which would, so far as we could forsee, provide against abuses.
It is, after all, a scheme of duty-free tobacco, food, wines and spirits, which is costing the general taxpayer about £8 million a year. Therefore, we are bound to include these safeguards in it, and if at any time they appear not to be working well, it is obviously not impossible for them to be re-arranged or revised. I should like finally to assure the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) that there is no question whatever in our minds of any further reductions or this being the thin edge of the wedge or anything like that.

Commander Maitland: Could the hon. Gentleman tell us whether there will be a saving or not owing to these Regulations, and if so how much?

Mr. Jay: On balance I think the calculation is that had this change not taken place the cost would have been £10 million. The cost now will be £8 million.

Lieut. - Commander Baldock (Har-borough): Paragraph 3 of this Statutory Instrument says:
There Regulations shall apply to goods of the following descriptions,

(a)food, and
(b)tobacco,
which are supplied to any of H.M. Ships specified in Article 4 (a) and (b) of these Regulations or to the Admiralty at a Naval Victualling Yard or Depôt for distribution to any of H.M. Ships specified in Article 4 (a), (b) or (c) …
Can the hon. Gentleman tell us whether these naval shore establishments will be able to get duty-free the proprietary brands of tobacco and cigarettes?

Mr. Jay: I am assured that the Admiralty victualling yards will be able to get the proprietary brands.

Lieut.-Commander Baldock: Will they supply them?

11.7 p.m.

Commander Noble: We are most grateful to the Financial Secretary for the speech he has made. After the Finance Bill, he is used to functioning at this hour of the night and at even later hours. I am, however, a little disappointed at what he has told us, which refers to the subject rather broadly, and I am hoping that his hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty is going to get up in a moment and fill in some of the gaps that have been left.
Two points remain outstanding in this debate. The first is the amount of tobacco. The hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) rather confused the issue, because if my memory serves me right one can have 1 lb. of duty-free tobacco at home and 2 lbs. abroad. At the same time there was nothing to stop an officer buying as many duty-free cigarettes in the ward room as he wanted or a rating buying as many duty-free cigarettes as he liked in the canteen. I hope we shall have that point made clear.
The new regulations would confine the duty-free tobacco and cigarettes on board. Presumably if a man has taken out his duty-free allowance there is nothing to stop him going to the canteen or the ward room and buying more cigarettes and more tobacco at ordinary shore prices. Therefore, one might very well reach the situation described by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bedford (Captain Soames) where a person offering his cigarette case would say "This side duty-free, that side shore-priced." We are going to get into a rather ridiculous position.
The other point I want to make is in regard to this signing. The Financial Secretary did not say very much about it. An hon. Member on the other side of the House quoted the ordinary rum issue as rather illustrating this point, but it does not. If a man decides to take up his rum issue, he gets his rum; if he does not, he gets a certain amount per day in lieu. That is a very different thing from saying that he is a smoker or not, because he is going to get no advantage whatever for not being a smoker. How often is he to have to sign this declaration—every month or at certain intervals? We have not been told anything about that at all. As my hon. and gallant Friend said, is he to have to sign when he gets married or when different circumstances arise?
If one really thinks about this signing, there are many difficulties. Is there to be any criterion applied to the smoker? Men have to apply and get permission to grow beards. Are they to have to give any outward and visible sign of their smoking? In the old licensing regulations, a person could get a drink after certain hours only if he had a statutory sandwich; is there to be a statutory smoking or a statutory cigarette? In the recent nightclub legislation, licences were only to be allowed if there was dancing after a certain time. I honestly think that this signing is really a rather complicated matter which has been treated very lightly.
Finally, there are the three cases raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden. The Financial Secretary did not mention the W.R.N.S. and the Marines; and there is also the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, which, so far as I can see, does not


come into any of the categories mentioned tonight. If we are to have any more explanation from the Government Front Bench, I hope they will give further consideration to this matter. We do not intend to press this matter to a Division, but we should like to have a little more information.

11.13 p.m.

Sir Herbert Williams: I had not intended to take part in this debate but for the unnecessary comments of the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), who started talking about the smuggling of food. That led me to study this topic. The Regulations state:
'Food' means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs.
I rather regret the absence of Lady Astor from this House, because that definition would have horrified her. I wonder what kind of food the hon. and gallant Member meant. What kind of food can be smuggled by people who leave this country for not more than six days? I interrupted him about food. I do not think he can tell me of any kind of food that would come under the terms of these Regulations.

Commander Pursey: Surely the hon. Member realises that coffee has a considerable value in France, because of its low price in this country and the better quality. One of the things that the Customs have had to take particular care to try and avoid is the smuggling of coffee and other foodstuffs out of this country.

Sir H. Williams: Paragraph 3 deals in specific detail with tobacco, and paragraph 4 makes a reference to paragraph 3 and speaks of Regulations for consumption. Do I understand it is now the practice of the Navy to supply coffee in tins or bottles, and that that is what they sell abroad? I cannot find anything in the Regulations that bears out his contention. I have never served in the Navy, but I have served in the Merchant Navy, which has not these advantages.

Commander Pursey: Does the hon Member think they sell coffee in bricks?

Sir H. Williams: I thought they supplied it in cups: I do not know what kind of coffee the hon. and gallant Member has in mind. It is a stupid thing to

ask a man to declare his morals. In the old Chamber I heard countless speeches about men "genuinely seeking work." Any man in the Navy will declare that he is a smoker if he wants to get this, and why not?
I should like to deal with the constitutional aspect. I think Parliament ought to control all regulations. According to paragraph 9, it would seem that if we approve this document the Commissioners can do all sorts of things over which we have no control. I think it is wrong that after we pass on Regulations like this they can be superscribed later on in various ways and what becomes the law is not challengeable in this House.
That is the constitutional issue I wish to raise. I think it is quite improper that some statutory declaration, which is not attached to this document and does not appear in the Schedule or Appendix, should be demanded. When an Order is brought before Parliament and conditions are attached to it which may be varied from time to time, it ought to be provided that these should be published so that this House could challenge them in the way these Regulations have been challenged tonight.

Commander Pursey: Nonsense.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I wish to endorse what has been said from these benches. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury answered a number of the questions put by my hon. Friends, but a great many were left unanswered. No answer was given about the W.R.N.S., or about the Royal Marines, or about the signing of the declaration. I hope the Government will consider the views expressed from these benches in regard to this declaration. I wonder if the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty will consider answering the purely naval questions put during the debate to the Government Front Bench.

Mr. Jay: When the hon. Gentleman rose I was about to answer one or two of the questions which the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) asked me. He asked about the Royal Marines. They are included if they are in sea-going vessels or in naval establishments ashore under naval discipline. As the hon. and gallant Member thought, the W.R.N.S. are excluded as


not coming under the Naval Discipline Act. The Royal Naval College, Greenwich, is not included, but that is under consideration.

Captain Ryder: I said at the beginning that we are in broad agreement with the main principle of these Regulations. We brought forward the Prayer in order to extract explanations on a number of points, and although we have not had all of them explained, we are grateful to the hon. Gentleman for answering a number of them. With the permission of the House, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— [Mr. Wilkins.]

11.20 p.m.

Mr. John Grimston: In the early days of railways and roads rules had to be formulated for the safe operation of the new forms of transport. Aircraft control has now reached a stage where similar rules must be put into force to ensure the safety of air travel, and in this connection I wish to discuss for a short time a signalling system whereby aircraft entering a congested area, or flying on a busy air thoroughfare such as leads to and from London, can do so quickly without danger of collision in any weather conditions.
It is right that at the commencement of a new system of this kind we should broadly review the experience so far obtained, because we are to a large degree pioneering in this field. The problem is very much more complex in the case of aircraft than in the case of railway or road traffic, because, among other reasons, the aeroplane cannot stop when it gets into doubt or difficulty. In this country we have, the worst weather in the world to contend with, we have the first jet air-liner with its special problems; we have aeroplanes flying into congested areas, such as London, with varying ranges of speeds, from the helicopter with a zero speed at certain times, to piston engined aircraft ranging from 150 m.p.h. to 350 m.p.h. and the jet airliner with speeds of 500 m.p.h. or more.

In a short time it is impossible to cover more than a few of the problems that confront us, and therefore I will refer to only two specific aspects—the strategic and the technical or tactical. There are two main methods by which one can control or signal aircraft. One is the positive method: the other is the supervisory. Carrying the analogy to the car or railway, the railway train is controlled entirely by the positive method. It is controlled by visual signals at every few hundred yards. Its direction is
controlled by the rails and its speed by the rate at which it passes each signal. Supervisory control is where a motor car is driven on the left of the road. This is the rule of the road, and it is assumed that if one is conforming to the rule it is reasonably safe.
The American solution to these controls is to adopt the positive control at an early stage in approaching a congested area. This means there is great disadvantage for the operator of the aircraft, for the pilot and for the Government. The operator must accept a heavy burden in the equipment that such a system entails. The pilot must be au fait with an extremely complex organisation, with its risk of mechanical and human failure always inherent in it. Consequently, from the operator's point of view, positive control has much against it.
From the Government or political point of view, it is a very expensive matter, and no doubt Ministries, whatever their political complexions may be, will always be under great pressure to cut their expenditure. Despite the American solution, which is bound to have great effect on our policy, I believe that positive control should apply only in the final stages of the aeroplane's approach to the landing ground and that we should devise a simple, safe and cheap system of our own based on radar supervision.
The first step is to invest air traffic controllers with much stronger powers than they have at the moment, to empower them to refuse to accept, except in emergencies, aircraft which are unable to conform to their pattern. At the moment, these controllers have not these powers and must therefore accept, for example, an aeroplane flying into London which is determined to use some obsolescent procedure of its own which will involve


considerable delay. This delay, which must inevitably take place in these circumstances, means that possibly 30 or 40 airliners following during the next two hours or more will be delayed and the whole traffic pattern upset. Therefore, I think that much stronger powers must be put into the hands of air traffic controllers.
As a corollary, I think that the procedures at present in operation, both by air traffic controllers and aerodrome controllers, are capable of simplifications, some of which I shall mention later. From the strategic point of view, it should be a maxim that nothing should be said over the radio-telephone which could have been said verbally or by land telephone line beforehand, or which could be signalled by visual signals at the end of the runway, or taxi or perimeter tracks, and so on. It is still possible when flying round London to hear people ordering taxis or meals, or dating girl friends and that sort of thing, on operational V.H.F. frequencies. It is the cluttering up of these radio frequencies which is imposing great strain upon the capacity of aerodromes to cope with the present situation.
Let me turn for a moment to some of the more technical or tactical points. The present system falls easily into two parts. The first part is the actual airway or corridor itself; and the second is the method of approaching the aerodrome. Whatever system of final approach is adopted, the new projection of airways or corridors along which aeroplanes fly has in my opinion come to stay. These corridors extend from one reference point to another, and flying along them is simple.
But four points of principle ought to to be put right. The first is that no point of an airway should be below ground level. If one is in an airway, one wants to find some air. I have pointed out to the Parliamentary Secretary one instance where an airway passes through the top of an extremely dangerous mountain, which is well known to all aviators in the north of Scotland, into which many aircraft have flown with fatal results.
The next point is that no airway should pass through a danger area. There are three cases where existing airways do this, and there are three cases where projected airways pass through live danger areas.

The third point is that the reference points of the airway should be such that, particularly at times when the greatest accuracy and concentration is required from the pilot, the method of presentation of the reference point should be as nearly automatic as possible. It should not involve a lot of manual juggling as does a certain kind of point represented by what is known as the Kilburn intersection in London and the Dalry one at Prestwick. There, the operator, to find his position, must be continually switching about to find where he is when his attention is wanted on his instruments.
My fourth point is that a solution has still to be found to the practice which permits R.A.F. jet fighters to cross these airways without prior permission. In this connection, the present compromise is better than the original position, but I should like the Parliamentary Secretary tonight to say that he can give an assurance that that point is still very much to the fore in the mind of the Ministry.
So much for the airways themselves, which are already reasonably simple; but not so simple a matter is the entering of a zone such as that around London. These airways should, in my view, stop at an outer circle surrounding London which would form a waiting zone for aircraft wishing to enter the London zone. Inside this outer circle should be an inner circle around which there would be one-way traffic flying at one speed only.
To use the car analogy again, let us imagine Ludgate Circus with no traffic lights and with heavy traffic going by at a minimum speed of 30 miles an hour and all the hazards of vehicles passing to and fro at all speeds in a criss-cross pattern. My solution is to have a large roundabout instead of any direct right-angled crossings. This system would mean that an aircraft approaching London would be free to come in at its designated height to one of a number of holding points in the outer circle.
One series of radio messages would authorise a pilot to leave this position at a specified time and join the inner circle or one-way traffic lane around London. As all aircraft in this ring would fly at one specific speed, the pilot could turn off the ring with no risk of collision and land direct at his destination with no further messages. Among other things, this would


greatly reduce the number of radio telephone messages that it is now necessary to give. The effect of freeing these radio channels would be greatly to economise the cost both to the operator and to the Ministry.
Let me mention that three years ago it was possible to fly round London with one frequency, two years ago with four, but that now one has great difficulty on ten channels. One can hardly get around on those, but sets are being built with as many as 140 channels. While on the question of V.H.F. frequencies, there is one other improvement which needs to be made, and that is to provide one special frequency to cover the whole country and, if possible, the whole of the Continent, which light civilian aircraft could call their own.
There should be a special corridor for jets; this would be a further advantage of my one-way system of traffic around London, and could be very simply introduced. This problem of handling jet civilian airliners is a very real one and ought to be overcome. The Comet for example, if it goes into service on the Atlantic, may very well start its approach to London Airport miles west of Ireland. The need for exact timing is very great, because a jet aircraft has very little reserve of fuel at low altitude and must, therefore, land almost immediately on its arrival.
To sum up, therefore, we have too many competing systems of control in operation at the moment, with the result that the expense of air travel is rising to the consumer and to the Government, and the complexity of the equipment needed is imposing a serious burden on the operating companies and on the aircrews. We need to define again the system we hope to see in operation in five years' time, which should be basically that the aircraft is responsible for finding its own way, subject to radar surveillance only, to a particular point to which it has been permitted to fly, and that when it gets there at a specified time it should join a simple roundabout system of one-way traffic, again subject to radar surveillance, so that the only positive control, which is an expensive one, that the aircraft need be subjected to is on the very final part of its approach to the aerodrome in bad weather.

11.36 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Mr. Beswick): We have had most interesting and informed observations from the hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Grimston); indeed, in one sense they were too well-informed, because he touched upon such detail that I really felt we should be better employed around a committee table discussing them than in this Chamber. The hon. Gentleman himself said how complicated it was trying to sort out the traffic in our skies, but when he went on to give some of his own simplified suggestions, I think, that if we really got down to it with a map and considered all the details he would see that the so-called simplified one-way pattern, which has been put up to us before, was so complicated that the delays and the dangers its details would involve would mean that the simplified roundabout system he described is no better than the system we are developing at the present time.
However, we appreciate the hon. Gentleman's comments and his criticisms. We will look at them. I do not know of any Government Department that has taken such trouble to consult the industry, the organisations, and the representatives of users than my own Department of Civil Aviation. What we have done has received the agreement of these different organisations, and from time to time we review progress, invite criticism, invite complaints, and we have meetings to consider in what way we can bring about developments and improvements in the present system.
Within the short time available, I will try and deal with some of the detailed points the hon. Gentleman raised, of which he was good enough to give me some prior notice. His first complaint was that although we have consistent minimum heights for airways throughout the system there are odd points on some of the airways at which the lowest safety height is above the minimum airways height.
In particular, the hon. Gentleman asked me why we do not avoid a certain area in the Isle of Arran as well as certain danger areas in the other airways systems. The fact is that to get a pattern of airways which is at all straightforward, which avoids all danger areas, all moun-


tainous areas, all defence aerodromes, and so on, would involve such a zig-zagging business that it would nullify the whole airways system. If the hon. Gentleman tried to draw a straight line across our comparatively small country to avoid all these areas he would find it was not practical planning.
We have tried to avoid the danger areas as far as possible. The Service Ministries have given us the fullest cooperation, and in some cases have moved their areas of operation or closed them down altogether. In those cases where it is necessary to pass over a danger area every precaution is taken to ensure that the pilot is aware of the safety height, and in the case of firing areas the air traffic control centres have contact with the firing control centres to ensure that firing is reduced to a minimum or stopped altogether when an aircraft is actually passing overhead.
With regard to the Arran spot height about which the hon. Member was asking, the airway takes the direction it does in order to pass over a point on which it is possible to erect a radio beacon—that is, in fact, the only practical site for providing a beacon. If we were to increase the minimum height for the entire airway it would raise certain difficult problems of control. The only way of providing control whilst the aircraft were climbing or descending to the minimum safety height of 4,500 feet would be by considerably extending the aerodrome control areas, which in this particular case is not possible for various reasons.
The hon. Member also pointed out that the spot height is not shown on the procedural map, but the document to which he refers is a diagram; it is not a map, and spot heights are not normally shown. However, I can see the difficulty to which he calls attention, and I will see if it is possible to publish these documents with a clear indication of the minimum safe cruising altitude where that is higher than the base of the airway. I hope that that will meet the point he has raised.
Then there is this very important new problem of fitting jet aircraft into the present airways pattern. When the present system was drawn up we had very closely in mind the difficulties that would arise when jet aircraft came along. We have now had a fair amount of practical

experience. The operators and the manufacturers have given valuable co-operation with trials and experiments with both the Viscount and the Comet, and so far it does seem that there will be no difficulty in controlling the jet machines.
Some adjustments may of course be necessary, and there will have to be some improvements in certain equipment. What we shall need is the closest liaison between the Uxbridge Control Centre and the Radar Unit at London Airport. What I think we shall eventually achieve is a liaison to the point of complete integration, probably on the one site of the Uxbridge Control Centre and the Radar Unit at London Airport. I hope very soon that we shall be able to announce plans for a completely new and enlarged Radar Unit at London Airport.
I think the hon. Member spoke rather too optimistically about the possibility of simplifying V.H.F. frequencies. If by that he means reducing the number of frequencies, I am afraid he is overlooking the ever-increasing number of functions and services which have to be performed by radio. No one would be happier than we would to reduce frequencies, because the ether space available to us is so confined for the elaborate and manifold aids, services and communications which we have to provide that we have considerable difficulty in pressing them into these confined bands.
I do not quite follow what the hon. Member had in mind in talking about a common V.H.F. frequency for light civilian aircraft, though I do sympathise with him in his desire to reduce the weight of equipment in light aircraft and to simplify the work of the private flier. We just could not afford a separate frequency for the private flier at airports catering for different categories of fliers. What I think we might do, and what I think we should consider, is having a common frequency for those aerodromes which cater only for the private flier and light aircraft. Even there, if aerodromes were fairly close together we should have to consider the problem of interference of one with the other.
As regards the Kilburn intersection, we have got a traffic junction at Kilburn. People do not realise the very important spot above there. It is rather difficult to mark it out, and we should like a beacon.


We have not a frequency for the beacon, and in any case there is difficulty in siting it. I hope we shall solve that in the course of time, although, as I say, I think the hon. Gentleman is exaggerating the problems that arise.
I was asked what progress has been made in keeping military aircraft, especially jets from public airways. We have an agreement with our Service colleagues that military aircraft not covered by radar surveillance will cross the airways at right-angles and at the appropriate quadrantal heights between 3,000 and 5,000 feet. There is no intention of changing this arrangement. If any progress is to be made it will be in the direction of ever-improving discipline, and if there are any specific examples of trouble of which the hon. Member can give me details I will have inquiries made.
Those are the detailed points that I understood the hon. Gentleman to make. If I have missed any points, perhaps he would be good enough to write to me. I will have a look at his speech in HANSARD tomorrow and follow up anything I have overlooked. I would say in conclusion that I am not complacent about these airways that we have developed. On the other hand I do feel that what we have achieved so far is something which stands to the credit of those officers who have been responsible for their creation.
One reason why the airways have achieved the undoubted success that we can claim for them has been because so much trouble has been taken in consultations and discussions with the users. In about a month's time we shall be having another full meeting with all the users concerned as to the extent of control which should be exercised over pilots of aircraft passing along these airlanes. It was not so very long ago, as I remember very well, that there used to be strong protests if anyone suggested that there should be any control of the pilot from the ground.
That state of affairs is passing, and the most interesting and healthy development is that some of the pilots are now asking that there should be a closer and, as the hon. Gentleman described it, more positive control, certainly along, these congested airways. That is a good thing. It may be that we shall be criticised for not going quickly enough, but we have been very anxious to carry the pilots along with us. I think that we have had great success, and if we listen to the kinds of constructive suggestions made by the hon. Member and others we shall, between us, develop a traffic control above our skies which will be to the credit and ensure the safety of all concerned.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twelve Minutes to Twelve o'Clock.